Security awareness by online banking users in Western Australian of phishing attacks by Utakrit, Nattakant
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
Theses: Doctorates and Masters Theses 
2012 
Security awareness by online banking users in Western Australian 
of phishing attacks 
Nattakant Utakrit 
Edith Cowan University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses 
 Part of the E-Commerce Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Utakrit, N. (2012). Security awareness by online banking users in Western Australian of phishing attacks. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/503 
This Thesis is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/503 
Edith Cowan University 
  
Copyright Warning 
  
 
  
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose 
of your own research or study. 
 
The University does not authorize you to copy, communicate or 
otherwise make available electronically to any other person any 
copyright material contained on this site. 
 
You are reminded of the following: 
 
 Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons 
who infringe their copyright. 
 
 A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a 
copyright infringement. Where the reproduction of such material is 
done without attribution of authorship, with false attribution of 
authorship or the authorship is treated in a derogatory manner, 
this may be a breach of the author’s moral rights contained in Part 
IX of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
 
 Courts have the power to impose a wide range of civil and criminal 
sanctions for infringement of copyright, infringement of moral 
rights and other offences under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, 
for offences and infringements involving the conversion of material 
into digital or electronic form.
  
Security Awareness by 
Online Banking Users in Western Australian of Phishing Attacks 
 
 
by 
Nattakant Utakrit BBA, M. Info Sec 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Information Technology 
 
 
 
 
Faculty of Computing, Health and Science,  
Edith Cowan University, 
 
Mount Lawley Campus 
 
 
 
 
23rd February, 2012 
USE OF THESIS 
 
 
The Use of Thesis statement is not included in this version of the thesis. 
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Phishing involves sending e-mails pretending to be from the legitimate financial 
institutions to recipients and asking for personal information such as username and 
password. It also redirects network traffic to malicious sites, deny network traffic to web 
services, and modify protection mechanisms in the targeted computer systems. 
Consequences of successful attacks can include identity and financial losses, and 
unauthorised information disclosure.  
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the experiences of Western 
Australian bank users in using online banking. The study considered the relationship 
between the background of the Western Australian bank users and their experience in 
using online banking security. The research analysed phishing through case studies that 
highlighted some of the experiences of phishing attacks and how to deal with the 
problems. Emphasis was placed on knowledge of phishing and threats and how they 
were actually implemented, or may be used, in undermining the security of users’ online 
banking services. The preferences and perspectives of Western Australian bank users 
about the deployment of online banking security protection and about future online 
banking services, in order to safeguard themselves against phishing attacks, are 
presented. The aim was to assist such Australian bank users through exploring potential 
solutions and making recommendations arising from this study. 
 
Research respondents had positive attitudes towards using online banking. 
Overall, they were satisfied with the security protection offered by their banks. 
However, although they believed that they had adequate knowledge of phishing and 
other online banking threats, their awareness of phishing attacks was not sufficient to 
protect themselves. Essentially, the respondents who had experienced a phishing attack 
believed it was due to weak security offered by their banks, rather than understanding 
that they needed more knowledge about security protection of their personal computers. 
iv 
 
Further education is required if users are to become fully aware of the need for security 
within their personal online banking.  
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 CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Background of the study 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2011) reports that 83% of Australian 
households had access to a computer at home in 2010-11. It explains that computer 
access at home is more common in higher income areas in State and Territory capitals. 
Figure 1 .1 shows the categories of use of the home computers in 2010-11 in Australia.  
 
Figure1.1 Personal internet use at home, by activity (a), 2010-11 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011) 
 
Of the 13.3 million people who reported accessing the internet at home, paying 
bills online or online banking was the third most common activity (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2011). This spread of home computer ownership has meant that businesses, 
especially banks and financial institutions which wish to reduce the need for direct 
customer interaction with staff, have used the Internet to develop services and provide 
cost effective online banking systems. Banking organisations are not only trying to 
support customers’ online transactions and gain new customers, but also to protect them 
while they operate in the cyber world (Singer, Baradwaj, Flaherty, & Rugemer, 2012). 
Even if online banking and other services have been introduced to make customers’ 
lives and businesses’ continuity more secure, threats to online banking are still common 
(Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2010a). 
 
Image is not available in public access version 
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1.2 The significance of the study 
The Internet has become one of the common attack channels that criminals use 
to gather valuable assets, such as customer details and confidential bank information, in 
order to paralyse online businesses and Internet users by using simple social engineering 
attacks (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2007). One of the main concerns is identity 
theft; while customers are online, criminals may try to gain sensitive information and 
use it to attack individuals and organisations. Types of attacks include social 
engineering, spreading malware, and phishing. (More specific definitions of these terms 
will be provided in Chapter 2). 
 
While engaging in transactions on the Internet may seem to be private matters 
between senders and receivers, eavesdroppers might be listening to the communications. 
Breaches of privacy and access to confidential information may take place without 
users’ awareness or consent. Inexperienced users may not be aware that they are liable 
to attack if they have not implemented adequate security measures. Recognition of the 
need for up-to-date security measures is an essential component of any self-protection 
undertaken by government, businesses and individuals.  
 
1.2.1 Where is the phishing targeted? 
Phishers deceive online users or mislead users with different techniques to gain 
unauthorised information with the purpose of stealing money. A detailed explanation of 
phishing techniques is provided in the second chapter of this thesis. The extent of 
phishing has increased due to the availability online of phishing tools and free hosting 
services, thus it is causing large losses for companies and customers (James, 2008). 
Phishing has become the most common threat to Internet users and web services. Martin 
Brinkman’s blog (2012) shares the security company Avira’s list of brands which 
experienced the most phishing attacks in 2009. It is significant that banks and other 
financial services, such as eBay and PayPal, were the most heavily targeted. Two 
Australian banks, the Commonwealth Bank and the National Australia Bank, are 
included in the list, as are international banks operating in Australia, such as HSBC and 
Citibank (Brinkmann, 2009). 
3 
 
Phishing attacks have increased in almost every industry all over the world. 
Statistics about the numbers of phishing attacks in particular countries are difficult to 
estimate beyond the fact that they have been increasing. A report from Symantec in 
2010 shows the statistics of country of targeted brand industries in logarithmic scale as 
shown in figure 1.2.1. 
 
Figure 1.2.1 Numbers and types of phishing attacks per country in 2010 
(Symantec, 2010) 
The brand industries that phishing sites spoofed were categorised based on the 
country where the brand’s parent company is based (Symantec, 2010). As appears in the 
graph, the major target of phishing attacks was banking, spread throughout all countries 
except China where e-commerce was a primary target and banking seemed not to appear 
in any sector. Organisations targeted in Australia were banks, other institutions not often 
being attacked.  
 
In the United States, Gartner Inc.’s survey found that more than 4,500 online US 
adults, representative of the online US adult population in August 2007, lost money to 
the successful attacks by $3.2 billion (Gartner, 2007). “Of consumers who received 
phishing e-mails in 2007, 3.3% say they lost money because of the attack, compared 
with 2.3% who lost money in 2006, and 2.9% who did so in 2005, according to similar 
Gartner surveys during those years” (Gartner, 2007). Similarly in the United Kingdom, 
 
Image is not available in public access version 
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the amount of money lost and damage caused by phishing activities rose by 14%; 
criminals targeting victims from the Internet banking systems (Bachelor, 2010). This 
increase has not been seen only in the larger countries like the US or the UK. Many 
Australian national banks, such as the Commonwealth Bank and the ANZ Bank, have 
suffered the impacts from phishing attacks when the phishers have targeted customers 
via the Netbanking service (Sharma, 2010). The Anti-Phishing Working Group (2010b), 
figure 1.2.2, reported that the percentage of computers infected (unstated the district) 
with banking Trojans and password stealers, in other words desktop crimeware, 
increased to 17.58% in quarter 2 from 15% in quarter 1 of 2010. The percentage of 
downloader activities rose from under 8.3% to almost 8.4 % in quarter 2, whilst 
malware infection was the top phishing activity at 74.05%. 
 
 
Figure 1.2.2 Percentages of desktop crimeware infections cause by phishing attacks in 
quarter 2 in 2010 (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 2010b) 
 
1.3 Aims and research questions 
It is essential for online businesses, banks and financial institutions to develop 
secure systems to protect their millions of online users worldwide from unwanted risks 
and breaches of the confidentiality of users’ information. However, responsible bank 
customers who are aware of the dangers are able to contribute to their own security. 
 
 
Image is not available in public access version 
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The major aim of this research is to analyse the extent to which Western 
Australian people who use online banking and conduct online financial transactions are 
aware of the dangers associated with phishing attacks. An evaluation of their knowledge 
about such crimes may enable the subsequent publication of advice which will help 
many to avoid financial loss and the effects of identity theft. More specifically, this 
research aims to investigate the 
(i) experiences of Western Australian bank users in using online banking, 
(ii) relationship between the background of Western Australian bank users and 
their experience in using online banking security, 
(iii) users’ understanding of phishing attacks and effective countermeasures, 
(iv) preferences of Western Australian bank users in the deployment of online 
banking security protection, 
(v) perceptions of Western Australian bank users about future online banking 
and to determine what they would prefer from banking services in order to 
safeguard themselves against phishing attacks. 
 
This study therefore aims to answer the following research questions: 
1. What are the factors which lead people to use online banking? 
2. What are users’ opinions of online banking systems? 
2.1 What are users' opinions about the available online banking authentication 
systems? 
3. Are users of online banking taking adequate steps to secure their online 
transactions? 
4. What levels of knowledge do users of online banking have about phishing? 
4.1 Do bank customers believe that banks are taking adequate steps to prevent 
phishing attacks? 
4.2 What could be the vulnerable point that leads online banking users into 
phishing attacks? 
4.3 Do users have enough knowledge to be able to distinguish a legitimate bank's 
e-mail and website from a fraudulent one? 
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1.4 Organisation of this thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters: 
Chapter 1 presents the background, significance and purpose of this study. This 
chapter also identifies the research questions. 
Chapter 2 will include a review of the relevant research literature, which outline 
the theoretical underpinnings of online banking and phishing, current issues associated 
with phishing, and phishing techniques that could attack banks’ users. 
Chapter 3 will outline the research method and research design used to conduct 
this study. 
Chapter 4 will present the analysis of collected data from the survey. 
Chapter 5 will comprise of the analysis of the data in the context of the primary 
and supporting research questions, leading into the recommendation of the findings 
based on their research questions. 
Chapter 6 will consist of the concluding of the research and the potential for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This literature review aims to define the terminology associated with malicious 
attacks on online banking systems, specifically phishing attacks. It will evaluate the 
literature about such attacks, without being restricted to any specific locations. It will 
also consider various means by which attacks may be delivered to the laptops and 
telephones belonging to customers of online banking. Finally it will examine the 
literature which analyses customers’ awareness of means by which they may protect 
themselves against identity theft and financial loss. Ways in which banks may assist 
customers to broaden their awareness of protective measures will be detailed.  
 
2.2 Defining online transaction and activities including online banking threats 
This section discusses terms and definitions of online banking transactions and 
activities, online banking threats and other related terminology. 
 
2.2.1 Online transaction activities 
Some common terms are used quite often in association with online transactions, 
such as e-business, e-commerce, e-payment, e-banking and online banking; the 
differences between them are clarified below: 
 
Electronic business (e-business) describes the activities when technology is 
involved in business processes (Northern Territory Government of Australia, 2012). E-
business includes sending e-mails to staff or suppliers ("Understanding E-business," 
n.d.), performing online transactions, using internet based interactions for selling goods 
to consumers, monitoring and exchanging information, auctioning surplus inventory and 
collaborative product design ("E-business versus e-commerce," 2012). 
 
Electronic payment (e-payment) refers to the automated process of exchanging 
monetary value among parties in business transactions and transmitting this value over 
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the information and communication technology (ICT) networks (Ayo & Ukpere, 2010). 
It is a system in which financial information can be held, processed, received, and 
transferred in a digital form. It consists of users, issuers such as banks and financial 
institutions, and regulators who are involved in its potential impact on the wider 
economy via monetary instruments. However, “E-payment may be treated as a protocol 
among the payer, the payee and their respective Financial Institutions (FIs)” (Raja, 
velmurgan, & Seetharaman, 2008, p. 6). Examples of e-payments such that electronic 
cash, electronic check, electronic traveller’s check (Wang, Yang, & Paik, 2011), secure 
electronic transactions (SET), secure socket layer (SSL), and modern credit card 
transactions (Raja, et al., 2008).  
 
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) is defined as transaction activities between 
firms and individuals which involve in the exchange of money, good or duties (M. 
Hasan & Harris, 2009). It involves online transactions such as shipping, billing and 
payment information. E-commerce is a partnership of consumers as payers, merchants 
as payees and their respective financial institutions (Raja, et al., 2008). 
 
Electronic banking (e-banking) is defined as the automated delivery of new and 
traditional banking products and services directly to customers through electronic and 
interactive communication channels (Salehi & Alipour, 2010). E-banking includes 
telephone banking, NetBank (Internet Banking), mobile phone applications, BPAY and 
BPAY view, ATM, Debit MasterCard, key card (debit card), EFTPOS terminals, 
Maestro/Cirrus, MasterCard and Visa Plus networks, AFT (Automated Funds Transfer), 
and Deal direct (Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 2011). 
 
Online-banking or Internet-banking is used for a  new age banking system with 
the internet technology as a delivery channel to conduct banking activities (Singhal & 
Padhmanabhan, 2008). The system supports customers who prefer to manage their 
finances, such as money transfers, bill payments, personal information updating, and 
balance checking via the Internet, from anywhere, and at any time when that access is 
available. This service is becoming more helpful because bank branches alone are no 
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longer able to offer services to meet the needs of today’s highly demanding and 
challenging customers (Bradley & Stewart, 2003 cited by Qureshi, Zafar, & Khan, 
2008).  
 
2.2.2 Online banking threats 
The following threats are claimed in association with online transactions, such as 
e-business, e-commerce, e-payment, and online banking; the differences between them 
are clarified below: 
 
Phishing is a jargon, another type of scam. It comes from the analogy that 
Internet scammers use e-mails to ‘fish’ Internet user for personal identity (Anti-Phishing 
Working Group, n.d.). Phishing may have developed its tactics from money laundering 
based on electronic transfers. The process of transferring funds through electronic 
messages between banks is known as wire transfers and was first declared as a crime 
under the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 of the U.S. Code (Raja, et al., 2008). 
Phishing employs social engineering and subterfuge techniques to steal consumers’ 
personal identity and financial account credentials (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 
2007). It also refers to an act of an Internet swindler who uses e-mails to lure Internet 
users by asking for password and financial data. Phisher may also send a SMS to 
consumers which seems to come from legitimate businesses, normal banks or other 
financial institutions or telecommunications providers (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2012). 
 
 Malware is a term for any malicious software which enters system without user 
or system authorisation (Vinod, Laxmi, & Gaur, 2009). It can also be defined as a 
software that is harmful to other software and possibly and indirectly control other 
hardware by (affected) driver application (Kramer & Bradfield, 2010). It is designed to 
infiltrate a computer system without an owner’s informed consent (Queensland. 
Department of Education, Training and Employment Policy and Procedure, 2012). 
Malware has ability to infect other executable codes, files, boot partitions of drives. 
Malware can modify data, disclose confidential information, monitor and transfer user’s 
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information to the software sender. Malware includes Trojans, adware, spyware, rootkit, 
virus, worm, botnet and backdoor. All these terms are defined in the Appendix A. 
 
Social engineering definitions can be drawn upon several social psychological 
aspects. According to Kessem (2012) claims social engineering is involved with a route 
of persuasion as below: 
• A central route to persuasion, which involves the recipient thinking 
about the message. 
• And a peripheral route to persuasion, relying on superficial clues within 
a message to get a person to purposefully not think - but rather react 
emotionally and react immediately. 
• Again, neither is new. That peripheral route to persuasion has been and 
still is, vastly used in confidence scams and in telemarketing fraud. 
 
It also means an art of persuasion (Mosin Hasan, Prajapati, & Vohara, 2010) that 
allows an attacker to detour technical controls and attack human in an organisation 
(Major, 2009). Some common techniques used in social engineering include: 
persuasion, reverse social engineering, shoulder surfing, dumpster diving, phishing e-
mail, and phone phishing. It can be summed up that the concept of social engineering is 
an attempt to elicit a victim into provides information for illicit purposes. Cyber 
attackers use social engineering, phishing, and malware to commit online crimes 
especially in online banking services with the purposes of identity fraud and money 
transferring. The issue of online banking attack is becoming more serious to financial 
institutions and their customers.  
 
2.3 Current issues of the exploited vulnerabilities in online banking 
Going to a branch or ATM or paying bills by paper cheques, mailing them, and 
balancing a cheque book, are all time-consuming tasks. In today’s world of emerging 
technologies, enterprises are relying more on the Internet for business. People are 
adapting e-commerce applications for their day-to-day needs. Meanwhile, banks and 
financial institutions have cost-effectively provided faster and more convenient online 
banking services so customers may do their business anywhere an Internet connection is 
accessible. It is both an opportunity and a challenge to traditional banking and has 
become a necessity for many customers. 
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2.3.1 Is bank really a target by phishers? 
The numbers of phishing and malware threats attacking customers increase 
every year. While the picture just painted generally depicts the impact on larger 
financial institutions, community banks are not immune. More phishers are targeting 
clients because of the ease in achieving. According to a cybercrime researcher, 
international organised crime groups launched the first wide-scale phishing attacks in 
2003 on the customers of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, one of Australia's 
major banks (Sharma, 2010). Online banking services, such as Netbank, were the 
channels used to target the bank’s customers. The attack was carried out by sending out 
a mass of e-mails, which attempted to persuade customers to provide their credentials. 
The following banks targeted by attacks were the ANZ bank in April 2003, the Bank of 
America in May and Westpac in July (Sharma, 2010).  
 
The number of people who use online banking and have experience in online 
banking attack has increased. Australian Bureau Statistics (2010a) disclosed that in 
identity fraud cases in the 12 months prior to the survey, 3% or nearly half a million 
(499,500) people in Australia were victims of identity fraud, of whom 54% of the 
victims were male and 46% were female. More interestingly, just over 800,000 
Australians aged 15 years and over, which equated to 5% of the population, were 
victims of at least one incident of personal fraud in the 12 months (Australian Bureau 
Statistics, 2010a). 
 
The fraudulent e-mails and websites that created by phishers are intended to 
deceive users into disclosing personal information (Mell, Kent, & Nusbaum, 2005). 
Information such as user names, passwords, social identification, credit card details, 
bank accounts, and date of birth are the personal identity details frequently sought by 
phishers. Phishers can also install malware and attacker tools to detect users’ computer 
and mobile devices for data recording and unknowing of data transferring and send it 
back to the senders. These stolen identities may also be used to commit further crimes; 
for instance, they may enable phishers to avoid being caught by the police if they use the 
stolen identity as a suspected perpetrator during illegal activities. 
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Cyber criminals attempt to bypass the security measures employed by the bank 
and aim to attack the banks’ customers instead because they are an easy target which 
could be compromised easily. The technique used is often a social engineering attack 
that is used to trick people to reveal confidential information. Users’ computers were 
infected with malware every 20 minutes, in which each of the infected computers hosted 
3.5 threats; these were defined mainly as actual malware or clues that a successful attack 
had been launched against the machine (Keizer, 2011). In addition, Keizer (2011) 
mentioned that Java-based exploits were one of the top 10 threats which created 
vulnerability in users’ computers. Not only financial services staffs have experience of 
phishing attacks, end users also have more chances to get attacked from phishing. The 
research found that 7% of victims that were compromised the website was used for e-
merchant purposes (Piscitello, 2011). In addition, Security Week News ("ZeuS-Style 
Attacks Trump Phishing as Greatest Threat to Online Banking," 2010) revealed a survey 
which was conducted in November 2010, included responses from financial services 
professionals at more than 70 banks about greatest threat to online banking that: 
 
Real-time attacks from online banking Trojans (ZeuS, Clampi, etc), also referred 
to as man-in-the-middle attacks, are seen as the greatest threat to online banking today 
for more than half (51%) of survey respondents, and 69% indicated an increase in the 
frequency of these attacks over the last 12 months. In fact, 37% of respondents or one-
third of data stealing were attacked by Trojans (Phifer, 2010) which was the most 
prevalent type of online banking attack. The following threats were worms, phone 
frauds, diallers, and other forms of malicious codes (Phifer, 2010). 
 
The above information is showing that more than one attack method was 
successful in compromising or accessing online banking service illegally. Phishing e-
mails may not only mimic themselves to unidentical look to bank’ e-mails and ask 
customer’s information but also attach malicious codes or malware to silently install in 
user’s computer if they open the infected e-mail besides. Some of the common threats 
were discussed as they were part of the interview question. Also, it shows the 
significant of phishing threats to online banking users. More details about threats that 
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are associated with online banking attack on the client side are discussed below. 
 
2.4 How users get attacked by phishers? 
There are many types of phishing attacks. Even though the forms may vary, the 
purpose of the attack is the same. The following paragraphs describe some common 
techniques of phishing that could harm online banking users. 
 
2.4.1 Phishing e-mails  
“According to McAfee, 95 percent of phishing e-mails pretend to be from 
Amazon, eBay, or banks. Targets can also be seasonal (e.g., IRS) or capitalize upon 
social trends (e.g., Facebook)” (Phifer, 2010). Phishing e-mail uses social engineering 
techniques to compromise recipients with interesting or fear-causing subject lines or e-
mail content, for example password disclosed, money lost, or work from home and get 
$200 a day (Nattakant Utakrit, 2008). Other common motivators and emotional e-mail 
subjects include tax refunds, greetings from lottery winnings and 419-scam deals, false 
accusations from tax frauds, curiosity searching people, fake order confirmations from 
online merchants or shopping sites, fake e-mails from banks and financial institutions 
(Kessem, 2012). 
 
Recently, the American Banker Association reported that an online miscreant 
used automated diallers, text messages and e-mail to lure bank’s customers into entering 
their credit card information due to the fraud alert closed account (Moscaritolo, 2012). 
Recipients may respond to the sender with the required information because of fear or 
interest. As soon as e-mail addresses have been obtained, phishers may use 
communication channels such as e-mail, instant messaging, and web page to launch the 
phishing attacks by using social engineering technique. The phishers must impersonate 
their victims by using trusted sources such as the help desk of banks or automated 
support responses from the victims’ favourite online retailers in order to create 
credibility for the forged messages. 
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2.4.1.1 Spoof E-mails with false senders 
Spoof e-mail is one of the common techniques. E-mail pretends to come from a 
legitimate bank or someone the recipient knows, informs recipients pretended to be an 
e-mail alert of someone has left a message or in the guise of confirmation notification 
(GMA Network Inc., 2012). E-mail content asks the user to identify their status with 
user’s account number, pin number, or credit card number through the friendly 
automated bank’s operation system. Trend Micro reported ways that fake messages use 
sender addresses which appear legitimate starting with confirm@... or noreply@...,for 
example (GMA Network Inc., 2012). Cases in which e-mail addresses are adjusted, they 
may be either modified via the top level domain (eg., from .com to .net) or by adding an 
additional letter to the user’s name (eg., abcd@abc.com to abcdd@abc.com) or in an 
addition to changing a letter into a number or vice versa (eg., abc@0123.com to 
abc@.O123.com) (Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center & 
Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2012). This spoof e-mail can cause a problem to 
customers if banks choose to send e-mails to contact their customers for any issues.  
 
A case was found in 2009 when a bank’s customer clicked on links within a 
phishing e-mail that pretended to be from the legitimate bank that customer was a 
member. She claimed that her bank always sent e-mails to their customers regarding a 
security upgrading. As a result, more than $550,000 was transferred from her account to 
various accounts in many countries. This crime is known as a ‘wire transfer’(Financial 
Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center & Internet Crime Complaint Center, 
2012). This incident happened even though the bank had ‘two-factor authentication 
using digital certificates for its online banking portal’, the phisher was able to 
circumvent bank’s security measure (McGlasson, 2010).  
 
2.4.1.2 Spoof E-mails with HTML attachment 
Although the number of phishing e-mails attached with malicious attachments 
has been decreased (Help Net Security, 2012), yet they are still significant because of 
the increasing in sophisticated phishing attacks. Phishers have combined social 
engineering attack and malicious code to entice customers into clicking the attached file 
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and providing users’ credentials. A new class of cyberattack is threatening e-mail that 
infects users’ computers without openning an attachment (Cole, 2012). Users do not 
need to open the attached file, as soon as the e-mail is loading to open, it downloads 
malicious software into their computers automatically. 
 
Help Net Security (2012) reveals the way that attackers avoid built-in phishing 
detection installed in customers’ computer browsers by “attaching HTML version of 
banking websites to e-mails rather than linking victims to bogus banking sites”. The 
spoofed webpage which is attached in the e-mails can avoid the HTTP GET, which 
formed as a link, to the phishing site, thus the attached file cannot be detected by the 
browser (Mendrez, 2011, October 4). The upper level of phishing e-mail contains a 
HTML e-mail attched which automatically downloads malware and stores into users’ 
computers when the e-mail is opened (Cole, 2012). The HTML attachment may be 
inserted with the malicious JavaScript that exploits the customers to Trojan software to 
steal their information (Internet Crime Complaint Center's (IC3), 2012) or the 
information can be collected and sent over to the phishing’s server using the HTTP Post 
Request method (Kulkarni, 2009). 
 
Cole (2012) claims from a security company that uers can avoid phishing e-mails 
by switching all security settings in e-mails to maximum, and updating browsers to the 
latest versions. In fact, there are more types of phishing can attack users especially bank 
customers. Techniques and tools used are more sophisticated and consequence in more 
severe impacts. One of the most successful technique is ‘man-in-the-middle attack’. 
 
2.4.2 Man-in-the-middle attacks 
Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks occur when an attacker acts as a gateway in 
the traffic stream (Callegati, Cerroni, & Ramilli, 2009) and compromises the connection 
between clients and legitimate servers. While performing the attacks, the attacker may 
monitor and record confidential information such as usernames and passwords, bank 
account details, or social security numbers. In addition, they can alter information or 
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relocate the destination of information or finance away from the user’s intended site. 
Specific types of MITM are discussed below. 
 
2.4.2.1 Web spoofing 
Phishing attack through websites is more sophisticated than phishing e-mails. It 
needs various techniques and tools to induce customers into believing that they are 
accessing to the legitimate bank websites. This may enable phishers to record users’ 
information more easily.  
 
 A man-in-the-middle through web spoofing claimed by Hyde (2012) where he 
mentions this severe attack to HSBC bank’s users with a total fraud of £22.6 million in 
2007, rose up to £52.5 million in 2008, £58.7 million in 2009 and £46.7 million in 2010. 
It resulted in 32% year-on-year fall in the first six months of 2011. Even though the 
bank customers had used a new ‘Secure Key and Barclays’ PINentry’ authentication to 
protect crimes, a new virus was found over the ordinary anti-virus protection. The 
attacker sent malicious codes to masquerade as a real bank website and lure customers 
to participate the ‘upgrade security system’ training. There was no doubt for unwitting 
customers to get money stealth by signing in the system. This attack was discovered 
further once the users opened an e-mail, the hidden virus was immediate resided in their 
computers without opening the attached file. 
 
This is another form of MITM in which the attacker can install malicious 
software known as a Trojan horse on the user’s computer, monitor the victim’s activity 
and record usernames and passwords (Wells, Hutchinson, & Pierce, 2008) from the 
online financial website. The Trojan horse infects a user’s computer; its malicious 
program is installed in the browser and then waits for the browser to be opened before it 
begins operation. The intruder will filter the website and target the links to online 
banking. The attacker waits until user logs in into their account and performs money 
transaction in which the amount of money and the destination of the recipient can be 
manipulated without user consents as shown in figure 2.4.2.1 (Nattakant Utakrit, 2009).  
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Figure 2.4.2.1 The form of man-in-the-browser attack (Nattakant Utakrit, 2009) 
 
Another MITM attack revealed by Higgins (2012) about the phishing tool ‘Zeus 
and SpyEye’ bypassed the two-factor authentication such as SMS and withdrew funds 
from a victims’ account without monitoring the process. This attack is called an 
‘automatic transfer system’ (ATS) in which the attack used WebInject files to create 
pop-up windows and conducted a wire transfer. The attacker employed a phony login 
page to bypass the authentication once the log in process was achieved, and sent a 
message to invite the victim to participate in security training with bank’s upgraded 
security system. The victim was asked to provide the information and make a fund 
transfer and confirm his transaction using the mobile confirmation code. 
 
2.4.2.2 URL spoofing  
 The attackers mislead client’s connection to a phishing proxy server instead of a 
real server. Example of URL spoofing with the spelling mistake or misplaced of a root 
domain can be illustrated below: 
Legitimate domain = www. moneybank.com.au 
Mimic domain example 1= www.moneybank.au.com 
Mimic domain example 2= www.nnoneybank.com.au 
The above example shows that the root domain of the original bank is misplaced 
from .com.au to .au.com in mimic domain example 1. Similarly, the word ‘money’ is 
replaced with ‘nn’ (lower-case of alphabet N is used twice). If the customers do not 
check the URL carefully or do not type the full domain name manually and carefully 
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every time they visit their bank, they may fall to phish easily. One technique that the 
phishers also use to lure bank customers is replacing the domain name by an IP address 
to hide the domain name of the visited website (Gastellier-Prevost, Granadillo, & 
Laurent, 2011). For instance, a URL address: http:// 74.220.215.65 instead of 
http://volleyballplayerz.com/ which is a phishing website that fakes Natwest bank site 
(Gastellier-Prevost, et al., 2011). 
 
Many web browsers have included authentication information such as username 
and password in the domain as URL://username:password@server/resource.ext. 
Phishers may use this URL syntax to “create a hyperlink that appears to open a 
legitimate website but actually opens a deceptive website” (Microsoft Support, 2012) by 
adding @ and targeting website after the original website. In addition, this syntax can be 
used to automatically send username and password fields to a target organisation that 
supports the basic authentication method (Microsoft Support, 2012). For example, the 
phishers may trick customers to believe that they are visiting the legitimate ‘Commbank’ 
website; therefore, the replacement would be, username = commbank, password = e-
banking, and the target domain name is moneyonline.com. As a result, the entire format 
of the URL would be http://commbank.com:-ebanking@moneyonline.com/.  
 
Another technique found in phishing attack is URL shortening. Phishers may use 
URL shortening service to shorten the URL which may contain malware or lead 
customers to the phishing sites (Gibson, 2011). For example, a URL address:  
http://www.phishingyoutobanksite.com.au has a length of 39 characters. The phishing 
may user TinyURL web service to shortening the characters into 26 characters as: 
http://tinyurl.com/c22yn36. By clicking the URL, customers are routed to a webpage 
which looks like the legitimate bank login page. URL spoofing also can be exploited by 
redirecting a website from an original link to a destination link, for example 
http://originalweb.com/redirect.html?q=http://destination.fake.com/destination_page.h
tml became location=http://destination.fake.com/destination_page.html; with the 
redirect script. A URL redirect or URL redirection usually refers to when a web page 
redirects to another web page as soon as it is loaded. This technique is useful if the 
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content on user’s page has moved to another page according to the code that use to load 
a page are the same. However, the attackers are successful using this technique when the 
victim visits a malicious webpage, or receives a malicious e-mail message (Babu, 
Bhaskari, & Satyanarayana, 2010). 
 
2.4.2.3 DNS spoofing 
Domain name system (DNS) is a resolution service which helps users to locate 
computer and other resources easily on a TCP/IP based network (Microsoft, 2011). 
Basically, the system host files contain domain match information to various types of 
data such as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses (Microsoft, 2011). When a user wants to 
access a website, the machine sends a request to DNS to get an IP of the particular 
domain. Once the request is sent to the server, it will match the pattern of the IP request 
with its host name in databases and sent the request back to the user’s browser with 
readable mode of host name such as www.abcdf.com.au. DNS spoofing is performed by 
the attackers to make a DNS entry to point to another IP (Singh, Sharma, & Kumar, 
2012). To perform a spoofing attack an attacker will introduce forged DNS information 
into the cache of a domain server (US-CERT, 2008). The DNS spoofing allows a router 
to acts a proxy DNS server and replies to any DNS queries using either the configured 
IP address in the IP DNS spoofing or the incoming interface for the query (Singh, et al., 
2012). In other words, he or she can create obstacles to traffic routing by infusing false 
IP addresses into real domain names as displayed in figure 2.4.2.3. The DNS protocol 
contains a transaction ID of 16 bits wide requires up to 32,768 attempts to predict the ID 
field (US-CERT, 2008).  
 
20 
 
 
Figure 2.4.2.3 DNS cache poisoning (TCT Solutions, 2011) 
 
DNS cache poisoning then modifies the IP address and redirects the user to the 
attacker server. DNS cache poisoning may cause an incorrect domain server connection 
and thereby a malicious attack on the clients. In addition, it may use redirect techniques 
to transfer the wrong traffic connection to attack the clients. Once the user’s computer is 
controlled, the attacker can create a malicious file to embed inside the computer and 
start monitoring and stealing the user’s confidential information. 
 
Example of DNS attack claimed by Zorz (2012) occurred when Latin American 
bank customers were constantly attacked by the phishers duped the customers to 
download a Trojan that redirected them to the phishing sites. The phishers installed 
Trojan quietly contacted another domain to retrieve a Host file that was used to redirect 
customers to the legitimate bank sites to the phishing counterparts instead. 
 
2.4.2.4 HTTPS spoofing  
One of the challenged attacks is exploiting Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure 
(HTTPS) on the address bar which tends to rate high on severity scale. HTTPS is a 
protocol for secure communication that adds a sub-layer of security under regular HTTP 
application layering through a secure socket layer (SSL) or transport layer security 
(TLS) protocol connection (Sharpe, 2008). Many online banking systems employ a SSL 
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and a transport layer security TLS protocols that use to authenticate web server and to 
establish a cryptographically secure channel between users’ browser and the web server. 
HTTPS is widely-used for e-business or e-commerce websites such as eBay, Amazon, 
e-payment such as PayPal, and e-banking such as Internet banking. However the 
effectiveness of HTTPS depends on the robustness of browser or server software 
(Sharpe, 2008). Poor customers who rely on the HTTPS evidence (https://) may be in 
risk of phishing attack by providing their confidential data to a malicious website that 
looks similar to the real website (Kolsek, 2011). Figure 2.4.2.4, most people consider 
HTTPS-based (port 443) data exchange is safer that HTTP-based (port 80) because 
when the protocol is secure, the lock symbol (Callegati, et al., 2009) and sometimes 
comes with the green highlighted covered the padlock area appear in the clients’ address 
bar. Kolsek (2011) mentioned that the spoofing URL may be noticed by the hawk-eyed 
if the left pad lock is grey instead of green for the valid HTTPS addresses. Also, 
HTTPS:// starting in the URL may less likely to notice the absence of a lock icon 
because the web browsers are different.  
 
HTTPS can be compromised by the attackers in bypassing HTTPS security 
warning as the attackers exploit the integration of SSL/TLS into the browser and 
browser’s presentation of security-relevant information to the user without breaking the 
cryptographic model (Kolsek, 2011). Online banking security’s system relies on a valid 
certificate that initiates the SSL/TLS connection to the fact that HTTPS cryptography 
can secure page contents from modifications (Prandini, Ramilli, Cerroni, & Callegati, 
2010). Certificate Authorities (CA) are companies that issue a variety of SSL certificates 
for the organisations and individuals to purchase (K. Thomas, 2011) to authenticate 
websites (Babu, et al., 2010; Fung & Cheung, 2010; K. Thomas, 2011). “Digital 
certificates are documents that combine a public key and an identity” (Seltzer, 2009, p. 
9). 
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Figure 2.4.2.4 Extended validation secure socket layer differences in various web 
browsers (Online Trust Alliance, 2011) 
 
Certificate Authorities (CA) are companies that issue a variety of SSL 
certificates for the organisations and individuals to purchase (K. Thomas, 2011) to 
authenticate websites (Babu, et al., 2010; Fung & Cheung, 2010; K. Thomas, 2011). 
“Digital certificates are documents that combine a public key and an identity” (Seltzer, 
2009, p. 9). The very basic certificate is used to ensure that the company is the same one 
that registered the domain whereas the more rigorous certificate, which is the extended 
validation certificate is required to prove the physical location of the company in the 
real world (K. Thomas, 2011). With such a different level of CA, the organisations who 
use the basic certificate may fail to man-in the-middle attack. Investigations have shown 
that 531 fraudulent certificates were issued from DigiNotar (McAfee® Labs™, 2012), a 
Dutch Certificate Authority.  
 
A case of man-in-the-middle-attacker compromised Comodo, the second largest 
CA in the world was found in March 2011 claimed by David (2012). Moxie 
Marlinspike, computer security researcher said that the attacker was found when he 
made a connection to the Comodo website. He was trailed back to the Hak5 website 
where he previously visited for a video on using SSLstrip tutorial. The attacker followed 
the video tutorials on the internet to begin hacking and was able to make off with a 
 
Image is not available in public access version 
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number of rogue certificates such as mail.google.com, login.yahoo.com and Skype 
(David B., 2012). Another attack was found when Stuxnet and Duqu worms used rogue 
certificates to evade detection (McAfee® Labs™, 2012) as well as Flame malware that 
used forged Microsoft certificates. The compromised CA shows that there is no 100% 
security on cyber space even though the clients may believe that the certificate is from 
the trustworthy company.  
 
Forms and channels of attacks have been spread to phone based attack, from the 
traditional as landline device to a smart mobile devices such as smart mobile phones and 
iPads. 
 
2.4.4 Phones based technology attacks on online banking 
In the early 1970s, Jon Draper invented an emitted device called ‘Blue Box’ 
which was known as ‘phone phreaking’, to hack telephone systems; hacking allowed a 
user to control the phone switches for free long distance calls or to bill calls to someone 
else’s phone number. Phishing began to be used in the 1996 by hackers who were 
stealing America On-Line (AOL, an American global online Internet services and media 
company) accounts by scamming passwords from unsuspecting users. Phishing has 
become increasingly popular, and has developed since 2006 from simply stealing AOL 
dialup accounts into an ominous criminal enterprise (Anti-Phishing Working Group, 
n.d.). 
 
Vishing or phishing VoIP, another variant of phishing is known as voice-
phishing, which is a method that combines phone-based social engineering and the 
development of low-cost VoIP, to attack users over the phone. The combination of an 
Internet Protocol private branch exchange (IP-PBX) system with a VoIP telephone 
service requires minimal hardware; a sound card, speakers and a microphone, and a 
cheaper calling rate with downloadable free software such as Skype or Asterisk to set up 
with in a small business ("Why VoIP Should Get VIP Treatment in Your Small 
Business," 2008). VoIP service can be used to make both national and international calls 
between two computers or from a PC to a landline, or have a VoIP account on a mobile 
24 
 
phone while the VoIP number can be used from any country where a broadband Internet 
connection is available. “Many VoIP systems are rich in features. Some common 
features include: off-site call forwarding, extension dialling, voice-mail boxes, audio 
conferencing, and auto attendants to answer the phone and direct calls” ("Why VoIP 
Should Get VIP Treatment in Your Small Business," 2008). 
 
In addition to phone phishing, the Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA) 
(2011) warned of a telephone survey scam which is using its name in an attempt to 
defraud bank customers. The bogus survey telephone operator may inform the person 
that they are completing a customer satisfaction survey on behalf of the ABA. The 
phony operator may also ask a series of questions regarding the person’s banking 
provider, such as: name of the bank, membership activating period since, and 
satisfaction with the service. One example is spear phishing which operates when e-
mails release by a legitimate bank have been overwhelmed by forged ones, which is 
likely to become a popular technique. The e-mails contain phony contact numbers and 
ask customers to call back regarding the installation of software and/or confirm the 
details of their accounts. Spear phishing can occur even when an attacker pretends to be 
a member of the organisation and uses an apparently nearby phone number to call a 
customer when it actually comes from across the country or from another continent. 
 
Phone attack is not limiting within traditional connections, with a fast moving 
technology of telephone spreading to mobile device, many mobile phone companies are 
integrating themselves into a smart mobiles. It enables users to entertain with mobile 
applications and be convenience and feel safety with personal mobile banking. iPhone 
application had launched mobile banking when users can deposit a check by taking 
photo of it and be secure with the application that is limited to credit-approved military 
personnel (USAA) customer (Larkin, 2009). Other facilities of mobile banking provided 
by iPhones include: downloading a dedicated program on cell phones, using phones' 
browser to access a mobile version of users’ banks, or simply sending an SMS message 
(Larkin, 2009). The convenience of mobile banking may have a myth of its insecurity 
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when mobile phone may be easy to lose and also get attacked by malware stealing bank 
user’ identity and make a financial transfer. 
 
Malicious mobile code can be programmed with some popular languages such as 
Java, ActiveX, JavaScript, and VBScript. Nimda is one of the best-known mobile worm 
codes. It used JavaScript for multiple infection or transmission methods to e-mail, 
Windows shares, web servers, and web clients. Nimda exploits e-mails by using HTML-
based e-mail to look for e-mail addresses on the host and then sent copies of itself to 
those addresses. Windows Shares is interrupted due to the infected host which contains 
Nimda, of unsecured Windows files shared that is sent from NetBIOS. Whilst, web 
server is occurrence when a vulnerable server is found and get the infected code reside 
in the server (Ruggiero & Foote, 2011). 
 
The act of malware explosion had spread parallel the new mobile technology. 
63.39% of malware that targets mobile device is spyware and 36.43% are SMS Trojan 
(Juniper Networks, 2012). A case of URL spoofing was tested and founded in mobile 
operating systems such as iPhone 4, iPhone 4S, iPad 2 and third-generation iPad, iOS 
5.0 and 5.1 (AppleInsider Staff, 2012). This explosion occurred because of the 
JavaScript code window.open() method that directs a user to a user to a forged 
online banking or shopping site. In addition, a new technology attacking mobile was 
claimed by Hyde (2012) about a Spanish hackers sent a virus to modify customers’ 
mobile phone numbers registered to reinforce customers in receiving the text messages 
passcodes to verify their online payments. Furthermore, Mickey Boodaei, Trusteer CEO 
writers, posed on the Data Chain’s blog ("Mobile Users Three Times More Vulnerable 
to Phishing Attacks," 2012) that users who always leave their mobile status on to read e-
mail messages as soon as they arrive were more likely to be attack by the fraudulent e-
mails. Secondly, users who accidentally accessed phishing websites via BlackBerry and 
iPhone are more vulnerable to phishing website. These are because their personal 
information will be submitted automatically from the second access to the website apart 
from the web appearance in the mobiles which is difficult to spot phishing. Finally, 
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iPhone users are eight times accessed to phishing websites compared to BlackBerry 
because of the market share in mobile business. 
 
What can be seen from the cases is that mobile users are also in risk of phishing 
attack. It is not only because of the mobile browser vulnerabilities, but the trust that 
users have towards mobile security and mobile banking application. The attackers still 
use social engineering and the used of poor mobile security and its weak algorithm that 
allow cybercriminal to gain access and take control of traditional phone and smart phone 
in revealing personal information. Therefore, it is important that additional protection be 
used, such as checking the enterprises PBX (private branch exchange) or call manager 
software to see if it has any capabilities for detecting and filtering repeated calls from an 
outside number. This complements security awareness, policies used, and social 
engineering defensive techniques. 
 
2.5 Why phishing still works? 
Why is this older and well-known threat still so prevalent today? "A few years 
ago, the phishing e-mails and spoofed websites were easy to spot," Baumhof says. 
"Today, it's not so easy. They look legitimate, and end-users are easily fooled." (Kitten, 
2012). Phishing therefore is still one of the top threats on the Internet. Its direct and 
indirect costs tax the global economy with billions of dollars in fraud damages every 
year. 
 
While the level of spam is declined cybercriminals continue to enhance the level 
of sophisticated techniques to get over phishing detection. For example, the combination 
of embedded files or HTML attachment in e-mails (Help Net Security, 2012) with the 
use of encoded JavaScript to bypass the browser protection. In fact there are other 
loopholes that users may fail to beware such as visiting Facebook and Twitter websites 
which may increase the level of phishing unenticingly. In addition, the art of deception 
and persuasion that derived from social engineering concept is still deeply rooted in 
many fundamental social psychology principles and thus its perpetual success (Kessem, 
2012). 
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As the level of trust in the information received is high in the motivation and 
emotion, any topic relating to tax, tax fraud, bank confirmation, security upgrading are 
such influential to financial users. There is no doubt why phishing is still successful. 
According to Microsoft Security Intelligence Report claimed by Kessem (2012) found 
that social engineering tactics had increased to 84.5% in 2011 from 8.3% of all phishing 
attacks in 2010. That means the impact of trust abuse enhance people to be at risk. 
 
Phishing is not a new threat, yet it can be effective especially those who have 
‘bad habits’ (Rashid, 2012), and naïve in security protection. From the incidents it can 
be seen that although the bank has strong and sophisticated security measures to protect 
their customers; failing in bank e-mail policy, user education and user awareness 
practices (Worthen, 2012) can cause a severe impact. This research investigated the 
knowledge about online banking security and their security or alertness in phishing 
threats and ways to mitigate the risks that financial institutions can be serious control to 
strengthen their services and understand what customers need. 
 
2.6 Summary 
Phishing may appear in various forms of attacks, depending on the target, such 
as on bank services or customers. However, this research focuses on the customers’ side 
where the target is weaker and perhaps is more vulnerable to an overwhelming attack. 
Therefore the attack methods phishers use are different. One may be as a file attached to 
customers’ e-mail, or pop-up windows appearing together with a webpage or an attack 
may be embedded in commercial or non-commercial websites. For example, if a 
customer accesses an infected website, the phisher can generate two files to create a 
counterfeit e-mail which could be used to spoof e-mail from the bank and create a 
fraudulent webpage which looks similar to the bank’s actual website. Such pages may 
include attack codes to permit the sending of e-mails from the spoofed page to massive 
lists of addresses, providing a link to a malicious website which requests users to 
provide their personal banking information.  
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This chapter has examined and outlined the issues relating to the online banking 
threats that could have serious impacts on banks’ end users. There are many types of 
cyber threats which could harm users when they are accessing their online banking. 
Each threat performs its unique tasks but they all still work towards similar illegal 
purposes. In addition, phishers or malware use different attacks to gain access to users’ 
computers and cause them problems, particularly targeting online banking. More 
discussion of phishing attack methods will be presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to investigate bank users’ awareness about phishing, 
their online banking activities and their perceptions of the security measures 
recommended and offered by their banks. The selected methodology in this study was 
approached by descriptive research and comparative research. Descriptive research can 
require either or both quantitative or qualitative method to find out ‘what is’, might be 
applied to investigate the collecting questions (The Association for Educational 
Communications and Technology, 2001). Example of descriptive research in this study 
is a survey research where the investigator attempted to examine situations to establish 
the norm under the same circumstances (Walliman, 2006). Comparative research or 
analysis is designed to search for similarity and variance for universals or underlies 
general processes across different contexts (Mills, Bunt, & Bruijn, 2006). It highlights 
differences and similarities between two or more cross-sectional studies, shares the 
same issues of reliability, validity, replicability and generalisability to a 
better understanding of social phenomena (Walliman, 2006). Partial data colleting from 
this survey may be compared the differences or similarities with the similar studies from 
Australian Bureau Statistics, Australian Departmentt of Broadband, Communication and 
the Digital Economy, or from other formal statistics resources within or outside 
Australia where is possible to enhance the data validity and generalisability. The results 
of the study may be used for theory building which may be improved that “the research 
is more able to establish the extent to which the theory will or will not hold” (Walliman, 
2006) under the existing theoretical literature and its practice, and inserting any 
recommendations arise from this study. This chapter includes discussion of the 
following topics: 
Research paradigms and methods, 
Research design, 
Ethical considerations, and 
Limitations of the study 
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3.2 Research paradigm and research methods 
Thomas S. Kuhn’s (1970) philosophical discussion of the nature of the history of 
science introduced the concept of the research paradigm, “a concept [which] has been 
heavily criticized” (Bloor, 1983, p. 313). Kuhn (1970, p. 23), in introducing “paradigm” 
as “an accepted model or pattern” attributes the acceptance of a paradigm by a 
community of researchers to its success in “increasing the extent of the match 
between ... [accepted] facts and the paradigm’s predictions” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 24) and by 
further development of the paradigm itself. One accepted use of the term is as a “model 
or a framework that is derived from belief systems of individual knowledge (ontological 
assumption) and existence or multiple realities” that could be acquired (Olson, 1995, 
Dobson, 2002 quoted by Krauss, 2005) or, more simply, as “a holistic approach 
underlying a research methodology” (Kassim, 2001 quoted by Hamid, 2006, p. 92). 
 
Quantitative and qualitative research paradigms are commonly described as the 
basic frameworks for academic social researchers, although the distinctions between the 
two must be understood. The goal of quantitative research is to “measure and analyze 
causal relationships between variables within a value-free framework” (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994 quoted by Sale, Lohfeld, & Brazil, 2002, p. 44). On the other hands, 
many qualitative researchers believe that a qualitative approach can make it easier to 
understand any phenomenon that needs to be viewed within its context (Krauss, 2005). 
“For example, statistical data collected from a quantitative method can often shape 
interview questions for the qualitative portion of one’s study” (Hesse-Biber, 2010, p. 5).  
 
3.2.1 Quantitative research  
In general, quantitative research focuses on the numerical form of data obtained 
from the participants. Examples of quantitative data include the number of items 
recalled, reaction times, or the number of aggressive acts (Psychology Press Ltd., 2004). 
Thomas (2006) defined the quantitative approach with a survey method: “Quantitative 
surveys aim to measure demographic and personal attributes, living conditions and 
circumstances, behaviour, opinions, attitudes, values”. Sample sizes in quantitative 
research are much larger than those used in qualitative research because it is necessary 
31 
 
to ensure that a representative sample can be used (Carey, 1993 quoted by Sale, et al., 
2002). Research questions using quantitative methods ask participants the same 
questions and offer choices between answers, so that the gathered data can be used in 
statistical analysis (Mersdorf, 2009). Quantitative methods thus use statistical analysis to 
measure data from a large number of respondents. Examples of quantitative research 
methods are questionnaires/surveys, pre and post examinations and interrogation of 
existing statistical databases (Center for Civic Partnerships, 2007). Statistical modelling 
is used when researchers are measuring descriptive statistics and inferential statistics to 
find the distribution of central tendency, variability, and skewness (Center for Civic 
Partnerships, 2007).  
 
The aim of the quantitative components of this research is to identify the extent 
to which a gap exists in terms of respondents’ experience of security precautions. In 
particular, this is also to evaluate their knowledge and behaviours in accessing online 
banking with their current authentication methods and to identify their expectations 
about the security systems that they should be offered through their banks’ websites.  
  
3.2.2 Qualitative research  
Qualitative research, on the other hand, aims on “experiences of participants and 
on the stated meaning they attach to themselves, to other people, and to their 
environment” (Psychology Press Ltd., 2004, p. 4). It also emphasises processes and 
meanings based on interpretivism and reality constructivism (Sale, et al., 2002). The use 
of meticulous qualitative research methods can improve the quality of data measuring, 
the comparative quality reports dissemination, as well as quality improvement efforts 
(Sofaer, 2002). According to Hayllar and Veal (2000 quoted by Nattavee Utakrit, 2006, 
p. 27), qualitative research methods are “concerned with collecting information which 
does not involve numbers. They typically focus on a small number of people, to be able 
to provide important information (Sale, et al., 2002), and produce large amounts of 
information about these people.” Techniques used in qualitative studies include in-depth 
and focus group interviews, case studies, and participant observations (Sale, et al., 
2002). Qualitative research is used for any method other than the survey such as 
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observations, interviews, focus group discussions, the collection of primary materials 
include transcripts, documents, photographs, sketches, and video or tape recordings. 
 
The purpose of the qualitative aspects of this research is thus to gain insights into 
respondents’ perceptions and knowledge about online banking threats and the security 
implementations of online banking systems. The sample group is selected from bank 
clients in WA who use and/or wish to use Internet banking. The purpose is to collect 
information about bank clients’ attitudes, thoughts, behaviours in order to know how the 
group (Lanthier, 2002) as a whole thinks and what they understand about phishing 
attacks on Internet banking systems. So that the sample group represents the whole 
population (Neill, 2003), participants in this research were selected randomly from 
people of different ages, genders, and careers.  
 
3.2.3 Mixed methods research 
Mixed methods have been used widely in research projects, to assist the 
researcher to consider research questions from different perspectives. In practical 
research, mixed methods research combines quantitative and qualitative data gathering 
and analysis to achieve answers to research questions (Hesse-Biber, 2010). There are 
several reasons why qualitative and quantitative methods can be combined. Firstly, the 
two approaches can be combined because they share a unified logic (King et al., 1994 
quoted by Sale, et al., 2002), and the goal of understanding the world people inhabit 
(Haase and Myers, 1988 quoted by Sale, et al., 2002). An example of a way that 
quantitative method is used to help explain qualitative findings is revealed in the 
following sentence: “The observation that women are reluctant to participate in exercise 
is qualified by a survey which reveals that it is older women who participate least” 
(Stecker, McLeroy, Goodman, Bird & McCormick, 1992, quoted by Nattavee Utakrit, 
2006). Secondly, achieving similar results may be merely a matter of perception. In 
order to synthesise results obtained via multiple research methods, people often simplify 
the situation under study, highlighting and packaging results to reflect what they think is 
happening. They may combine two or more theories or sources of data from cross-
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validation or triangulation to study the same phenomenon, in order to gain a more 
complete understanding of the research (Denzin, 1970 quoted by Sale, et al., 2002).  
 
3.3 Research Design 
Selecting the right investigative methods is an essential part in a developing an 
appropriate research design. A research design, which is a function of the research 
objectives, is defined as “…a set of advance decisions that makes up the master plan 
specifying the methods and procedures for collecting and analysing the needed 
information” (Burns & Bush, 2002 quoted by Hamid, 2006, p. 120). An appropriate 
research design is vital as it determines type of data, data collection techniques, and 
sample group, and approximate duration of data collecting. Primarily, it helps to align 
the planned methodology to the research problems (Churchill & Iacobucci 2004; 
Malhotra 1999 quoted by Hamid, 2006). 
 
To achieve its objectives, this study was conducted in eight phases. Phase one 
was an exploratory study, including a literature review. Phase two focused on designing 
techniques and tools to be used in the study. Phase three evaluated reliability and 
validity of a pilot test. Phase four executed a pilot test. Phase five completed the actual 
data gathering. Data was collected from various sources, from publications and 
government statistics databases, and from a questionnaire administered to a sample of 
respondents. This phase involved description and statistical data analysis, concluding 
with cross-tabulations. The last two phases were devoted to writing a thesis based on 
findings and suggesting possible solutions to solve the problem. The phases of the study 
are represented diagrammatically in figure 3.3 and discussed in the following sections of 
this chapter. 
 
3.3.1 Review and do a research of literature 
The researcher began with an exploratory study to collect existing information, 
which provided the essential background information needed to precede a descriptive 
study. The exploratory study reviewed previous studies and explored new and related 
information which then was incorporated into this research. In turn, information 
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obtained from the descriptive study helped the researcher to design a causal experiment 
(Burns & Bush, 2002 quoted by Hamid, 2006). Lastly, the researcher established the 
scope of the study by forming questions. The questions were about the problems or the 
situation of events or conditions and their inter-relationships between the respondents’ 
knowledge and behaviour in online banking and the threats they encountered from 
phishing attacks. 
 
3.3.2 Designing and developing research approaches 
This step involved selecting appropriate techniques and tools to be used in the 
study. Selecting a sample group was also part of this phase. The paragraphs below 
describe data collecting techniques, tools, and details of selecting a sample group. 
 
3.3.2.1 Data collection techniques/ tools  
“Data-collection techniques allow us to systematically collect information about 
our objects of study (people, objects, phenomena) and about the settings in which they 
occur” (Varkevisser, Pathmanathan, & Brownlee, 2003, p. 144). The systematic 
collection of existing data has been described in 3.3.1 above. In addition, a variety of 
participatory communication tools have been developed and implemented to enhance, 
contribute, and support research techniques (United Nations World Food Programme, 
n.d.). They also aim to stimulate interactions and make research approaches more 
participatory and fruitful. To avoid confusion in the use of terms, the following table 
points out the distinction between techniques and tools applied in data collection. 
 
Table 3.3.2.1 Data collection techniques and tools  
Data collection techniques Data collection tools 
Using available information 
Archived records, online and offline 
publications 
Administering written questionnaires Questionnaire 
Interviewing (focus group and individual) 
Questionnaire, structured interviews, 
focused interview, open-ended interview 
Case study 
Questionnaire, semi-structured interviews, 
focused interviews, open-ended interviews 
(Varkevisser, et al., 2003) 
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Revise 
procedures 
Techniques 
and tools 
selected for 
both tests 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Research plan 
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36 
 
(i) Administering written questionnaires 
The planned structured survey involved several steps, from deciding on 
question wording, content and sequence, to devising measurement scales and 
response formats and assessing the reliability of the measurement used. 
 
(ii) E-mail Survey 
A number of researchers have begun to explore the advantages of conducting 
research via the Internet using e-mail (Smith, 1997; Murray & Sixsmith, 1998 quoted by 
Fox, Murray, & Warm, 2003). E-mail surveys may allow extra time for participants to 
answer the questions, which may increase self-esteem and allow them to brainstorm 
ideas, while reducing their social anxiety (Joinson, 1999 quoted by Fox, et al., 2003), 
and the feeling of pressure when someone is monitoring their performances. In this 
research, multiple copies of the questionnaire were sent to many known recipients. 
Some of these recipients had forwarded the e-mail to their contacts and asked them also 
to complete the survey. Of the 55 e-mail respondents, only 50 were used for further 
analysis, as some were incomplete. The questionnaire included multiple choices, rating 
scales, filling in the gaps, and open-ended questions. The open-ended questions that 
were sent via e-mail and used for online survey also used as interview questions for the 
individual and focus group interviews in this study. 
 
(iii) Online Surveys  
Internet or online survey conduction is becoming more effective in terms of 
getting quick responses and a high number of participants. The advantages are low 
costs, ease, and speed of administration (Schmidt, 1997; Buchanan & Smith, 1999 
quoted by Fox, et al., 2003). In addition, it is inexpensive to establish an online survey 
and more convenient to launch the survey over the global network, where a number of 
online tools are available to assist the researchers to accomplish their tasks. Many 
researchers are interested in using the virtual community to conduct survey research. 
“Virtual communities have flourished online, and hundreds of thousands of people 
regularly participate in discussions about almost every conceivable issue and interest” 
(Wright, 2005). The Internet gives researchers the opportunity to target either large or 
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small populations, depending on the research project, who may have difficulty accessing 
offline survey channels. Lastly, the online environment also offers a high level of 
anonymity (Coomber, 1997 quoted by Fox, et al., 2003) for the respondent who may not 
want to identify himself. The investigator will not see the respondents’ faces, or be 
aware of any other identifying aspects, apart from the IP addresses of their computers. 
An example of such online research is creating a questionnaire by using trusted and well 
known tools, such as ‘SurveyMonkey’. 
 
The online questionnaire for this study consisted of an introduction to the 
research, a questionnaire, with some open-ended questions. The introduction to the 
project was provided on the first page of the site, before participants were able to start 
the actual survey. Once the questionnaire was created, the link to the online survey was 
redirected to a social network or virtual community website, that is, Facebook. 
Facebook settings were used to restrict its display only to members of the WA 
community.  There were 33 respondents who participated in this online survey. Only 30 
responses were useable. 
 
(iv) Personal Approach 
This is a method of hand-delivering questionnaires to respondents and 
collecting them later (Varkevisser, et al., 2003). In addition, the idea of administering 
written questionnaire can also be referred to as “gathering all or part of the respondents 
in one place at one time, giving oral or written instructions, and letting the respondents 
fill out the questionnaires” (Varkevisser, et al., 2003, p. 147).The personal approach 
helps the investigator to target the sample group directly and to have an almost 
immediate response after the questionnaire is completed. A personal approach is best 
used when participants are willing to spend their time to answer questions immediately. 
It often means that the participants need have no further contact with the investigator. 
Some of the participants in this study preferred to answer the questionnaire, which 
included open-ended questions, without wishing to clarify any of their answers with an 
interviewer. 
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(v) Personal Interviews 
“An interview is a data-collection technique that involves oral questioning of 
respondents, either individually or as a group” (Varkevisser, et al., 2003, p. 146). Boyce 
and Neale (2006) defined the goal of interview as “… to deeply explore the respondent's 
point of view, feelings and perspectives”. In this sense, the individual interview may 
help researcher to gather more information about the interviewee’s experiences or 
opinions related to the question. Individual interviewees are encouraged to “expand 
upon their answers to specific questions by providing explanations, rationale, and 
additional context and related issues” (United Nations World Food Programme, n.d., p. 
23). The benefit of the individual interview is that the respondent could express their 
opinion freely without social censure. Besides, individuals may not want to share their 
personal opinion in front of a group or in public. However, this method is time 
consuming if the researcher needs to consult a number of participants in a limited time.  
 
(vi) Focus group discussions 
This technique provides “data on group interaction, on realities defined in a 
group context, and on interpretations of events that reflect group input” (Frey and 
Fontana, 1993 quoted by Waite & Harrison, 2004, p. 70). A focus group is influenced 
by word-of-mouth. Therefore, it is appropriate to utilise group discussion to explore the 
extremes of views expressed, the interaction between these views and the consensus 
achieved (Rogers, 1995 quoted by Waite & Harrison, 2004). The benefit of group 
discussion is that it can reduce the time spent, in comparison to a series of individual 
interviews. However, the participants’ answers could be influenced by their peers, 
particularly in the situation when everyone in the group can hear what other people said. 
 
The researcher recruited focus group volunteers by designing a poster and 
advertising in many public places such as university libraries, government council 
libraries, and other public notice boards. Participants were invited to information 
sessions where they were able to voice their opinions and then to learn how to avoid 
phishing scams. A copy of the invitation is attached as Appendix A of this thesis. 
Respondents were asked to tell their direct and/or indirect experiences of online 
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phishing attacks and how they solved the problems these attacks caused. Two focus 
groups were conducted, in which a total of 20 participants shared their knowledge and 
opinions about online banking threats and security implementation via online banking 
authentication measures. 
 
(vii) Case study 
“Case study research relates to an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of 
evidence” (Noor, 2008 quoted from Yin, 1993). A case study is not always intended as a 
study of the entire population, rather it is often used to focus on a particular group, 
feature or unit of analysis. In order to understand and examine the processes of group 
activity, the case study approach was chosen specifically. A multiple case study was 
employed in this research study to enhance generalisations. The benefit of a multiple 
case approach is that it stimulates the research and distinguishes replication data in the 
cases examined without generalising the findings due to the multivariate nature of the 
cases (Valli, 2003). Noor (2008, p. 1603 quoted from Yin, 1993) emphasised that “The 
development of consistent findings, over multiple cases, can then be considered a very 
robust finding”. This means that multiple cases of phishing attacks were included in the 
same study in an attempt to enhance research credibility. Variations in the findings of 
case studies based on individual phishing attacks added necessary detail to the 
countermeasures planned in research questions. The researcher therefore needed to 
identify different types of phishing attacks and to understand how they affected online 
bank users. Consequences of each attack method will be presented in chapter 5. 
Incidents of phishing attacks that have occurred with Australian bank users were 
investigated to evaluate the vulnerabilities and find the appropriate solutions or 
recommendations to mitigate the threats. If high levels of replication are found in 
several cases of attack, the researcher may be confident that the need for 
countermeasures has been thoroughly investigated in the future. 
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3.3.3 Sampling 
The sample population was comprised of bank clients who are resident in 
Western Australia (WA). To ensure that only participants who were bank clients in WA 
responded to the online survey, participants were asked for their postcode in section A6 
of the questionnaire. WA postcodes cannot be used to link individuals to specific 
addresses, so this question did not compromise the confidentiality promised to 
respondents. People included in the sample may vary in career, age, sex, nationality, 
educational background, or location. Bank clients may or may not have used online 
banking. They may or may not also have direct and/or indirect experience of a phishing 
attack. 
 
For the pilot test, 45 questionnaires were distributed in Perth, Western Australia 
and resulted in the return of 30 completed questionnaires used for statistical analyses 
during 3 months data collecting started from November 2009 to January 2010. Several 
pilot tests had been conducted when the reliability statistics of the data was failed to 
meet the minimum satisfaction score due to errors with questionnaire design. Factors 
were tested using reliability analyses to calculate with Cronbach’s Alpha formula, 
results of which are given in Table 3.2.4.1.  
 
For the actual test, this data collecting process acquired 8 months to reach such 
numbers started from February 2010 to September 2010. 266 respondents completed the 
actual survey, but results from only 209 were analysed. Some were excluded because it 
was clear that they lacked understanding and were unable to answer the questions 
accurately. Within this number, only 99 respondents participated in the interviews. 
Individuals’ responses related to the various banking institutions which offered them the 
ability to conduct online banking. Students and other professionals in Western Australia 
were among those who responded online. The sample focused on people in Western 
Australia, who had participated in online banking activities and may also have had 
experience of online banking threats. It also included those who had no experience of 
online banking activities, but may have received phishing e-mails which pretended to be 
from their existing bank and asked for personal information. 
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3.3.4 Evaluate reliability and validity of tools 
Prior to pre-testing, the researcher’s academic supervisors were asked to review 
the questions and gave their opinions about the questions’ content validity. Typically the 
questions were standard and structured. In other words, a formal questionnaire was 
prepared and questions were asked in a prearranged order. The structured survey 
involved several steps from designing the questions to field work and assessing the 
reliability of the measurement used. After the review process, the questionnaire was 
ready to be pre-tested in an exploratory survey. Statistical tests of reliability will be 
discussed in 3.4.3.2 below.  
 
3.3.5 Exploratory (pre-test) survey and revise questionnaire 
The questionnaire was then distributed by different means, online, in print and as 
an e-mail attachment, in order to conduct a preliminary test. The aim of the pre-test was 
to ensure that the questions were eliciting the responses required, to uncover ambiguous 
wording or errors before the survey was launched at large (Burns & Bush, 2002; 
Zikmund, 2000 quoted by Hamid, 2006). If the test result had been below the standard 
score, revision of the test would have been carried out to find any loopholes and the text 
of the questions would again have been revised to ensure the correctness of the 
questionnaire. 
 
3.3.6 Reliability Statistics 
The empirical data collected from individual consumers were examined using 
the reliability test and multiple regression analysis using the SPSS program. Survey 
respondents were comprised of online banking users in the Western Australia. The 
respondents' profile was representative of the general population with equal split on 
gender and age groups between 18 and 65+. The reliability test results in that the 
Cronbach alpha (α) values should be at least .70 or higher (a lenient cut-off of .60 is 
common in exploratory research) to retain an item in an adequate scale, the standard 
error of measurement will be over half (0.55) a standard deviation (Garson, 2008). The 
following tables illustrate the results of reliabilities from the pilot test.  
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Table 3.3.6 Reliability statistics results from the pilot test 
 
Table 3.3.6 illustrates reliability statistics results from the pilot test. The tests 
were analysed from rating scale sections which were used to calculate the Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) values. The confidence interval of data collected is 95%. It shows that α in 
both results are over the minimum standard score of .70 (α >.70). The opinion of 30 
respondents about their safety of using online banking was 0.82 (α = .82) whereas 
opinion of 30 respondents about their preferences of securing online banking offered by 
bank was 0.76 (α = .76). This can be seen that this questionnaire was reliable and 
compatible among their groups.  
 
3.3.7 Survey method and administration 
This step involves the administration of the final version of the questionnaire 
after the pilot had been tested and found to be correct. In this survey, respondents were 
asked verbally, in writing or via a computer, a variety of questions regarding their 
behaviour, attitudes, demographics and lifestyle characteristics in relation to assessing 
online banking and their knowledge of online banking threats, including their direct or 
indirect experience of online banking attacks.  
 
In order to acquire data from focused group sampling based on survey 
approaches, surveys can generally categorised into two broads of questionnaire and 
interview (Mersdorf, 2009). The form of questionnaires used in the focus group 
Description Cronbach's Alpha 
95% Confidence Interval 
N of 
Items 
Total 
population Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Reliability statistics of respondents 
about their safety of using online 
banking (D9) 
.82   8 30 
Single measures  .23 .55   
Average measures  .71 .91   
Reliability statistics of respondents 
about their preferences of securing 
online banking offered by bank (D10) 
.76 7  7 30 
Single measures  .18 .50   
Average measures  .60 .87   
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interviews and individual interviews were the same as the online survey and e-mail 
survey. Therefore, the researcher collected data with multiple approaches, as described 
above, to gain a high volume of respondents. 
 
The questionnaire was circulated in both online and offline formats. A link to the 
online survey was included in e-mail, so that potential respondents could forward it to 
others who might be interested. This encouraged participation by those who felt they did 
not have the time to complete a hard copy questionnaire. Participants were free to 
choose their preferred questionnaire format. A benefit of this decision is that more 
thoroughly-considered answers are sometimes provided. 
 
3.3.8 Evaluate and analyse the data 
This stage involved the use of standard analysis tools, SPSS and Microsoft Excel, 
to examine the data collected about participants’ activities involving online banking 
systems. 
 
3.3.9 Prepare the report based on findings 
All the findings were documented and evaluated, the problems which were 
reported by participants being analysed and compared with other academic, public, and 
government information. 
 
3.3.10 Suggest solutions that solve the problem/question 
In this phase the key incidents and risks were communicated along with 
recommendations for minimising the impact of phishing attacks. What respondents felt 
they needed or preferred in their future use of online banking security was analysed. In 
addition, this study attempted to investigate the extent to which online banking security 
features affected consumer assessment of satisfaction, retention and trust.  
 
3.4 Ethical Considerations 
“Ensuring the well-being of respondents is of paramount importance in any 
study” (Fox, et al., 2003, p. 177). When dealing with sensitive information, such as 
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passwords, authentication security, and money, high-level precautions must be 
maintained. Fox et al. (2003) mentioned two aspects of protecting respondents from 
harm: 
 
The first relates to ensuring that the information that the respondent have 
entrusted to the researchers is dealt with in a sensitive way. The second involves 
ensuring participation in the study does not affect the respondent in any adverse manner. 
 
To secure the respondents’ privacy, personal respondents’ information such as 
contact details, social security number, and bank account number were not required, and 
all information gathered was kept securely and not revealed to anyone. Only the 
researcher had access to the information collected. In addition, Varkevisser et al. (2003, 
p. 153) recommended several points to consider for ethical research behaviour: 
 
• Obtaining informed consent before the study or the interviewing begins; 
• Not exploring sensitive issues before a good relationship has been established 
with the informant; 
• Ensuring the confidentiality of the data obtained; and 
• Learning enough about the culture of informants to ensure it is respected during 
the data collection process. 
 
Thus, no research took place unless participants had previously signed a consent 
form or, in the case of the online survey, read and accepted the introductory material 
provided. Name and postcode of research participants were kept militarily secret. 
Documentary records were stored in a locked filling cabinet in the supervisor’s office. 
The data on the laptop were secured with passwords known only to the researcher. 
According to University requirements, this data will be stored and retained for five years 
after the research project has been completed. Once this period is over, any printed 
documents will be shredded securely and recordings will be destroyed. Electronic data 
will be deleted by formatting and multiple overwriting and thereby written off the 
devices.  
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3.5 Limitations of the study 
None of the methods could satisfy all the needs of the researcher (Hawthorne, 
1992 quoted by Nattavee Utakrit, 2006). There is a factor which may limit the research. 
First of all, a case study that happened to the respondents may involve just a single real 
case; therefore, the result may not be representative of all the ideas of the general group 
or population. Also, “much of the information collected is retrospective data, 
recollections of past events, and is therefore subject to the problems inherent to 
memory” (Rickards & Ritsert, 2011, p. 941). Case studies often rely on descriptive 
information provided by different people. Some details may be overlooked 
unintentionally. For example, if online incident attacked to the respondents for several 
years ago, the given information may not be as complete as what the research expected 
to obtain. Consideration of maximum participants in research survey may enhance the 
quality of the research. Lastly, this study was limited to the Western Australian region 
where a number of populations may not as large as those in other states. Therefore, it 
may result in a number of people who use online banking, of which a consequence may 
be a population with few experiences of receiving phishing e-mails or being concerned 
about online banking attack incidents. 
 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has provided a summary of the research methods employed in this 
study and justifications for the research approach utilised. Mixed method research, 
including quantitative and qualitative tools and techniques, has been described and 
details provided of the ways in which participants were recruited. Detailed results will 
be presented in Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of the quantitative data and qualitative data 
derived from the questionnaire survey, open-ended questions and semi-structured 
interviews in order to find answers to the research questions. This chapter contains 
descriptive results for five main factors: 
4.2 Respondents’ backgrounds. 
4.3 Respondents’ experiences in using online banking. 
4.4 Respondents’ experiences in relation to online banking security. 
4.5 Respondents’ perceptions of a deployment of online banking security 
protection. 
4.6 Respondents’ perceptions and experiences in online banking attacks. 
 
In addition, results for research questions 1 and 2 have been cross-tabulated. 
 
4.2 Respondents’ backgrounds 
Of the 226 questionnaires completed and submitted, 209 were analysed and 
divided by 21 respondents from focus group discussion, 33 from online survey, 45 from 
e-mail attached, and 110 from personal approaches. A significant group of completed 
questionnaires was excluded because, although the demographic questions were 
completed accurately, answers to the remaining questions in several cases revealed that 
the respondents either misunderstood the questions or did not have the knowledge 
required to offer valid responses. Although it was made clear, through the consent 
process, to participants that they could have stopped doing the questionnaire at any time, 
it is possible that some continued, despite limited knowledge of the topic, in the hope of 
being helpful. This may be regarded as a tentative indication of the lack of 
understanding of the need for highly secure means of utilising online banking. 
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Answers from open-ended questions and from semi-structured interviews were 
also used in this analysis. The researcher used qualitative evaluation processes to 
organise and categorise data by adapting Dey’s (1993) structure to manage the data. 
Once the raw data was obtained, the researcher, firstly, needed to find a main focus of 
individual answers which matched the questions. Secondly, data was read and annotated 
several times to ensure the understanding of the answers. Thirdly, categories of the data 
were created to group similar answers into each category. Then, answers were assigned 
to the created categories. Data splitting and splicing were used to create sup-groups or 
levels of the similar answers to enhance the clarity of the data. “Categorizing the data 
allows us to compare the observations in terms of relations of similarity and difference” 
(Dey, 1993, p. 161). This helps the researcher to construct theoretical ‘edifices’ and 
combine them with existing further sources to create relationships between different 
parts of the data (Dey, 1993). Once the evidence was corroborated, the use of cross-
tabulation statistical analysis was applied to compare results from the two datasets and 
make an aggregation between the quantitative and qualitative variables. In the 
meantime, other more random data was also analysed with descriptive and inference 
statistics such as central tendency measurement and chi-square analysis 
 
4.2.1 Gender of respondents 
The distributions of the demographic characteristics of the questionnaire 
respondents are summarised in the table below. All respondents were residents of 
Western Australia. 
 
Table 4.2.1 Genders of the respondents 
Genders Frequency Percent 
Male 109 52.2 
Female 99 47.4 
Valid total 208 99.5 
No answer 1 0.5 
Total 209 100.0 
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From the data above, it can be seen that the percentage of males and females in 
the sample were 52.2% and 47.4% respectively. This shows that the population 
surveyed has a gender distribution closely resembling the distribution of males and 
females in the Western Australian population. According to data from the National 
Regional Profile of the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2010, the estimated resident 
population of Perth Statistical Division at 30 June 2009 was 1.65 million. This number 
consisted of 833,110 (50.22%) male and 825,882 (49.78%) female (Australian Bureau 
Statistics, 2010e).  
4.2.2. Age of respondents 
Table 4.2.2 Age distribution of the survey respondents 
Age Frequency Percent 
Under 20 7 3.3 
20 - 24 29 13.9 
25 -29 35 16.7 
30 - 34 26 12.4 
35 -39 11 5.3 
40 - 44 19 9.1 
45 - 49 21 10.0 
Above 50 58 27.8 
Total 206 98.6 
No answer 3 1.4 
Total of respondents 209 100.0 
 
Table 4.2.2.1 Estimates of the Perth resident population by age group at 30th June, 2010  
Population by age group percentages 
0 to 14 years 19.2 
15 years to 24 years 15.2 
25 years to 34 years 14.8 
35 years to 44 years 14.5 
45 years to 54 years 13.8 
55 years to 64 years 10.9 
65 years to 74 years 6.4 
75 years to 84 years 3.9 
85 years and over 1.5 
(Australian Bureau Statistics, 2010e) 
49 
 
In table 4.2.2, it can be seen that most of the respondents were aged above 50 
which equated to 27.8% followed by the group aged between 25-29 at 16.7%, and the 
20-24 years at 13.9%. The percentage of the elderly group compared to the ABS data in 
table 4.2.2.1 had similar results, with 22.7% of people who were above 54. The next 
largest sample by age group was 25-29 years which presented at 16.7% of all age 
groups. Data from ABS found that 15-24 years and 25-34 years age groups were the 
second and the third highest in the population, excluding 0-14 years, because this age 
group was not able to use online banking services. Obviously, the sample by age groups 
of 15-24 years and 25-34 years were overlapped at the second highest percentage of all 
samples. It thus appears that there is no direct statistical comparison between the 
population sampled and the ABS data.  
 
Figure 4.2.2 Paying bills online or online banking by each age group 
(Australian Bureau Statistics, 2011a) 
 
Figure 4.2.2 shows that people who are 25-34 accessed the internet from home to 
pay bills online or use online banking most often. This study found that the largest 
group of respondents who accessed online banking were in the same age groups, i.e. 25-
29 at 16.7% and 30-34 at 12.4%, totalling 29.1%. Percentages of use by age groups are 
shown in table 4.2.2. 
  
  
 
Image is not available in public access version 
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4.2.3 Annual income of respondents 
Table 4.2.3 Respondents’ annual incomes 
Annual Income Frequency Percent 
< 20,000 49 23.4 
20,001-30,000 17 8.1 
30,001-50,000 34 16.3 
50,001-100,000 61 29.2 
> 100,000 10 4.8 
I prefer not to answer 32 15.3 
Total 203 97.1 
No answer 6 2.9 
Total of respondents 209 100.0 
 
The data in table 4.2.3 shows the estimation of personal annual income of the 
respondents. It indicates that 61 respondents had an annual income between $50,001and 
$100,000, which resulted in 29.2%. The next largest group was comprised of 
respondents who earned less than $20,000 annually or 23.4%, which included 40 
respondents. According to the compiled data from the Australian Taxation Office's 
(ATO) Individual Income Tax Return Database, which was provided to the ABS at the 
Statistical Local Area level in the 2010 report, the estimated personal income of Perth 
Statistical Division in the last four years from June 2005 to June 2008 is shown in table 
4.2.3.1.  
 
Table 4.2.3.1 Estimation of personal income at year ended 30th June during 2005-2009 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Average wage & salary income $ 38 712 41 095 43 785 46 804 - 
(Australian Bureau Statistics, 2010c) 
The above table reveals that the annual average income had increased $8,092 in 
the five years between 2005 and 2008. Due to the lack of official published data for 
2009 and 2010, an approximate prediction therefore has been carried out to forecast 2 
years’ future trends. An extrapolated graph for 2009 and 2010 was plotted, as shown in 
figure 2.4.4.  
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Figure 4.2.3.1 Approximate growth prediction for the average wage and 
salary during 2005-2010 
 
Figure 2.4.3.1 shows the average annual income of the majority of Perth 
residents. The 2-year predictions of the annual growth trend had indicated that, in 2009 
and 2010, the average of the annual income would be approximately $49,000 and 
$52,000 respectively. Thus, it can be concluded that the approximate annual incomes of 
the respondents appears to be very similar to the expected incomes of the majority of the 
Perth population. 
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4.2.4. Respondents’ occupation classifications 
Table 4.2.4 Classifications of respondents’ occupations partly adapted from Australian 
Standard Classification of Occupations 
Occupation Frequency Percent 
Professionals 50 23.9 
Students 46 22.0 
Technicians and trades workers 19 9.1 
Retired 11 5.3 
Clerical and administrative workers 10 4.8 
Managers 8 3.8 
Sales workers 8 3.8 
Labourers 8 3.8 
Community and personal service workers 6 2.9 
Home duties 5 2.4 
Machinery operators and drivers 4 1.9 
Miscellaneous 7 3.3 
Valid total 182 87.1 
No answer 27 12.9 
Total 209 100.0 
  
Table 4.2.4 displays the occupations of the respondents. Part of the occupational 
classifications have been categorised according to the Australian Standard Classification 
of Occupations (ASCO) of 2001. If excluding unpaid occupations, such as student, 
retired, and home duties, and inadequately described occupations (miscellaneous), 
professional groups such as academic lecturers, IT specialists, consultants, and building 
engineers, comprised the highest percentage of occupations gathered from the sample: 
50 respondents or 23.9% of the total belonged to this group. They were followed by the 
technicians and trades workers groups, related to food, automotive engineering, 
electrical and electronics, which was made up of 19 respondents (9.1%). Clerical and 
administrative workers were the third highest number of respondents at 10 respondents 
(4.8%) of the sample. This data correlated with the ABS database of Western Australian 
population statistics as below: 
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• According to data from the estimated occupations of employed persons: 
percentage of total employed persons in the census of the year ended 30th June, 
2006 (Australian Bureau Statistics, 2010e), the professionals’ group was ranked 
first, followed by technicians and trades workers, and clerical and administrative 
workers with the percentages of 20.6%, 15.9%, and 15.7% respectively. 
Machinery operators and drivers formed the lowest percentage of all paid 
occupations. 
 
There is no adequate public record of the unpaid occupations such as retired, 
students, and housewives; therefore, the chi-square test cannot be used to find the 
significance of the study compared with ABS data. However, this research result 
appears to be consistent with the government data available for comparison with the 
sample population. 
 
4.2.5. Education levels of respondents 
Table 4.2.5 Highest of current education level of the respondents 
Education Frequency Percent 
PhD/Dr. 6 2.9 
Master degree 44 21.1 
Bachelor degree 70 33.5 
Diploma 28 13.4 
High school graduation 53 25.4 
Others 5 2.4 
Total 206 98.6 
No answer 3 1.4 
Total 209 100.0 
 
In table 4.2.5, it can be seen that the highest current education level of the 
respondents in this sample were bachelor degree (33.5%) followed by high school level 
(25.4%) and master level (21.1%). In contrast, data from ABS indicated that: 
… in 2009, 62% aged 25-64 years in WA had obtained a non-school 
educational qualification, increasing from 59% in 2008. Of these, almost 
one quarter (25%) had obtained a Bachelor degree or above while 38% 
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had an Advanced diploma or lower qualification (Australian Bureau 
Statistics, 2011b).  
 
However, it appears that there are no adequate public records about the overall 
graduation levels of the WA population, which means that there is no way of comparing 
the total data between the sample population and the government statistics. However, 
from the survey results it can be seen that a combination of the diploma and lower 
qualification/ high school levels in table 4.2.5, would give a percentage of 38.8%, which 
would give a very similar result to the ABS statistics. In addition, the percentages of 
respondents having a bachelor degree and the ABS results are also very similar. The 
total percentage of the respondents who have been educated to degree level is 57.5%, 
and for non-degree is 41.2%. It can be seen that the overall education level of the 
respondents to the survey is relatively high.  
 
4.2.6. Geographical distribution of respondents 
In figure 4.2.6.2, the red highlighting illustrates the area where most respondents 
were living, which mainly covered the Perth metropolitan area. Residential respondents’ 
postcodes illustrated in table 4.2.6 have been grouped according to the TransPerth zone 
boundary as shown in figure 4.2.6.1. 
 
According to the data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2010, the 
estimated resident population of Western Australia (WA) at 30 June 2009 was 2.25 
million, and almost three-quarters or 73.9% of the state's population resided in the Perth 
metropolitan area. A further 11% resided in the South West (Australian Bureau 
Statistics, 2010f). Generally, people are more likely to live close to the city. In relation 
to Internet access, factors such as level of income, education, population age, lifestyle 
and interests could cause the level of Internet access differences between metropolitan 
and other areas of Australia (Australia Government. Department of Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy, 2008). 
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Figure 4.2.6.1 Residential areas defined by TransPerth zone boundaries  
(TransPerth, 2010)
 
 
 
 
 
Image is not available in public access version 
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Table 4.2.6.1 Postcode and living zone of the respondents 
 
 
Figure 4.2.6.2 Residential areas from which respondents were drawn  
(Optus, n.d.) 
 
The Australian Government, Department of Broadband, Communications and 
the Digital Economy (2008) reported that metro Internet users aged 14 years and over 
were likely to have accessed the Internet more than residents of other areas; percentages 
of 73% and 65% respectively were recorded in June 2006. From this, we may infer that 
Zone Postcode Frequency Percent 
1 
6000, 6003, 6006, 6014, 6103, 6151, 6152, 6009, 6060, 
6019, 6153, 6104, 6100, 6101, 6052, 6059, 6051, 6007, 
6008, 6010, 6016 
80 38.6 
2 
6015, 6020, 6023, 6107, 6108, 6155, 6150, 6055, 6061, 
6062, 6063, 6147, 6021, 6023, 6022, 6066, 6011, 6012, 
6156, 6157, 6163, 6018, 6019, 6024, 6064 
72 34.6 
3 6026, 6027, 6919, 6025, 6069, 6065 26 12.4 
4 6112, 6028, 6030 4 2 
Outside 
zone 4 
6169, 6430, 6053 5 2.5 
Unknown N/A 1 0.5 
 Approximate total 188 90.0 
Missing No answer 21 10.0 
 Total 209 100.0 
 
Image is not available in public access version 
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ease of Internet access is associated with living area, which can be reflected in the 
number of online banking access. This research covers respondents in the Perth 
metropolitan areas and was extended to some parts of the city’s outer boundaries, which 
indicated the high significance of the sample used in the research.  
 
4.2.7 Summary of description of respondents’ backgrounds 
Section 4.2.1-4.2.6 describes the respondents’ backgrounds in terms of genders, 
ages, annual incomes, occupations, education levels, and usual places of residence. The 
overall results have been analysed and compared for data consistency with relevant 
information from public records to ensure the satisfactory results. The findings revealed 
that male respondents used online banking more than females. The majority of the 
respondents in this survey were above 50 and most respondents had annual incomes 
between $50,000 and $100,000. Professional workers and bachelor degree graduates 
were the main groups of the respondents. In addition, most respondents lived close to 
Perth city. An interesting finding was that the results of the demographic characteristics 
were highly reflective of the government statistics. This positive significance could 
enhance the reliability and the credibility of the data that needed to be analysed from the 
survey throughout this research. 
 
4.3 Respondents’ experiences in using online banking services 
This section discusses the respondents’ behaviours in accessing online banking 
services.  
 
4.3.1 General purposes of using online banking services 
This survey collected 209 responses; 185 respondents or 88.5% had experience 
in accessing online banking services, whilst 24 respondents (11.5%) had never 
experienced online banking as shown in figure 4.3.1. Of the non-online banking 
respondents, 21 provided their reasons for not using online banking services. Their 
comments are discussed in the following paragraph.  
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Figure 4.3.1 Monthly frequency of accessing online banking websites 
 
Table 4.3.1 illustrates reasons why some people had not used online banking 
services. Questionnaire respondents could provide more than one reason for not 
accessing online banking. 14 responses (33%) of the non-online banking respondents 
were concerned about the security of online banking whereas 10 responses (24%) 
indicated that they were not interested in using online banking. In addition, 4 responses 
(10%) revealed that they did not see any real value in using online banking or having an 
online banking account; 6 responses (14%) mentioned that they did not have an online 
banking account.  
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Table 4.3.1 Reasons given by non-online banking respondents 
Reasons of non-online banking respondents 
Responses 
N Percent 
 
I am not interested in online banking. 10 24 
I do not know how to use online banking. 2 5 
I do not know how to use Internet. 1 2 
I do not know how to use computer. 1 2 
I do not have an Internet connection. 1 2 
I do not have an online banking account. 6 14 
I am concerned about security. 14 33 
I have not had time to open an account. 1 2 
I do not see any real value in using online 
banking or having an online banking account. 
4 10 
It is too new. I would like to see how it works, 
and then I may open an account. 
1 2 
Other, please specify.... 1 2 
Rounding error 0 2 
Total 42 100 
Note: As small numbers of respondents are involved in this section, percentages have 
been rounded to appropriate whole numbers. 
 
People who had used online banking services were also given the opportunity in 
the questionnaire to select multiple reasons for doing so. In contrast to the non-users, of 
181 online banking respondents 36.1% indicated that they used online banking services 
because of their rapid operations. 28.7% of the respondents pointed out that they could 
avoid waiting in a queue in the bank branch, likewise 22.9% revealed that the time 
saved by not commuting to the bank was important. Surprisingly, only 0.6% (2 
responses) felt that online banking offered better security and only 5.5% said they 
believed that using online banking was more convenient in terms of 24/7 access. 3.4% 
did not offer any reason for their adoption of online banking. In this survey, fast service, 
reduction of the time spent waiting or commuting may be seen as parts of the 
convenience. When the percentages for these three factors are combined, the total result 
for this study is 87.7% of the valid responses. On the other hand, there was no indication 
that respondents were interested because of the security of use of online banking, 
possibly because there is no official evidence to support a belief that using online 
banking is more secure than using traditional services.  
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Figure 4.3.2 illustrates the monthly frequency with which the respondents 
accessed online banking services. The largest group of respondents, 28.7%, accessed 
their online banking 3-5 times monthly. On the other hand, 7.2% of the respondents 
accessed their accounts more than 20 times per month. ACNielsen’s research (2007) 
found that more than two-thirds of Australian Internet users accessed their online 
banking once a week or more. More specifically, 52% of Australians used Internet 
banking at least once a week whereas 16% accessed daily. Only 2.4% of the respondents 
did not answer this question and the other 11.5% was the group in which the 
respondents did not use online banking. It appears that the average Australian users 
accessed their online banking as frequently as once per week.  
 
In terms of the place in which they accessed the online banking systems, a large 
number of the respondents, 62.6%, accessed online banking from their homes. This 
percentage was much higher than the 18% who carried out their online banking from 
their workplace, whilst only 7.2% accessed online banking from academic institutions. 
Respondents who were related to the schools, universities, or colleges, such as students, 
professors, and school administrators would access their online banking from their 
institutions. 20 respondents (7.5%) accessed their online banking from their mobile 
phone or palm top. Furthermore, those respondents accessing online banking from 
Internet cafés and public libraries had the lowest percentages at 1.5% and 1.1% 
respectively. These results are similar to the ABS (2010b) statistics recorded in 2008-
2009 when 72% of the Australian households had home internet access increased from 
16% to 72%. However, no statistics were found for 2010. Therefore, based on the 
available statistics, people have more opportunity to access the Internet from home, 
which may reflect an increase of online banking from homes. 
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Figure 4.3.2 Monthly frequency of accessing online banking website 
 
Further investigation revealed the main activities carried out by respondents 
when they were using online banking services. Table 4.3.2 lists these activities and 
identifies the breakdown of the group of respondents according to the activity which 
they nominated as being most important. 
 
Table 4.3.2 Major activities carried out by respondents when online banking 
  Frequency Percent 
Cases 
Valid cases 181 86.6 
Missing cases 28 13.4 
Total cases 209 100.0 
Responses 
Money transfer 137 32.5 
Viewing balance and summary 
information 
135 32.0 
Pay bill(s) 130 30.8 
Update personal information 16 3.8 
Other 4 .9 
Total responses 422 100.0 
 
This shows clearly that most of the respondents did not think it was necessary to 
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reasons why respondents used online banking were to transfer money, check their 
account balances, and pay their bills. 
 
4.3.2 Online banking services in relation to individual banks 
Table 4.3.2 Respondents’ behaviours in accessing online banking services compared 
between two statuses: previous access and current access categorised according to bank 
 
Previous access Current access 
Frequency Percent Percentage of cases Frequency Percent 
Percentage of 
cases 
Cases 
Valid cases 181 86.6 N/A 178 85.2 N/A 
Missing cases 28 13.4 N/A 28 13.4 N/A 
Total cases 209 100.0 N/A 209 100.0 N/A 
 ANZ bank 73 24.5 40.3 63 25.0 35.4 
Responses 
Commonwealth 
bank 
69 23.2 38.1 54 21.4 30.3 
Bank West 40 13.4 22.1 30 11.9 16.9 
Westpac 40 13.4 22.1 35 13.9 19.7 
National bank 25 8.4 13.8 24 9.5 13.5 
Citibank 7 2.3 3.9 4 1.6 2.2 
HSBC bank 7 2.3 3.9 5 2.0 2.8 
I prefer not to 
answer 
6 2.0 3.3 10 4.0 5.6 
Others 31 10.4 17.1 27 10.7 15.2 
Total responses 298 100.0 164.6 252 100.0 141.6 
 
Respondents were asked to detail their banking history and online banking 
preferences. They were asked whether they were still banking with their original bank 
(previous access in Table 4.3.2), whether they had changed to another bank or whether 
they had ceased to use online banking services. Respondents were allowed to select 
more than one bank. Table 4.3.2.above illustrates the comparison between the previous 
online banking access and the current online banking access of the respondents. In the 
left column, 73 respondents (24.5%) have chosen the ANZ Bank as their first choice of 
online banking service, while the Commonwealth Bank was the second selection with 
69 respondents (23.2%). Bank West and the Westpac had the equivalent percentages of 
online baking accesses at 13.4% (40 respondents). The right column displays statistics 
of the respondents who decided to continue, discontinue, or had changed from a 
previous bank to another online banking service. 63 respondents (25%) of 252 
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respondents had chosen the ANZ Bank whereas the Commonwealth Bank, the Westpac 
and the Bank West had been chosen at 21.4%, 13.9% and 11.9% respectively. The 
results show that 80 respondents had used more than one online banking service, 
equivalent to 44.2%. These results are similar to a previous study carried out by 
Lichtenstein and Williamson  (2006), who revealed that 40.6% used at least one Internet 
banking service.  
 
Figure 4.3.2 shows the comparative statistics of the banks that the respondents 
had previously accessed and had been continuing. It can be seen that, overall, the current 
access, excluding the no answer provided option, had declined compared to the previous 
access. Focusing at first on the four most commonly used online banking services; the 
ANZ was the bank that the respondents still used even if it had declined by 4.9%. It was 
followed by the Commonwealth Bank for which the numbers dropped dramatically by 
7.8%. Similarly, the Westpac and the Bank West had decreased by 2.4% and 5.2% 
respectively. Note that these percentages have been derived from the total case 
percentages as shown in table 4.4.2, due to the unequal numbers of respondents between 
the two periods. Reasons why the respondents decided to stop using online banking 
services are discussed below. 
 
The most important reason that influenced the respondents to choose online 
banking with a particular bank was that 47.4% had continued by using online services 
offered by the bank in which they operated a traditional account. 19.7% chose a bank 
because of the excellent service it offered; followed by 13.7% who chose according to 
the security protections offered by the bank.  
 
On the other hand, many of the respondents did not continue with their original 
bank when they moved to online banking services. 38.9% decided to move their online 
banking account to another bank. 27.8% gave reasons such as they had forgotten their 
username and/or password, refinanced their accounts, and/or lost their money from that 
particular account. Another 16.7% decided to close their account permanently without 
giving any reasons; while another 16.7% discontinued their account due to their 
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uncertainty about the security of their online banking system. Importantly, for the one 
case in which the respondent had lost money from his online banking account it may be 
assumed that either there was a low level of security provided by the victim’s bank 
and/or his terminal was vulnerable to a phisher who gained access to the online banking 
system, as described in chapter 2. 
 
4.3.3 Summary of description of respondents’ experiences in using online banking 
Sections 4.3.1-4.3.2 provided a description of the respondents’ experiences in 
using their online banking services. These sections described the banks respondents 
accessed, their frequency of usage, their reasons to use online banking and choose a 
particular bank, and included the place in which they usually had access to online 
banking. 
 
The overall results show that the number of online banking respondents was 
greater than the non-online banking respondents. The reason that influenced most to use 
online banking was the convenience, whereas those who were not interested in using 
online banking were concerned about the security of online banking itself. The core 
activities of the respondents in accessing online banking services were money transfer, 
viewing balance and summary information, and paying bills; however, the activity of 
updating personal information was not often regarded as important. 
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Figure 4.3.2 Respondents’ behaviours in accessing online banking services compared between two statuses: previously 
accessed and currently accessing, categorised according to bank 
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Respondents usually accessed their online banking once a week from their home. 
Nearly half of the respondents had more than one online banking account. The reason 
that persuaded them to use their particular banks was that their existing traditional bank 
service could also offer online services. That usually occurred if there had been no 
incidents had led them to seek an alternative new bank. However, 16.7% had changed 
banks or closed their previous accounts because they felt that the online system they 
were using was not secure enough. People having more opportunity to access the 
Internet from home resulted in an increase of online banking access. Nevertheless, the 
perception that the security was not adequate outweighed the convenience offered by 
online banking, so that a significant number of people were still unwilling to utilise the 
services offered. 
 
4.4 Respondents’ experiences of online banking security 
Section 4.4 includes the analysis of the respondents’ experiences with regard to 
online banking security. The experiences of online banking incidents of some of the 
respondents are included in this and following sections. 
 
4.4.1 General use of accessing online banking services 
Statistics about the types of the Internet connections that the respondents used 
when accessing online banking were collected. The respondents who connected to the 
Internet with asymmetrical digital subscriber line (ADSL) wireless broadband had the 
highest frequency at 84 responses (40.2%), while ADSL wired broadband had 65 
responses or 31.1%. However, 14 responses (6.7%) did not know which type of Internet 
connection they used even though they accessed the Internet from home. AusCert 
(2008) revealed from their survey that 84% have some form of wired broadband; 9% 
have wireless or mobile broadband and 6% still use dial-up modems. In addition, similar 
research disclosed by ABS (2010d) released types of Internet connection from all the 
ISPs operating in Australia at 30 June 2010. At that time 92% of the Internet 
connections were non dial-up, and 44% of the total Internet connections were digital 
subscriber lines (DSL) which continued to be the major technology. In an extension to 
its definition, ABS (2010c) described DSL as: 
67 
 
 
It is a family of technologies that provides digital data transmission over 
the local telephone network. This suite of technologies, now referred to 
as xDSL, includes Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL, 
ADSL2, ADSL2+) and Symmetrical Digital Subscriber Line (SDSL), 
etc. DSL is excluded from ABS counts where it is not used for internet 
connectivity (e.g. leased lines). 
 
An Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) (2011) survey 
concluded that “financial considerations appear to be the strongest driver in consumer 
selection of an internet service provider (ISP) for a home internet service…  Other 
factors identified in the survey were: 
 
Table 4.4.1. Reasons for choice of ISP 
Reason Percentage 
Price 45 
Service speed 25 
Download limits 16 
Bundling and package deals 13 
(Source: Australian Communications and Media Authority, 2011) 
 
Perhaps the development of newer technologies has also had an effect on the 
consumer uptake of Internet connections, but the ACMA data does not include an 
examination of this possibility. 
 
Further detail was gathered about the technologies with which the respondents 
accessed their online banking. Different types of operating systems (OS) were installed 
on the computers that they most often used to access online banking. 30.8% had 
installed Windows XP for their OS, followed by Windows Vista, and Windows 7 at 
28.1% and 21.9% respectively. On the other hand, the respondents who installed 
Macintosh OS comprised 6.7 % of the total, while only 2.2% installed open source 
operating systems such as Linux. 2.7% were not sure of the operating system used in 
their device while only .4% (1 person) said that he used a banking sim card to access his 
online banking service. 20 people said that they used mobile palmtop devices to access 
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their online banking services. It is possible that the 6 of those who could not identify 
their OS were using mobile operating systems such as Windows Mobile, Android or 
iOS platforms. 
 
These findings parallel the W3Schools (2011) finding that the most popular 
operating system in 2010 was the Windows platform. In particular, Windows XP was 
still the highest OS platform installation, even if its use continuously decreased from 
January 2010 at 59.4% to December 2010 at 47.2%. Windows 7, on the other hand, 
increased continuously from January 2010 at 11.3% to December 2010 at 29.1%. 
StatCounter (2011) also revealed that Windows XP had the highest OS usage at 
approximately 48% and declined to 35% from January 2010 to December 2010. 
However, Windows 7 had increased dramatically from approximately 11% to 29% from 
the January to December in 2010. Nevertheless, Linux remained steady at the bottom of 
the list at approximately 1%. Internet connection types, operating systems installed, and 
their impacts on the respondents’ views toward online banking will be discussed further 
in chapter 5.  
 
4.4.2 Security protections installed on respondents’ computers 
 This section of the questionnaire focused on the use of security protection that 
was installed on respondents’ usual online banking access devices. It is possible that 
some people installed more than one type of security protection. 
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Table 4.4.2 Types of security protection installed on respondents’ computers 
  Frequency Percent 
Cases 
Valid cases 174 83.3 
Missing cases 35 16.7 
Total cases 209 100.0 
 Yes, I have installed anti-virus software. 124 38.9 
Responses 
Yes, I have installed firewall application. 76 23.8 
Yes, I have installed a popup window blocking tool. 43 13.5 
Yes, I have installed anti-spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
42 13.2 
Yes, I have installed security protection, but I am not 
sure what type of security protection I have in my 
computer. 
14 4.4 
I am not sure whether I have security protection or not 
(go to question C5). 
7 2.2 
No, I do not use computer security software protection 
(go to question C5). 
9 2.8 
Other, please specify 4 1.3 
Total responses 319 100.0 
 
Table 4.4.2 illustrates types of security protection installed on the respondents’ 
computers. As can be seen from Table 4.2.2, respondents were able to nominate more 
than one type of security in this section of the questionnaire. 174 respondents made a 
total of 319 responses. 38.9% of respondents installed anti-virus software as a main 
security protection. The second most common protection that respondents installed in 
their computers was a firewall, at 23.8%. Only 13.5% and 13.2% of the respondents 
installed anti-malware and pop-up blockers, respectively. 4.4% said that they had 
security protection, but they were unsure what types of security had been installed. 
Finally, 2.2% declared that they were not sure whether they had security protection on 
their computer or not. Most respondents relied on anti-virus applications to secure their 
computers whereas 48 respondents chose to install only the anti-virus without any extra 
applications. Thus it can be seen that most respondents relied on a single anti-virus 
protection to protect their computer system and secure their personal information. On 
one hand, it can be viewed as a positive result that most respondents were concerned 
about computer attacks; on the other hand, relying only on one type of software 
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protection is less effective in securing computer and personal information. Further 
discussion about this impact is in chapter 5. Moreover, the investigation of respondents’ 
frequency in updating security software also showed that most relied on their automatic 
security update at 36.5% of total responses, followed by daily update and weekly update 
which were 15.6% and 12.6% respectively.  
 
Upon the investigation, out of the 83.7% valid cases there were 58.9% who 
defined online banking statement as a website that resides on the bank’s server in the 
form of the bank’s home page. 7.2% (15 respondents) answered that online banking 
service is software provided by bank that operated and was resident on a PC to connect 
to the bank. On the contrary, 16.7% were not sure of the definition of online banking. 
According to Dixit and Datta (2010) Internet banking or online banking on a basic level 
can be referred to the mean of “setting up of a web page by a bank to give information 
about its products and services”. It also involves provision of facilities such as accessing 
accounts, transferring funds, and buying financial products or services online so that the 
consumer can use the Internet to access their bank account and to undertake transactions 
(Dixit & Datta, 2010). When asked, a majority of respondents understood the basic 
concept of online banking system. Further discussion about knowledge in online 
banking and the installation of security protection will be included in chapter 5 to report 
the respondents’ knowledge of online banking security systems and the software used to 
protect them from phishing attacks.  
 
Figure 4.4.3 illustrates the types of online banking authentication provided by 
the banks when the respondents accessed their online banking accounts. Most 
respondents were required to use a login and password authentication; this equated to 
61.2%. Login and password with mobile (SMS) verification code was dramatically less 
frequent, although it remained the second highest percentage at 18.2%. Login and 
password with token device was reported by 7.9%. Interestingly, logging in with the 
code that was attached on the credit card, EFTPOS or on a paper assigned by the bank 
and authenticating with other uncategorised online banking authentications (e.g., 
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password via online keyboard with mobile verification codes, and use ID and PIN 
entered via mouse which cannot be typed), had the same lowest percentages at 1.4%. 
 
However, the number of the respondents who had accessed their online banking 
account with biometric security was only 1.90%. Biometric security seems to be the 
newest type of authentication security that banks have started to implement to secure 
their customers’ personal identity. In Australia, the National Australia Bank (NAB) 
(Gedda, 2009) had launched a voice biometric identification and verification function 
aimed at delivering enhanced customer experience and security.  
 
The initial use of online banking authentication method as login + password was 
the most popular used, even if many banks were trying to develop and introduce better 
security authentication for their customers. Further investigation evaluated the numbers 
of passwords that the respondents exploited when accessing their online banking. It 
found that 8-character of the password was the length that most respondents selected 
when authenticating their account with the frequency used of 48 responses (27.6%) 
whereas 10-character password was used to authenticate with the frequency of 30 
responses (17.2%). Interestingly, the 2 character password had a higher number of uses 
than 4 character password for 22 (12.6%). Finally, there were 19 responses (10.9%) who 
had password lengths more than 10-16 characters. 
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4.4.3 Respondents’ security protection provided when accessing online banking services 
 
Figure 4.4.3 Types of security authentication provided for online banking 
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4.4.4 Respondents’ experiences of inaccessible online banking services 
Table 4.4.4 Experience of inaccessible online banking services 
 
Have been locked out Allowed to re-access 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Responses 
Yes 64 30.6 34 16.3 
No 112 53.6 30 14.4 
Total 176 84.2 64 30.6 
Missing 
No answer 9 4.4 9 4.4 
Not applicable 24 11.5 136 65.1 
Total 33 15.8 145 69.4 
Total responses 209 100 209 100 
 
Table 4.4.4 displays the statistics related to respondents who admitted having 
made an error which restricted their access to their online banking accounts. More than 
half of the sample, 112 respondents (53.6%) had never experienced their online bank 
accounts becoming inaccessible. On the other hand, 64 respondents (30.6%) had 
experienced their accounts becoming inaccessible. Conversely, the right-hand columns 
show that there were 30 respondents (14.4%) who were not allowed to re-access their 
online banking account whilst 34 respondents (16.3%) still were allowed to re-access 
their account after a period of time. The survey also asked the respondents how they 
reported online banking incidents. Of 156 respondents to this question, 46.7% chose to 
call a number provided on the ‘contact us' webpage, whereas 17.3% chose to inform the 
bank in person, and 13.1% preferred to use the e-mail provided. Other respondents 
indicated that they would “call bank centre”, “call number on card”, “contact account 
manager”, “direct call to the bank I know, not just ‘contact us’ page”, and “ring bank 
1800 number”. 
 
Figure 4.4.5 illustrates the online financial institutions and services the 
respondents believed had the strongest security. Of 83.7% of valid cases, the bank was 
seen to have the strongest online security, with a percentage of 44% overall, or half of 
the valid total. However, 27.8% (58 respondents) were not sure what could be the most 
secure institution for online financial services. Another three reasons the respondents 
specified, beyond the choices included in the question, were: “I trust the companies that 
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use an external code on special remote”, “I don’t trust anyone”, and “they are equally 
bad”.  
Further discussion exemplified the preferred security that the respondents trusted 
in their online financial institution. There were 59 people, (28.2%), who did not know 
what they liked about their preferred online financial institutions’ security, whereas 52 
people (24.6%) provided some details. 
 
The strongest four reasons, each selected by 1.9% of the respondents, were the 
issue of their safe and secure feelings, the presence of password authentication 
mechanisms, and SMS verification. A miscellaneous group, totalling 7.7% of 
respondents, provided other reasons as follows: 
 
(i) It allows the use of long passwords with both letters and numbers to 
authenticate, 
(ii) It has HTTPs secure web protection, 
(iii) It monitors customers activities, and  
(iv) They have high standards. 
 
The above reasons were some of the main points that respondents mentioned about 
their trust of the security measures offered by their chosen organization. If the similar 
group of reasons are combined, it can be seen that respondents paid more attention to 
the password authentication methods than to the feelings of trust or the complexities of 
the security authentication. 
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4.4.5 Respondents’ levels of trust of secure online financial institutions 
 
Figure 4.4.5 Levels of trust of secure online financial institution 
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4.4.6 Summary of respondents’ experiences of online banking security 
Sections 4.4.1-4.4.5 present descriptive results of respondents’ experiences of 
online banking security in terms of the types of OS implemented in the machine they 
used for their online banking, the security software protection they used, the types of 
authentication security provided, their experiences in being locked out from the systems 
and how to deal with any of the problems they faced, in conjunction with their basic 
perceptions of online banking systems. The overall results show that most respondents 
had wireless Internet connections and used the Windows XP platform to access their 
online banking. Approximately one of every three respondents installed only anti-virus 
software without any extra security applications; this was the most secure option that 
most respondents installed. Even if most respondents had knowledge of online banking 
systems, they seemed to believe anti-virus software with the auto-update option was 
secure enough to protect their computers and personal information. Surprisingly, a basic 
login with username and password was the most common online banking security 
provided to the respondents by banks, with most respondents assigned passwords with 8 
digits. Approximately half of the respondents had experienced being unable to access 
their own accounts; with half of those being allowed to re-access their online banking 
account. Finally, the majority of the respondents indicated that they believed that the 
banks were the strongest financial institutions in terms of the security provided. 
 
4.5 Respondents’ preferences for deployment of online banking security protection 
This section discusses the respondents’ perceptions and preferences in terms of 
the security offered by the online banking services they used. Respondents were asked 
whether they believed it was necessary to pay fees to ensure additional security, what 
kinds of passwords should be utilised and whether different kinds of authentication 
should be used in combination with passwords. 
 
4.5.1 General information of online banking security system preferences 
The investigator asked respondents for their reactions to the suggestion of paying 
mandatory fees for additional security measures such as biometric, or physical security 
authentication, or token devices such as a random numeric code device. 50.7% of the 
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valid responses disagreed with paying a mandatory fee as they believed that it should 
have been included in bank fees or it should have been the bank’s responsibility to 
provide customers with security services free of charge. On the other hand, 32.5% 
agreed to pay a fee and specified various fee rates, as shown in Figure 4.5.1. 13.4% 
preferred to pay $2-$5 per month, while 8.6% of the respondents decided $1 monthly 
should be sufficient.  
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Figure 4.5.1 Suggested monthly fees for using additional security measures
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4.5.2 Respondents’ password preferences in online banking security 
Respondents were asked how they thought they should create their passwords to 
secure their online banking accounts. 
 
Table 4.5.2 Types of passwords preferred for secure online banking account 
  Frequency Percent 
Cases 
Valid cases 153 73.2 
Missing cases 56 26.8 
Total cases 209 100.0 
Responses 
Numbers 12 7.5 
Lower case alphabets (e.g. abc) 7 4.4 
Upper case alphabets (e.g., ABC) 2 1.3 
Special characters (e.g. @#%&*) 4 2.5 
Mixed of numbers and lower case alphabets 48 30.0 
Mixed of numbers and upper case alphabets 8 5.0 
Mixed of numbers and special characters 8 5.0 
Mixed of numbers, special characters, lower case and 
upper case alphabets 
52 32.5 
I prefer not to answer 16 10.0 
Other, please specify 3 1.9 
Total responses 160 100 
 
Table 4.5.2 summarises the types of password respondents preferred to use to 
secure their online banking account from attack. The preferred passwords were not only 
provided by the respondents, but also included the use of password generators or token 
devices that randomly assigned security codes. 52 responses (32.5%) selected a mix of 
numbers and special characters with lower case and upper case alphabets, while the 
mixture of numbers and lower case alphabets had 48 responses (30%). On the other 
hand, purely upper case alphabets were selected by only 1.3% of respondents. It can be 
seen that most respondents preferred to mix lower and upper case alphabets and 
numbers to create their passwords rather than using a weaker type of password for their 
online banking authentication processes.  
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Table 4.5.3 Minimum length of passwords preferences 
Password Frequency Percent Password Frequency Percent Password Frequency Percent 
10 20 9.6 4 1 .5 8-10 3 1.4 
10-12 1 .5 5 3 1.4 9 6 2.9 
10-15 1 .5 5-6 1 .5 Doesn't matter 1 .5 
10-20 1 .5 6 28 13.4 More than 4. 1 .5 
11 1 .5 6-10 1 .5 More than 5 1 .5 
12 3 1.4 6-8 3 1.4 More than10. 1 .5 
15 4 1.9 7 7 3.3 Unlimited 1 .5 
16 2 1.0 8 61 29.2 - - - 
Valid Total 152 72.7 
Missing 
No answer 31 14.8 
Not applicable 26 12.4 
Missing Total 57 27.3 
Overall Total 209 100.0 
 
The investigator then asked the 152 respondents about the minimum length of their passwords. 61 respondents, or 
29.2%, verified their passwords as being 8 digits in length. 28 respondents (13.4%), selected 6 digits for the minimum length 
of their passwords. The next largest group, of 20 respondents (9.6%), chose 10 digits. The minimum password length that the 
one respondent preferred was 4 characters; another believed it was not necessary to specify how many characters formed the 
password, as long as there was a minimum of 10 digits. Each of these options was selected by 1 person and formed 0.5% of 
responses. In addition, one person indicated that it was not necessary to specify the length of passwords, because he believed 
that increasing the length of the password did not enhance the robustness of the password. 
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Figure 4.5.2 Frequency in changing online banking password 
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Furthermore, the survey also collected the respondents’ opinions about the frequency of 
changing online banking passwords. The graph 4.5.2 shows that most respondents 
(18.7%) preferred to change their password every 3 months, while 12.4% preferred to 
change their password every 6 months, and a further 12% chose to change their 
password every month.  
 
In addition to this survey, the respondents were asked their opinion toward changing 
their online banking passwords periodically in order to protect their account from 
unauthorised use. The result revealed that out of 172 responses, 132 respondents 
(63.2%) agreed to change their online banking password. This result was also opposed 
with KeCrypt’s research (2010) in which 7% of the customers preferred to change their 
passwords. However, 40 respondents (19.1%) disagreed to change their password. The 
reasons that those who chose not to change their password were listed below:  
 
(i) It is easy to forget; therefore, so they may choose to write down the new 
password and this could make them more vulnerable. 
(ii) It is inconvenient to create a new password. 
(iii) Changing the password may not solve the problem as changing the password 
does not counteract all types of phishing attacks. 
(iv) Changing the password should depend on the customers’ preferences. 
 
The reasons above paralleled Dale’s (2010) research about the problems of using 
multiple passwords and PINs as authentication methods. 60% had a problem with 
remembering and/or forgetting passwords, which eventually required the respondents to 
write them down (KeCrypt Systems Ltd, 2010). 
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4.5.3 Respondents’ security authentication preferences 
 
 
Figure 4.5.3 Preferred online banking authentication methods 
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It was very surprising that a simple login of username and password was the 
highest scoring authentication method, being chosen by 51 respondents (24.4%). This 
was followed by mobile (SMS) verification, which was chosen by 48 respondents 
(23%). Login with password and an additional token device, and verification with 
passwords and biometrics were the third and the fourth choices of respondents, with 33 
responses (15.8%) and 31 responses (14.8%) respectively. Nevertheless, in a group of 
miscellaneous answers, one respondent recommended the combination of all the first 
seven security methods shown on Figure 4.5.3. Another believed that none of the 
authentication methods listed in Figure 4.5.3 was secure. 
 
Subsequently the investigator analysed the hypothesis that there was a 
significant correlation between the security provided by banks (Figure 4.4.3) and the 
perceptions of the respondents in choosing their preferred authentication methods 
(Figure 4.5.3). Therefore, a goodness-of-fit of the chi-square test (X2) was used to 
compute the hypothesis assumption. The hypotheses for this test were written according 
to the formula below:  
 
H0: The authentication security provided by bank has no influence on the respondents in 
choosing their authentication security preferences. 
H1: The authentication security provided by banks has an influence on respondents in 
choosing their authentication security preferences. 
 
The compiled results showed the chi-square result and related values as X2 (49, 
N = 155) = 175.306 p <.01 (p = .000), which means the X2 value was 175.306, degree 
of freedom (df) was 49, and the probability of chance (p-value) was 0.000. This can be 
interpreted to mean that the chi-square value is not greater than the critical value at 
level .01; therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected and H1 can be accepted. 
Therefore, the authentication security provided by banks does influence respondents in 
choosing their authentication security preferences.  
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4.5.4 Means and standard deviations of preferred security authentication methods 
Table 4.5.4 Descriptive statistics of online banking security methods in customers’ 
opinions 
Common types of online banking security methods N Mean Standard Deviation 
Login+ password 140 5.44 2.277 
Login+ password + static verification code attached on 
card 
140 4.41 1.512 
Login+ password + security questions 140 4.22 1.957 
Login + password + challenge-response code 140 3.83 1.967 
Login+ password + token device 140 3.41 1.658 
Login+ password + mobile (SMS) verification code 140 3.41 1.586 
Login+ password + biometric 140 3.28 2.046 
 
Table 4.5.4 displays common types of online banking security methods that 140 
respondents prioritised from what they believed it was the most secure to the least 
secure. Answers to this question were calculated to find the mean values and the 
standard deviations (SD). The higher the mean value, the lower common security 
methods were ranked. Types of online banking security methods have been prioritised 
from the highest mean and SD values to the lowest one. It appears that login + password 
had the highest result (M = 5.44, SD = 2.277), followed by login + password + static 
verification code (M = 4.41, SD = 1.512). On the other hand, login + password + 
biometric had the lowest value (M = 3.28, SD = 2.046). It can be seen few of the 
respondents believed that the simplest protection, such as Login + password, was 
sufficient for online banking, while the use of biometric authentication was accepted by 
many of the respondents as offering the necessary highest levels of security. 
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4.5.5 Respondents’ opinions regarding the safety, trust, and confidence toward their online banking system 
 
Table 4.5.5 Respondents’ opinions in relation to the safety of using online banking 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
f % f % f % f % f % f % f % f % 
Cases 
Valid cases 161 77.0 162 77.5 162 77.5 158 75.6 158 75.6 156 74.6 159 76.1 158 75.6 
Missing cases 48 23.0 47 22.5 47 22.5 51 24.4 51 24.4 53 25.4 50 23.9 51 24.4 
Total cases 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 
Responses 
1= Strongly not 
believe 
5 2.4 3 1.4 1 .5 17 8.1 19 9.1 2 1.0 7 3.3 3 1.4 
2= not believe 11 5.3 20 9.6 15 7.2 34 16.3 32 15.3 10 4.8 15 7.2 6 2.9 
3= neither believe 
nor not believe 
54 25.8 42 20.1 35 16.7 47 22.5 56 26.8 39 18.7 30 14.4 35 16.7 
4= believe 70 33.5 73 34.6 85 40.7 49 23.4 35 16.7 83 39.7 61 29.2 55 26.3 
5= strongly believe 21 10.0 24 11.5 26 12.4 11 5.3 16 7.7 22 10.5 46 22.0 59 28.2 
Missing 
No answer 24 11.5 23 11.0 23 11.0 27 12.9 27 12.9 29 13.9 26 12.4 27 12.9 
Not applicable 24 11.5 24 11.5 24 11.5 24 11.5 24 11.5 24 11.5 24 11.5 24 11.5 
Total responses 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 
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f= Frequency, number of times score  
1= Using an online banking system is financially secure. 
2= I trust an online banking system to protect my personal information 
3= I have confidence in the security measures that my online banking system uses. 
4= Attack incidents against online banking systems have no influence in my level of 
confidence about online banking 
5= I am able to distinguish if a financial institution’s website is secure. 
6= I am satisfied with the security protection of my online banking account. 
7= I consider that security features are a main factor in my decision whether or not to do 
business with an Internet based company 
8= My bank should offer security metrics to measure how secure my online banking is; 
this would be valuable to me. 
 
Table 4.5.5 shows respondents’ opinions about the safety of using online 
banking. The questions within this section of the questionnaire aimed to evaluate 
respondents’ feelings about whether they could trust the levels of safety offered by their 
online banking institution. Responses were categorised by each of the statements listed 
above. 70 respondents (33.5%) believed that using an online banking system was 
financially secure. 73 respondents (34.66%) believed they could trust an online banking 
system to protect their personal information. 85 respondents (40.7%) believed that they 
could be confident about the security measures that their online banking system used. 
This confidence also extended to the situation where 49 respondents (23.4%) believed 
that attack incidents against online banking systems would not diminish their levels of 
confidence about online banking. However, 56 respondents (26.8%) of the group were 
unable to say whether they had the ability to distinguish whether a financial institution’s 
website was secure or not. Satisfaction with the security protection of customers’ online 
banking accounts was reported by 83 respondents (39.7%), while 61 respondents 
(29.2%) of the group believed that the security features offered were a major factor in 
respondents’ decisions whether or not to do business with an Internet-based company. 
Eventually, 59 respondents (28.8%) suggested that they would find it valuable if their 
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banks had offered security metrics to measure the levels of security of their online 
banking. 
 
The previous paragraph has reported the levels of agreement with statements 
about the trustworthiness of online banking security. Some of the statements were very 
similar. For example, statement 3 respondents who believed or strongly believed they 
could have confidence in the security measures of their online banking system totalled 
53.1%. Those respondents who believed or strongly believed statement 6, that they were 
satisfied with the security protection of their online banking account, totalled 50.2%. 
Analysis of the 8th statement, that respondents would value the banks which offered 
security metrics for customers to measure the security of their online banking, showed 
that 54.5% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed. Nearly half of the respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed with statement 1 that using an online banking system is 
financially secure. 46.4% agreed or strongly agreed with statement 2, that the banks 
were trusted to protect their personal information. Interestingly, the number of 
respondents who believed that attack incidents against online banking systems would 
have no influence on their levels of confidence about online banking was only slightly 
greater at 28.7% than those would disagreed or disagreed strongly at 24.4%. The neutral 
responses to this statement totalled 22.5% of the group. Those respondents who were 
not sure if they were able to distinguish if a financial institution’s website was secure 
totalled 26.8%, greater than those who believed that they could with only 24.4% of 
respondents selecting that option. Those who were sure they could not identify a secure 
webpage numbered 24.4% of the group.  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that respondents trusted the security provided for 
their online banking more than their own ability to diagnose any problems with their 
online banking. Although the group who agreed that online attacks would not prejudice 
their level of confidence about online banking was the largest group of responses to 
statement 4, the differences between the groups was not significant. There was no clear 
indication that attack incidents would either damage or enhance their trust of the 
security offered by their existing online banking. 
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4.5.6 Respondents’ opinions regarding the multilevel and complexity of security protection toward their online 
banking system 
 
Table 4.5.6 Respondents’ opinion about security preferences of their online banking system 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
f % f % f % f % f % f % f % f % 
Cases 
Valid cases 159 76.1 160 76.6 159 76.1 157 75.1 160 76.6 159 76.1 157 75.1 156 74.6 
Missing cases 50 23.9 49 23.4 50 23.9 52 24.6 49 23.4 50 23.9 52 24.6 53 25.4 
Total cases 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 
Responses 
1= Strongly 
disagree 
2 1.0 11 5.3 3 1.4 6 2.9 4 1.9 6 2.9 9 4.4 7 3.3 
2= disagree 12 5.7 34 16.3 4 1.9 6 2.9 6 2.9 3 1.4 13 6.2 7 3.3 
3=neither agree 
or nor disagree 
22 10.5 31 14.8 23 11.0 18 8.6 12 5.7 4 1.9 25 12.0 12 5.7 
4= agree 54 25.8 43 20.6 54 25.8 25 12.0 25 12.0 14 6.7 19 9.1 25 12.0 
5= strongly agree 69 33.0 41 19.6 75 35.9 102 48.8 113 54.1 132 63.2 91 43.5 105 50.2 
Missing 
No answer 26 12.4 25 12.0 26 12.4 28 13.4 25 12.0 26 12.4 28 13.4 29 13.9 
Not applicable 24 11.5 24 11.5 24 11.5 24 11.5 24 11.5 24 11.5 24 11.5 24 11.5 
Total responses 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 209 100.0 
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f= frequency, number of times score  
1= My bank should apply multi security protection, such as login and password and 
SMS mobile verification code and digital signature. 
2= My bank should prompt me with a security question, such as ‘what is your mother's 
maiden name?’ every time I log on to my online banking account. 
3= My bank should offer a tracking facility showing all transactions and detail about 
when I have logged in and out. 
4= My bank should never allow more than one computer access to the same online 
banking account at the same time. 
5= My bank should detect, deny and stop all online banking activities if there is more 
than one computer accessing the same online banking account at the same time. 
6= My bank should log off my account automatically when I close the window. 
7= My bank should log off my account automatically after I have been logged on for 45 
minutes.  
8= My bank should log off my account automatically if my bank webpage is not active 
for 15 minutes.  
 
Table 4.5.6 shows respondents’ opinions about the security deployment of their 
online banking system. The questions within this section of the questionnaire aimed to 
evaluate respondents’ opinion about their transaction security preferences by their 
online banking institution. Responses were categorised by each of the statements listed 
above. 69 respondents (33%) strongly agreed that their bank should have applied multi 
security protection, such as login and password and SMS mobile verification code and 
digital signature. 75 respondents (35.9%) strongly agreed that their bank should have 
offered a tracking facility that shows all transactions and detail about when the 
respondents have had logged in and out. This strong attitude also extended to the 
situation where 102 respondents (48.8%) respondents agreed that their bank should have 
not allowed more than one computer to have access to the same online banking account 
at the same time. Also, they preferred their banks to have a monitoring system to detect, 
deny, and stop all online banking activities if there is more than one computer accessing 
the same online banking account at the same time. This percentage was 54.1% or 
91 
 
equalled 113 respondents. Moreover, high numbers of 132 respondents (63.2%), 
strongly agreed that their bank should have logged off their account automatically when 
they closed the windows. In addition, there was strong agreement of 105 respondents 
(50.2%) to the statement that their banks should log off their accounts automatically if 
their bank webpage was not active for 15 minutes. Lastly, when the respondents were 
asked if their banks should have logged off their accounts automatically after they have 
been logged on for 45 minutes, the numbers strongly agreeing were 91 responses 
(43.5%.) However, only 43 respondents (20.6%) just agreed to allow their banks to 
prompt them with a security question every time they logged on to their online account.  
 
The previous paragraph has reported the levels of agreement with statements 
about the multiple levels and complexities of security protection. It can be seen that 
most respondents strongly agreed that their banks should have applied those 
complexities of security to their online banking systems. Only one security protection, 
statement 2 which was the security question, such as ‘What is your mother’s maiden 
name?’, saw many respondents agree rather than strongly agree.  
 
In addition, the table showed apparently that the majority of the respondents had 
positive opinions about implementing multilevel security for their online accounts. The 
total numbers of the respondents who agreed and strongly agreed with each statement 
were higher than the total number of those who disagreed and strongly disagreed or 
were neutral.  
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4.5.7 Respondents’ additional opinions toward online banking system 
Table 4.5.7 Respondents’ opinion about using online banking or security protection for 
online banking 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Increasing/ improving level of online banking 
security 
15 31.3 
Convenient satisfaction 8 16.7 
User education 6 12.5 
Self-awareness in security 4 8.3 
Ease of use 3 6.3 
Refund policy satisfaction 2 4.2 
Security satisfaction 1 2.1 
Other, please specify 9 18.8 
Total responses 48 100.0 
 
Table 4.5.7 shows respondents’ additional opinions regarding the use of online 
banking or security protection for online banking. It can be seen that 16.7% of 
respondents were satisfied that the convenience of using online banking made their life 
easier; however, only 2.1% were satisfied with online banking security measures. In 
addition, 31.3% of the respondents concerned about bank security and therefore wanted 
banks to increase and/or improve level of online banking security. 12.5% of the 
respondents suggested that it was necessary to educate users about benefits of online 
banking, its security, and to provide additional information about protecting users from 
online banking attacks. Moreover, 18.8% of the respondents mentioned their additional 
opinions that, even if they were using online banking, they really preferred not to use it 
because they were aware of the numbers of threats and attacks on online banking.  
These show that the security issue is the main concern for respondents in regarding to 
using online banking services. It can be concluded that increasing and improving online 
banking security by banks was the main concern that banks should focus upon ensuring 
that respondents have been given all information about the system and know how to 
protect themselves from the scammers.  
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4.5.8 Summary of respondents’ opinions about online banking security 
Sections 4.5.1-4.5.7 illustrate descriptive results of respondents’ opinion in a 
deployment of online banking security protection in terms of types of passwords and 
online banking security protection, and mandatory fees for deploying security measures. 
It also covered the respondents’ views about changing passwords durations, minimum 
length of secured passwords, prioritised secured password preferences, and their opinion 
on online banking safety and security features. The data about the respondents’ opinions 
of authentication security and advanced security features, needed to enhance their online 
banking security knowledge and ensure they can protect themselves from phishing 
attacks, has been analysed. The overall results indicated that most respondents preferred 
their passwords to have a mix of numbers, special characters, and lower case and upper 
case alphabets with the minimum of 8 digits. The responses revealed that the 
respondents agreed to change their password every 3 months for their bank account 
security. However, types of security authentication methods were not correlated with the 
complexity of the password. What was interesting was that most respondents chose the 
simplest authentication method, such as login with username and password, for their 
access more than the more complex methods such as login with username, password and 
mobile verification (SMS). This result was associated with the next question, which 
asked the respondents to prioritise the common types of online banking security from 
strongest protection to the weakest protection. However, the outcome revealed that login 
and password had become the weakest type of security whereas login with username + 
password and token digits had become the strongest security protection. Nevertheless, 
most respondents still believed in the safety, trust, and confidence toward their existing 
online banking system and also agreed to the points that their bank should have 
increased or implicated more multilevel and complexity of security protection toward 
their online banking system with free of charge. Lastly, more of their opinions about 
online banking security also indicated in the same way of the results that banks should 
have increased and/or improved level of online banking security to protect against 
phishing. 
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4.6 Respondents’ experiences in relation to online banking attacks 
This section presents the analysis of the semi-structured and open-ended 
questionnaire reports of the respondents’ experiences and their knowledge about 
phishing attacks and how to mitigate the risks. Due to the qualitative findings gathered, 
data cannot be analysed with any statistical degree of measurement. However, with a 
high volume of interview responses, the investigator has grouped similar viewpoints 
together and categorised them flexibly, based on the main keywords of the analysis. 
Findings are presented below in graphs or tables with their percentages and/or frequency 
values.  Some questions included the ability to make more than one choice from the 
options named. The totals of frequencies and percentages may be varied according to 
the numbers of respondents who answered each question. 
 
4.6.1 Interview question 1: Respondents’ opinions toward any online banking 
threat 
Table 4.6.1 Interview question 1: Knowledge about online banking threat 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Yes, I know 74 35.4 
No, I do not know 25 12 
Total 99 47.4 
 
Table 4.6.1 displays the interview question that had been asked the respondents 
about any online banking threat that they had heard from different channels. Out of 99 
interviewees, 74 respondents (35.4%) had heard of online banking threats whereas 25 
respondents (12%) had never heard of any online banking threats. Respondents were 
asked further whether they had heard about any online banking threat and whether their 
information had come from media, friends or banks. ATM skimming device incidents 
were specifically excluded. Particular detail of what respondents knew or had heard will 
be discussed on the paragraph below. 
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Figure 4.6.1 Channels of information obtained about any online banking threats
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The graph shows that 14 respondents (6.7%) obtained information from a bank, 
while 6 respondents (2.9%) heard about online banking threats from friends. 8 
respondents (3.8%) received information about online banking threats from other 
sources, such as school discussion, radio, and from published articles. It can be seen that 
the respondents had good connections to their banks in terms of receiving online 
banking security information.  
 
Table 4.6.1.1 Main points about online banking threats that respondents knew or had 
heard 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Warning/ customers’ awareness regarding online banking threats 10 4.8 
Fraudulent e-mail pretending to be from bank and asking for 
bank account detail or security question. 
10 4.8 
Have heard from someone's experience where his/her credit card 
number or money has been transferred/ used/ stolen 
7 3.3 
Scam mail that may look like legitimate business requesting 
personal information (e.g., username & password) 
5 2.4 
Attacking users' computer system with installed malware 
application to manipulate, acquire or delete user's information 
for fraudulent purposes 
5 2.4 
Fraudulent website that may look like the legitimate bank, 
asking to click the link and provide information 
2 1.0 
Hacking into victim's account and transferring money to the 
scammer 
2 1.0 
Coming from Nigeria/ winning lotto/ charity that looks like a 
legitimate business to join or participate with them by providing 
some information 
1 .5 
Other, please specify...(uncategorised answers) 5 2.4 
Other, please specify...(unrelated/ unclear answers) 4 1.9 
Not specified 22 10.5 
Total 73 34.9 
 
Responses to the online banking threat question had been categorised according 
to the points respondents raised about their experiences which were shown in Table 
4.6.1.1. 10 respondents (4.8%) received customers’ awareness information about online 
banking threats by their bank’s announcements. 9 respondents (4.4%) specified what 
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they knew or had heard about online banking threat that it was a fraudulent e-mail which 
pretended to be from a bank and asked recipients for account details or security 
questions. Interestingly, 7 respondents (3.3%), claimed to have heard about someone 
else’s experience, such as their friends or families, whom their credit card number or 
money had been transferred, used, or stolen from the Internet. In addition, 6 respondents 
(2.9%) knew or had heard about online banking threats differently. The answers 
provided were:  
 
(i) Yes, users information was disclosed to online & tele-sales as 
'CONTACTS'. 
(ii) Yes, bank security system attacks by hacker. 
(iii) Identity theft - dangers of discarding bank statements etc without shredding. 
(iv) I read an article that a number of years ago a computer in Asia was found to 
have all the customers banking details from a bank in Australia. 
(v) From a friend originally from New Zealand. He said he gets phishing e-
mails regularly. 
 
It can be seen that most respondents knew, had heard, or had been informed about 
online banking security threats by their banks in most cases. The most frequent 
responses were about fraudulent e-mail pretending to be from the bank and asking 
customers for bank account details or security questions, and customers’ awareness 
about online banking threat.  
 
98 
 
4.6.2 Interview question 2: Respondents’ opinions about phishing 
This question aimed to interview the respondents of what they knew or had 
heard about phishing. 
 
Table 4.6.2 Interview question 2: Knowledge about phishing 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Yes, I know 36 17.2 
Yes, I know (a little/ somewhat), but I am not so 
sure 
30 14.4 
No, I do not know 16 7.7 
I am not sure 5 2.4 
Other 8 3.8 
Total 95 45.5 
 
From the table above, 66 respondents (31.6%) believed that they knew or had 
heard about phishing whereas 16 people (7.7%) had never heard of phishing at all. 
Among the 66 respondents, 30 respondents (14.4%) of the entire group, knew or had 
heard about phishing vaguely, whereas 36 respondents (17.2%) had more confidence 
about their phishing knowledge. Only 5 respondents (2.4%) indicated that they were 
unsure if they really knew about phishing.  
 
Table 4.6.2.1 categorises respondents’ knowledge about phishing. 16% indicated 
that phishing was a fraudulent e-mail which pretended to be from a bank and asked 
recipients for bank account details or their security questions. 14.5% believed that 
phishing was a scammer who penetrated into victims’ accounts, and stole and/or 
transferred money to the scammers’ accounts without the victims’ knowledge. 12% said 
that phishing was a fraudulent website that looked like a legitimate bank, and that asked 
a customer to click the given link to provide personal information. In contrast, 2.7% 
believed that phishing was malicious software which attacked users’ computer systems 
and manipulated and/or stole users’ information for fraudulent purposes. In addition, 
9.3% provided different answers. Their answer pointed out roughly that phishing was a 
hack, a kind of illegal act, or a form of social engineering. 
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Table 4.6.2.1 Respondents’ knowledge about phishing 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Fraudulent e-mail pretending to be from bank and asking for 
bank account detail or security question. 
12 16.0 
Scammer penetrates into victim's account and steals/ transfers 
money to the scammer’s account 
11 14.5 
Fraudulent website that may look like legitimate bank, asking to 
click the link and provide information 
9 12.0 
Scam mail that may look like legitimate business requesting 
personal information (e.g., username & password) 
6 8.0 
Coming from Nigeria/ winning lotto/ charity that looks like a 
legitimate business to join or participate with them by providing 
some information 
4 5.3 
An illegal activity for the purpose of criminally attempting to 
acquire sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, 
and credit card numbers. 
3 4.0 
Malicious software attacks users' computer system and 
manipulate/ steal users’ information for fraudulent purposes 
2 2.7 
Other, please specify...(uncategorised answers) 7 9.3 
Other, please specify...(unrelated answers) 6 8.0 
Not specify 15 20.0 
total 75 100 
 
The interesting point is that the main idea of phishing attack, in respondents’ 
opinions, was more focused on the threat that imitated bank forms, either by e-mail or 
website versions, to entice customers into revealing their personal information. These 
combinations were 28% compared to all kinds of phishing activities. 
 
The answers that the respondents had mentioned about phishing were: fraudulent 
e-mail pretending to be from the bank, penetrating into user’s account to steal money, 
and fraudulent websites that look like legitimate bank were the main answers 
respondents mentioned. To ensure that their knowledge were sufficient enough in terms 
of the acts of phishing, the research has quoted most common acts of phishing under 3 
circumstances defined by the Commonwealth of Australia (2011b) as follows:  
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‘Phishing’ refers to e-mails that trick people into giving out their personal and 
banking information; they can also be sent by SMS. These messages seem to come from 
legitimate businesses, normally banks or other financial institutions or 
telecommunications providers. The scammers are generally trying to get information 
like your bank account numbers, passwords and credit card numbers, which they will 
then use to steal your money. 
 
Phishing e-mails often look genuine and use what look to be genuine internet 
addresses—in fact, they often copy an institution's logo and message format, which is 
very easy to do. It is also common for phishing messages to contain links to websites 
that are convincing fakes of real companies' home pages. 
 
The website that the scammer’s e-mail links to will have an address (URL) that 
is similar to but not the same as a real bank's or financial institution’s site. For example, 
if the genuine site is at 'www.realbank.com.au', the scammer may use an address like 
'www.realbank.com.au.log107.biz' or 'www.phoneybank.com/realbank.com.au/login'. 
 
4.6.3 Interview question 3: Respondents’ opinions about malicious attack 
The purpose of this question was to explore the respondents’ opinions about 
spyware, adware, and Trojans. 
 
Table 4.6.3 Interview question 3: Discussion about malicious threats 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Yes, I know 9 4.3 
No, I do not know 17 8.1 
Yes, I know (a little/ somewhat), but I am not so sure 55 26.3 
I am not sure 5 2.4 
Other 4 1.9 
Total 90 43.1 
 
From the table above, 64 respondents (30.6%) believed that they knew or had 
heard about malicious software whereas 17 respondents (8.1%) did not understand this 
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terminology. However, among the knowledge answers, 55 respondents considered that 
they knew or had heard about malicious software slightly, whereas 9 respondents (4.3%) 
had more confidence with their knowledge. Only 5 respondents (2.4%) were unlikely to 
indicate the malicious definitions. Results of respondents’ knowledge of each term will 
be displayed in a table below. 
 
As shown in table 4.6.3, 9 respondents (4.3%) indicated their knowledge that 
spyware was a software attack that secretly monitored users’ computer and 
collected/manipulated personal information, or interfered with users’ computer controls. 
On the other hand, 5 respondents (2.4%) believed that spyware was a virus, or a 
program used for detecting viruses, or something that could damage users’ computers. 
In addition, 8 respondents (3.8%) stated their belief that adware was a form of pop-up or 
any software package which automatically played, displayed, or downloaded 
advertisements to a computer. Some types of attacks were integrated with the spyware 
designed to interfere with users’ computers or to gain personal information. In contrast, 
3 respondents (1.4%) believed that adware was a kind of security protection for 
detecting viruses, or something that collected users’ information in order to sell it to 
marketers. Besides, 11 respondents (5.3%) said that Trojans were harmful pieces of 
software that looked legitimate and allowed an attacker to gain remote access to a target 
computer system and perform various unwanted/unauthorised operations. On the 
contrary, 4 respondents (1.9%) claimed that Trojans were the most serious virus and 
very difficult to remove, or they were the same type of viruses or spyware applications 
that allowed people to detect the victim’s password.  
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Table 4.6.3 Respondents’ opinions about malicious definitions 
 Spyware Frequency % Adware Frequency % Trojan Horses Frequency % 
Responses 
Software that secretly 
monitors users’ 
computing and collect/ 
manipulate various 
types of personal 
information or 
interfere with users’ 
computer controls. 
9 4.3 
A form of pop-up or any 
software package which 
automatically plays, displays, 
or downloads advertisements 
to a computer. Some may 
integrate with spyware 
purposed for interfere users’ 
computer or gain personal 
information. 
8 3.8 
 
Harmful pieces of 
software that looks 
legitimate and may 
allow an attacker 
remote access to a 
target computer system 
and perform unwanted/ 
unauthorised various 
operations. 
11 5.3 
Other, please specify 5 2.4 Other, please specify 3 1.4 Other, please specify 4 1.9 
I don't know Frequency = 18 Percent = 8.6 
Not specify Frequency = 3 Percent = 1.4 
I am not sure Frequency =4 Percent = 1.9 
Total 39 18.7 Total 36 17.2 Total 39 18.7 
Missing 
No opinion Frequency = 5 Percent = 2.4 
No answer Frequency = 116 Percent = 55.5 
Not applicable 49 23.4 Not applicable 52 24.6 Not applicable 49 23.4 
Total 170 81.3 Total 173 82.8 Total 170 81.3 
Total responses 209 100.0 Total responses 209 100.0 Total responses 209 100.0 
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However, for the three different types of malicious software, the percentage of 
the respondents who did not know some of those definitions were 8.6%, while 1.4% did 
not specify what they knew or had heard, and 1.9% were not really sure how to describe 
what they had heard or knew about all three terms.  
 
4.6.4 Interview question 4: Respondents’ opinions on how personal information 
can be stolen from the Internet 
The purpose of this question was to ask respondents what they knew about ways 
that personal information could be stolen from the Internet. Of 86 interviewees, or 
41.1%, 63 respondents (30.1%) of the total group, believed that they knew how personal 
information could be stolen from the Internet. Conversely, 13 respondents (6.2%) 
believed that they knew nothing while 5 other respondents (2.4%) were unsure. Details 
from respondents of what they believed that they knew or have heard will be discussed 
below. 
 
Table 4.6.4 Respondents’ opinions about how personal information can be stolen from 
the Internet 
Respondents’ opinion about ways of personal information 
can be stolen from the Internet Frequency Percent 
Malicious software attacks installed in unprotected/vulnerable 
computer 
21 25.6% 
Visiting untrustworthy/counterfeit websites which look 
legitimate and may have become infected with Trojans 
9 11.0% 
Scam mail that may look like legitimate business requesting 
personal information (e.g., username & password) 
7 8.5% 
Negligent user 3 3.7% 
Visiting unsecured websites 2 2.4% 
I do not know 14 17.1% 
I am not sure 4 4.6% 
Other, please specify...(uncategorised answers) 10 12.2% 
Other, please specify...(unrelated/ unclear answers) 6 7.3% 
Not specify 6 7.3% 
Total responses 82 100.0% 
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Table 4.6.4 shows respondents’ opinions about ways in which personal 
information can be stolen from the Internet. 21 responses (25.6%) of the total group, 
focused on the malicious software attacks installed in unprotected/vulnerable computers, 
while visiting untrustworthy/counterfeit websites which looked legitimate and could be 
active with Trojans had 9 responses (11%). 7 respondents (8.5%) believed that 
information could be stolen by a scam mail that seemed to be a legitimate business e-
mail requesting personal information, such as username and password. On the other 
hand, 16 respondents (19.5%) indicated that personal information could be obtained 
from search engine caches, downloaded files which were corrupted or contained viruses, 
or data could be sent away using common protocols, e.g. cross site scripting and buffer 
overflow, and acts of identity theft. 
 
4.6.5 Interview question 5: Using a combination of letters and numbers in 
passwords can protect an online banking account 
This question asked respondents’ opinions about the use of a combination of 
numbers and upper and lower case characters in their passwords to help protect them 
from an online banking scam.  
 
Table 4.6.5 Interview question 5: Using a combination of passwords can help people 
from an online banking scam 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Yes 56 26.8 
Yes, perhaps. However/ If 24 11.5 
Yes, I think ( a little/ somewhat), but I am not sure 2 1.0 
No 10 4.8 
Neither Yes nor No 7 3.3 
I do not know 4 1.9 
Total 103 49.3 
 
82 respondents (38.3%) of the total group, believed a combination of characters could 
mitigate the risk from online banking scams. However, 2 respondents agreed generally, 
but were unsure about their answers, while 24 respondents (11.5%) believed that the use 
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of a combination of upper and lower case letters and numbers was definitely safe, but 
depended on the situation. On the other hand, 10 respondents (4.8%) believed that such 
a combination of characters was not secure at all. 4 respondent were unsure about this 
question, and 7 people chose neither Yes nor No. More details about respondents’ 
opinions will be outlined below. 
 
Even though a majority of respondents agreed to this concept, because they believed 
that it was a good idea and would definitely protect them from online banking scams, 
there were two main reasons why some resisted this idea. Firstly, there were some who 
answered ‘yes’ conditionally. The reasons they gave were:  
(i) It was secure, but it was hard to remember. 
(ii) It was secure, but it was ineffective if other types of scam attacks occur. 
(iii) It was secure only if the password has been changed regularly. 
(iv) It was secure, but it could be very complicated for the customers. 
(v) It was securing, but not only relying on using alphabets recognition. 
(vi) Secondly the 10 people, who disagreed that complex passwords would offer 
sufficient protection, offered reasons which were very similar to those given 
by respondents who had agreed conditionally: 
(vii) It was too hard to remember. 
(viii) It was not enough protection as a phisher could still gain access to the 
system. 
(ix) It was not strong protection as a phisher could still figure it out. 
(x) It was too complicated and too confusing. 
(xi) It was so unuseful with this method. 
 
While the majority of respondents agreed with the use of combination passwords, 
the minority seemed to be unsure whether using such passwords could secure their 
online banking. If passwords are too complicated to memorise, using them on their own 
will not be enough to protect respondents’ banking accounts. 
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4.6.6 Interview question 6: Using date of birth or phone number as a password is 
insecure 
This question reveals 110 respondents’ opinions, for 52.6% of the total group, 
about whether using a password containing customers’ personal details such as dates of 
birth or phone numbers is insecure. 
 
Table 4.6.6 Interview question 6: Respondents’ opinions about using date of birth or 
phone number as a password is insecure 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Yes 88 42.1 
No 14 6.7 
I do not know 1 0.5 
Yes, perhaps. However/ If 5 2.4 
Neither Yes nor No 2 1.0 
Total 110 52.6 
 
From table 4.6.6, 88 respondents (42.1%) believed that using personal 
information as a password is insecure. However, 5 respondents (2.4%) slightly believed 
it was secure but they were unsure about it. On the other hand, 14 respondents (6.7%) 
believed that personal information was too weak to be used as a secure password. 
Further discussion of this question will be mentioned in the paragraph below. 
 
A majority of respondents agreed to this statement because they believed that 
any types of personal information which were used as a password were very insecure. 
However, 2 respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed believed differently. To begin 
with the first conditional agreement, this group of people agreed to answer ‘yes, it was 
insecure; however,...’ the supporting reasons for this answer are included below: 
(i) It is insecure if it is accessible by the public. 
(ii) It is insecure if types of personal information such as date of birth or phone 
number have been used in conjunction with other knowledge such as hard 
drive number, ISP, or Domain name. 
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The respondents who believed in using personal information in passwords seemed to 
feel secure. They thought the password would be safe as long as it was not accessible by 
public viewers or used in conjunction with other registered identification.  
 
4.6.7 Interview question 7: Discussion about opinions if changing password every 
3-6 months can protect their online banking account from phishing 
Answers to this question revealed 105 valid respondents’ opinions, from 50.2% 
of the total group, about whether changing their password every 3-6 months could 
protect their online banking account from phishing.  
 
Table 4.6.7 Interview question 7: Respondents’ opinions about changing password 
every 3-6 months to protect their online banking account from phishing 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Yes 35 16.7 
No 33 15.8 
Yes, perhaps. However/ If 26 12.4 
Yes, I think ( a little/ somewhat), but I am not sure 4 1.9 
I do not know 5 2.4 
Neither Yes nor No 2 1.0 
Total 105 50.2 
 
The above table shows that 65 respondents (31%) of the entire group, believed 
that changing passwords every 3-6 months could protect their online banking account 
from phishing. However, among these numbers, 4 respondents (1.9%) slightly believed 
it was a good idea, even if they still were unsure about it. 26 respondents (12.4%) in 
contrast preferred to believe conditionally and 35 respondents (16.7%) had more 
confidence in their agreements. On the other hand, 33 respondents (15.8%) disagreed 
with this statement. Further discussion of this statement is presented below. 
 
A majority of respondents, who agreed to this concept, believed that it was more 
secure than using unvarying passwords. However, respondents who agreed conditionally 
proposed that: 
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(i) It seems to be secure, but it is very impractical for customers. 
(ii) It is secure, but it is hard to remember. 
(iii) It is secure, but it still can be guessed easily. 
(iv) It could be secured only some sorts of attacks. 
(v) It is secure as long as the user’s computer is also secure. 
(vi) It may help, but there should be other protection available to use as well. 
(vii) It is good idea, but very confusing. 
(viii) It would help, but still can be too late if password had already been taken. 
(ix) It is good idea, but not convenient. 
(x) Yes, it would be more secure if password had been changed more often that 
the statement pointed out. 
(xi) Yes, it would help, but it would be better for customers to change their 
passwords without banks requiring that it should be done in a certain time. 
 
On the contrary, those who disagreed indicated their reasons, which were similar to 
the conditional agreement reasons, that: 
(i) It cannot protect as it seems. There should be other protection available to 
protect customers. 
(ii) It is unhelpful unless it has been changed every time after log off. 
(iii) It is so confusing to keep changing. 
(iv) It should be the bank’s responsibility to secure customer with their proper 
protection without asking customers to take the trouble. 
(v) No it is easily to retrieve. 
(vi) No, users should be aware of the danger by themselves. 
It appears that, while the majority of respondents agreed to change their password 
periodically, the minority seemed to be unsure that using combinations of passwords 
could secure their online banking.  They believed it was very impractical for them to 
memorise passwords, when other additional protections still needed to be applied. 
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4.6.8 Interview question 8: Respondents’ experiences in receiving an e-mail from a 
bank and asking respondents for confidential information 
The question reveals 109 valid respondents’ opinions, or 52.2% of the total 
group, about experience in receiving an e-mail from banks and asking for confidential 
information. 
 
Table 4.6.8 Interview question 8: Discussion about experience in receiving an e-mail 
from a banks and asking for confidential information 
Responses Frequency Percent 
No, I have not 71 34.0 
Yes, I have 34 16.3 
I am not sure if I have or I have not 1 .5 
Other 3 1.4 
Total 109 52.2 
 
From table 4.6.8, 34 respondents (16.3%) had experience with receiving an e-
mail which pretended to be from a bank whereas 71 respondents (34%) had never 
received one. In addition, 3 respondents (1.4%) did not specify in their answers whether 
they had or had not received such an e-mail. The table below illustrates respondents’ 
reactions when they received the scam e-mails. 
 
Table 4.6.8 illustrates reactions from respondents when they received e-mails 
that requested users’ confidential information. It shows that 15 respondents (7.2%) 
deleted a scam e-mail while 7 respondents (3.3%) just ignored it. Moreover, 6 
respondents (2.9%) preferred to contact their bank to verify the matter. On the other 
hand, those who had never received scam e-mails indicated that if they had received 
one, they would have contacted their bank immediately.  
 
However, respondents who had never received the scam e-mail also said that if 
they had received one, they would have checked their e-mail address to see if that e-mail 
was reliable or not, or they would have contacted their bank immediately. 1 respondent, 
who was not sure if she or he had received an e-mail or not, indicated her/his belief that 
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encryption is the best answer for any electronic correspondence containing highly 
sensitive information.  
 
Table 4.6.8.1 Discussion about reaction of receiving e-mail requesting for confidential 
information 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Yes. Deleted it. 15 7.2 
Yes. Ignored it. 7 3.3 
Yes. Contacted bank to verify. 6 2.9 
Yes. But not specify the solution. 3 1.4 
Yes. Deleted the e-mail & contacted the bank. 2 1.0 
Yes, I just did as the bank told me. 1 .5 
Yes. I have deleted most of them. Once I sent it through to the bank to let 
them know. 
1 .5 
Yes. Ignored the e-mail and contacted the bank. 1 .5 
No, their letter said they would never do this. It is happens, I will check the 
mail address first. 
1 .5 
No. but my first step if I was I would contact my bank immediately. 1 .5 
No. If I did, I will call my bank personally to verify before providing the 
information required. 
1 .5 
No. if it occurs, I will check whether it is reliable or not. 1 .5 
Nope, and I would do it if I received a mail like that. I would directly go to 
the bank to confirm authenticity of that mail. 
1 .5 
Not sure. I cannot remember but I do think that encryption is the best 
answer for any electronic correspondence containing highly sensitive 
information. 
1 .5 
Uncategorised answer: Bank e-mails will not provide direct link to the 
login page. 
Uncategorised answer: Somewhere in the content of genuine e-mail from 
bank will advise all users to log on a fresh page. 
1 .5 
Uncategorised answer: If the e-mail has asked for information, it is a scam. 1 .5 
Total 44 21.1 
 
On the other hand, 3 respondents, who did not indicate whether they had 
received the scam e-mail or not, stated that bank e-mails would have never provided a 
direct link to the login webpage; in addition, if any e-mail asked for personal 
information, it could be assumed that it was a scam. 
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4.6.9 Interview question 9: Discussion about ways to determine a legitimate e-mail 
The question reveals 103 respondents’ opinions (49.3%) of the entire group, 
about how to determine whether e-mails, which appear to be from banks, are scam e-
mails.  
Table 4.6.9 Interview question 9: Discussion about ways to determine a legitimate e-
mail 
Responses Frequency Percent 
I do know how to determine if an e-mail is a scam 87 41.6 
I do not know 6 2.9 
Neither know nor not know 5 2.4 
I am not sure 3 1.4 
I know ( a little/ somewhat), but I am not sure 2 1.0 
Total 103 49.3 
 
Table 4.6.9 shows that 87 respondents (41.6%) indicated that they believed they 
knew how to determine a legitimate e-mail while 2 respondents (1%) believed that they 
may have known how to verify a little bit of the difference, and 3 respondents (1.4%) 
were not sure if they really knew or not. Whereas there were 6 respondents (2.9%) did 
not know how to determine the legitimate e-mail at all and another 5 respondents (2.4%) 
who did not specify whether they knew or not.  
 
Figure 4.6.9 displays methods which respondents indicated were the ways used 
to verify their incoming e-mails. It can be seen that 14 respondents (14.4%) preferred to 
contact their bank regarding their receiving e-mail and to verify the legitimate e-mail 
from the bank; however, 13 respondents (13.4%) chose to believe themself by checking 
the correct e-mail address, whereas 7 responses (8.2%) chose to check e-mail content. 
The numbers of people chose to check only contact details, and chose to ignore unusual 
e-mail had the equivalent percentages at 7.2% or 7 responses.  
112 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6.9 Respondents’ determination of a legitimate e-mail 
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On the other hand, there were 9 respondents who indicated that they did not 
know how to check a legitimate e-mail; 6 respondents from the group who chose ‘I do 
not know’, and 3 respondents chose the ‘I am not sure’ option. In addition, there were 
18 responses or 18.6% of the answers which were included in the miscellaneous group.  
Their answers have been illustrated below: 
(i) They are not asking for my personal information. I have also introduced by 
bank that any e-mails need to include the address employee no. as well as 
their contact phone number. 
(ii) Check with your ISP and the ASIC website. 
(iii) Code and lock Sign. 
(iv) I don't check e-mails from Internet banking. 
(v) I receive my e-mails inside online banking log on as well as my personal e-
mail address. 
(vi) If bank only sends a statement or advertisement but no website attached, I 
think it is not a scam. 
(vii) Just by giving a reply. 
(viii) Read e-mail or compare real site. 
(ix) The topic of e-mail which indicates the name of the bank and makes me 
know that is the e-mail from bank. 
 
Statements above reveal some additional ways of how respondents determine a 
legitimate e-mail and decide whether it is a scam or not. If analysing the contents of the 
various methods, it can be seen that respondents chose to check the lock icon, verify 
with their ISP or the reliable website, to determine from the subject heading of the e-
mail or did not check e-mail from the bank at all. From the overall results, it can be seen 
that most respondents know how to determine between a legitimate e-mail and a scam e-
mail. 
 
 
 
 
114 
 
4.6.10 Interview question 10: Discussion about ways to distinguish a legitimate 
online banking website 
The question illustrates 94 or 45% participated respondent’s opinion regarding 
methods to distinguish a legitimate online banking website.  
 
Table 4.6.10 Interview question 10: Discussion about ways to distinguish a legitimate 
online banking website 
Responses Frequency Percent 
I did know how to distinguish 62 29.7 
I did not know 17 8.1 
I am not sure 7 3.3 
I knew ( a little/ somewhat), but I was not sure 5 2.4 
Other 3 1.4 
Total 94 45.0 
 
The result shows in the table above that 67% of the respondents knew how to 
verify the genuine website. 5 respondent (2.4%) of the entire group, believed that they 
had little knowledge of how to check the legitimate website, whereas 62 respondents 
(29.7%) had more confidence in identifying the legitimate website. On the other hand, 
17 respondents, or 8.1%, did not know how to distinguish the website, whilst 7 
respondents (3.3%) were not sure whether they really knew or not. 3 respondents (1.4%) 
defined other opinions. Various methods that respondents used to distinguish the 
legitimate website are discussed below. 
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Figure 4.6.10 displays various methods respondents used to distinguish a 
legitimate online banking webpage. 28 respondents (26.2%) focused on checking the 
correct web address, followed by 13 respondents (12.1%) who would check a secured 
webpage icon with its authorised coloured address bar. 7 respondents (6.5%) verified 
the legitimate webpage by accessing via favourite bookmark and 5 respondents (4.4%) 
checked for contents including font, spelling, and grammar. Alternatively, 21 
respondents (19.6%) did not know how to distinguish, while other 12 respondents 
(11.2 %), had additional ways to inspect their legitimate webpage as listed below: 
 
(i) By using the information given to me by the bank i.e. Netbank etc. 
(ii) Never go through a link attached to an e-mail. 
(iii) Just go to the government web site to check. 
(iv) The online banking webpage can only be connected to from the official bank 
website. Takes a long time to go through security protocols. 
(v) Sometimes the bank tells you. But one way to know is also that the sequence 
of process differs from the usual way I have been doing or accustom to. 
 
According to the Australian Department of Broadband, Communication and the 
Digital Economy (n.d.) there are indicators which tell if a website is secure:  
(i) The banks digital certificate is present and valid.  
(ii) The web address includes https:// instead of http://  
(iii) A locked padlock or key appears in the browser window. 
 
From the overall results, it can be seen that even though most respondents believed 
they had knowledge of distinguishing the legitimate website whether it was from a bank 
or delivered by a phisher, only 12.1% of 67% of the respondents had knowledge that 
were in line with the government recommendations. The most common method that 
they used to verify the legitimate webpage was checking the web address. 
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4.6.11 Interview question 11: Respondents’ experiences of phishing attacks. 
 
Victimisation rates for identity fraud, across Australia and its territories, have 
increased from 2007 to 2011 as shown in figure 4.6.11.1. Specifically, the number of 
victims of identity fraud increased among the states within four years, from 56,100 
victims (3.5%) in 2007 to 95,500 victims (5.3%) in 2010-11.  
 
 
Figure 4.6.11.1 Identity fraud victimisation rates by state/territory, 2007 and 2010-11 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012) 
 
 In this survey, 5 females had experience in phishing attack whereas 4 were 
found in males. The data found was similar to the ABS result where females in Western 
Australia were more likely to be victims of identity fraud (56,200 victims) than males 
(39,400) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). 
 
 
Image is not available in public access version 
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Table 4.6.11 below distinguishes between those respondents who had experience of an 
online banking attack and those who had not. 
 
Table 4.6.11 Interview question 11: Respondents’ experiences in phishing attacks 
Responses Frequency Percent 
No, I have not 84 40.2 
Yes, I have 9 4.3 
I am not sure if I have or I have not 5 2.4 
Total 98 46.9 
 
The result shows that only nine respondents (4.3%) had experience of an online 
banking attack. Another five respondents (2.4%) were unsure whether they had been 
targeted by a phishing attack and thought they would have needed to check with their 
bank. A majority of the respondents, 84 people (40.2%) believed they had never been 
attacked by a phisher. However, those who had experienced provided more detailed 
information, as given below. 
 
Table 4.6.11.1 shows respondents’ experiences regarding phishing attacks. It 
found that only one respondent had knowledge of his sister’s account being attacked and 
her credit card had been used by an unauthorised person. Respondents for the remaining 
8 cases were found and notified by their bank that someone was trying to access their 
account and to withdraw their money to spend without their permission. 
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Table 4.6.11.1 Respondents’ experiences of phishing attacks 
Responses’ opinions Frequency Percent 
Credit card yes, bank alerted us & cancelled transaction & used 
new card. 
1 .5 
I had only one of my account hacked and a phishing site was 
installed. Westpac called me and I changed my password and 
deleted the phishing directories. 
1 .5 
Yes, because I have lost my money for $3,000 from online 
banking. 
1 .5 
Yes, I noticed a small transaction appearing on my credit card once 
a month. I called the bank and had my card replaced. 
1 .5 
Yes, my NAB had been hacked when I booked the air ticket. The 
hacker came from Greece. 
1 .5 
Yes, the bank's fraud division told me that someone from New 
York was using my Visa for shopping. 
1 .5 
Yes. I have only been contacted once because someone was trying 
to use my credit card in another province. The bank suspected it 
was fraud, they contacted me and I assured them the purchaser was 
not me. I then immediately cancelled the credit card and received a 
new one. 
1 .5 
Yes. I periodically view my banking details. I once noticed that 
only 1 cent or 2 cents had been deducted from my account. I 
immediately contacted my bank. 
1 .5 
No, not mine. But twice with my sister's account had been attacked. 
We went to the bank and explained that we have not used credit 
card. It used by unauthorised person and bank investigated. 
1 .5 
Total 9 4.3 
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4.6.12 Interview question 12: Respondents’ financial impacts from phishing attacks 
11 respondents to this question (5.3%) revealed they had experienced online 
banking attacks which had had a financial impact. The question focused on whether the 
attacker was successful in obtaining anything from their accounts.  
 
Table 4.6.12 Interview question 12: Discussion whether the attack was successful in 
obtaining anything from respondents’ accounts 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Yes, it was 6 2.9 
No, it was not 3 1.4 
I am not sure if it was or it was not 2 1.0 
Total 11 5.3 
 
The result shows 6 respondents (2.9%) who acknowledged that their accounts 
had been attacked successfully, whereas 3 respondents (1.9%) had not lost anything 
from their accounts, although they were aware that they had been attacked. In addition, 
2 respondents were not sure if the phishing attack was successful or not. Their situations 
are outlined below: 
 
(i) I didn't see anything on the statements but they had apparently made secure 
purchases.  
(ii) Obviously, they had deducted $2-$3 each time for about 2 months – all 
ended up around $40. 
(iii) Yes, because I have lost my money for $3,000 from online banking. 
(iv) Yes, he used her credit card twice. 
(v) Yes, the hacker took $5,000. 
(vi) Yes. 1 cent or 2 cents had been deducted from my account. 
 
The answers above show various successful phishing activities which may be 
categorised into three attack methods: a small amount of money has been deducted 
regularly, credit has been used for unauthorized purchases, and larger sums of money 
has been taken out of the bank.  
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4.6.13 Interview question 13: Discussion of attempts to use personal information 
for other fraudulent purposes 
10 respondents answered the question about whether they thought an attacker 
was successful in attempting to use their personal information for other fraudulent 
purposes. Examples given were that the personal information could be used for claims 
for medical care, a job, or government benefits, for renting accommodation, or giving 
misleading information to the police if criminals were charged with crimes or traffic 
violations. 
 
Table 4.6.13 Interview question 13: Attempts by phishers to use personal information 
for other fraudulent purposes 
Responses Frequency Percent 
I am not sure if it was or it was not 4 1.9 
Yes, it was 3 1.4 
No, it was not 3 1.4 
Total 10 4.8 
 
3 respondents (1.4%) disclosed that they had suffered from the use of 
information obtained by phishers. One person whose personal information had been 
obtained had had her family called by the phisher who was hoping to get money:  
I was contacted on Saturday at 6.00pm from a ‘bank’ and asked about personal details. I 
discontinued the phone call and contacted my bank in the next working day. 
 
In this case, the respondent believed that her online banking had never been 
attacked by a phisher. However, she stated that her information was obtained by 
someone via the Internet and used her information to call up her family and ask for 
further personal details. 
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In addition, in a second case, the credit card of the respondent had been used 
somewhere the authorised owner had never visited. 
(i) Yes, credit card details was claimed to use in a place where I have never 
been to. 
 
Lastly, although having been the subject of a phishing attack, another victim was 
in doubt if his situation was caused by the phishing attack or not. His license plates were 
subsequently stolen from his car, which may have been because the thieves had found 
his address during the phishing attack. 
(ii) Not via banking; however, did have license plates stolen from my car 
which was then be used on another car without the police checking their 
own details. It was claimed to be my car which meant they felt I was 
liable for the costs. 
 
4.6.14 Interview question 14: Discussion about vulnerabilities of online banking. 
This question aimed to obtain respondents’ opinions about the vulnerabilities 
associated with online banking that could lead to a phishing attack. 
Table 4.6.14 Interview question 14: Respondents’ opinions about the vulnerabilities of 
online banking. 
Responses Frequency Percent 
User ignorance 41 41.4 
Bank security 12 12.1 
Unsecure user's computer 8 8.2 
Password 7 7.1 
Unsecure website 3 3.0 
Unsecure e-mail/ phishing e-mail 2 2.0 
Other(s), please specify 6 5.8 
No opinion 8 8.2 
I do not know 7 7.1 
I am not sure 5 5.1 
Total responses 99 100.0 
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Table 4.6.14 illustrates the 99 respondents’ views about the vulnerabilities of 
online banking. User ignorance was thought to be the most vulnerable aspect of online 
banking attacks, with a percentage of 42.3%, followed by bank security at 12.1%. 5.8% 
offered additional details, which are included below: 
(i) Banking policies including user right to get access to the information. 
(ii) Government policies to deal with system penetrator.  
(iii) Minor responsibilities go to cyber operators too.  
(iv) There was an incident regarding this matter.  
(v) Some responsibilities to ISPs. If only ISPs have strong firewall or 
other security measures, it could be remarkably reduced. 
(vi) By requesting details using offer that may appear too good to be true. 
(vii) Getting the person's personal information. 
(viii) Good copy version which is similar to others. 
(ix) Not enough security. 
(x) Too complex to remember, in action. 
The above statements display respondents’ opinions toward vulnerabilities that 
could lead to successful online banking attacks. Some respondents were concerned 
about too simple or too complex levels of security protection. Some also focused on the 
need for information and policies from responsible people or organisations to increase 
so that users of online banking could become more aware of ways of dealing with 
security vulnerabilities. 
 
4.6.15 Interview question 15: What respondents would do to protect themselves or 
solve problems caused by phishers 
The question reveals respondents’ opinions about various ways to protect 
themselves from online banking attacks or solve the problems resulting from phishing 
attacks.  
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Table 4.6.15 Interview question 15: Discussion about methods that respondents used, or 
would use, to protect themselves or to solve the problems caused phishers. 
Responses Frequency Percent 
What I did/would do was (is) 60 28.7 
I don't know 2 1.0 
Other 2 1.0 
Total 64 30.6 
 
It can be seen that only 2 respondents (1%) did not know how to prevent or solve 
the problems caused by online banking attacks at all, whereas 60 respondents (28.7%) 
believed they knew how to work against the attack. Below are respondents’ opinions 
about ways to counteract online banking scams and or phishers. 
 
Figure 4.6.15 above shows methods in which respondents chose to mitigate risk 
and protect themselves from online banking attack. 31 responses (39.7%) chose to 
believe in self-awareness in security, for example, to check for any suspicious activities 
on their online banking account and their computer device. Besides, the result in Figure 
4.6.15 illustrates that 13 respondents (16.7%) contacted their bank and informed it about 
any suspicious activity in their online banking account or an e-mail which pretended to 
be from the bank and asked for confidential information. 
 
Interestingly, installing software protection, detection or monitoring software 
was chosen by only 8 respondents (10.3%). The method was followed by changing 
passwords periodically with the percentage of 9.2%. Other methods that respondents 
used, or would use, are listed below: 
(i) Changed to a bank which has better online security. 
(ii) Delete any e-mails from banks. If I need information I phone them or login 
to my online banking facility. 
(iii) Do not use online banking. 
(iv) I delete or ignore all phishing. 
(v) Keep my security program up to date. 
(vi) I did not do anything. 
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Most banking phishing (that I know of) is by fake mails from bank with links to 
phishing sites. I don't use links from bank e-mails. 
 
Rang the people and got their details i.e. full name, employee numbers, and 
requested that they take the suspicious matter up with their supervisors. Then I 
requested a follow up and call from their supervisor as well as a letter of apology. 
 
The statements above display all the uncategorised solutions that respondents chose 
to react to a phishing attack. Interestingly, 3 responses (1.4%) believed that they did not 
do anything regarding the phishing protection. Other responses were provided, based on 
their respondents’ perceptions, which included deleting any e-mails from banks and 
waiting to be contacted in person, stopping using online banking, deleting or ignoring all 
phishing attacks, to keep updating security applications, maintaining a complex 
password and changing to better online banking security. 
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Figure 4.6.15 Method respondents used, or would use, to protect themselves from phishing attacks 
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4.6.16 Interview question 16: Installing an anti-malware application is enough to 
protect the user’s computer from being attacked. 
The table below illustrates respondents’ reactions to the suggestion that 
installing an anti-malware application provides enough security to prevent users’ 
computers from being attacked.  
 
Table 4.6.16 Interview question 16: Respondents’ opinions about installing an anti-
malware application. 
Responses Frequency Percent 
No 39 18.6 
Yes 30 14.4 
Yes, perhaps. However/ If 19 9.1 
Yes, I think ( a little/ somewhat), but I am not sure 1 0.5 
I do not know 3 1.4 
Other 2 1.0 
Total 94 45.0 
 
The results show that 39 respondents (18.6%) did not believe that installing an 
anti-malware application provided enough security, whereas 50 respondents (24%) 
believed it would provide sufficient security. However, among those who believed in 
anti-malware security installation, 19 respondents (9.1%) indicated that their agreements 
were conditional and only 1 respondent believed slightly but was not entirely confident 
that it would provide adequate protection. On the other hand, 30 respondents (14.4%) 
were confident that it would be absolutely secure. Additionally, those who did not 
believe in using a single security protection stated that viruses were updating all the time 
and that the anti-malware software might not always work. Also, some people believed 
that these types of software could be used to steal users’ information without their 
knowledge. On the other hand, the respondents who believed conditionally specified 
that effective security depended on appropriate anti-malware applications being installed 
to protect against particular malware attacks.  Other respondents indicated that an anti-
malware application would only work well if it was updated regularly. In summary, 
most respondents believed they could trust that a single anti-malware application was 
secure enough to protect them from online banking attacks. 
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4.6.17 Interview question 17: How do respondents secure themselves against 
phishing e-mails, phishing web pages and other phishing activities that they could 
encounter in their daily lives? 
 
91 respondents (43.5%) of the group interviewed, described methods they used 
to protect themselves from phishing activities. 
 
Table 4.6.17 Interview question 17: How respondents secure themselves from phishing 
e-mails, phishing web pages and other phishing activities that occur in their daily lives 
 
Responses Frequency Percent 
What I did/would do was (is) 86 41.1 
I don't know 4 1.9 
I am not sure 1 .5 
Total 91 43.5 
 
86 respondents (41.1%) gave their opinions in answer to this question, whereas 4 
respondents (1.9%) did not know about the protection methods, and only 1 respondent 
was unsure if he or she really knew how to deal with the problems. Further details about 
respondents’ opinions are shown in the table below. 
 
Table 4.6.17 indicates that 64 respondents (57.7%) focused on increasing their 
own security-awareness while 15 respondents (13.5%) indicated that installing anti-
malicious software would be sufficient protection. It can be seen from the table of 
responses that most participants believed that their improved self-awareness about 
security was the best countermeasure to guard them against fraudulent activities. 
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Table 4.6.17.1 Respondents’ opinions about countermeasures that could secure them 
against various kinds of online banking attacks 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Self-awareness in security 64 57.7 
Installing anti-malicious software 15 13.5 
Other, please specify 13 11.7 
Limiting online activities 3 2.7 
User education 2 1.8 
Increasing/ updating level of online banking security 1 0.9 
Security satisfaction 1 0.9 
I do not know 10 9.0 
No opinion 2 1.8 
Total responses 65 100.0 
 
4.6.18 Interview question 18: Current or future situations in online scamming 
The following table presents respondents’ feedback about current phishing, 
online banking security, or the future of online banking attacks.  
 
Table 4.6.18 Interview question 18: Comments or additional opinions about the current 
or future situations of online scamming 
Responses Frequency Percent 
What I did/would do/ suggest was (is) 44 21.1 
I don't know 3 1.4 
I am not sure at all 1 .5 
Total 48 23.0 
 
The table show that 44 respondents (21.1%) provided additional comments 
which are listed below. 
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Table 4.6.18.1 Respondent’s suggestions in online banking security 
Responses Frequency Percent 
Increasing/ improving level of online banking security 18 8.6 
User education 10 4.8 
Self-awareness about banking security 6 2.9 
Security satisfaction 3 1.4 
Refund policy satisfaction 2 1.0 
Other, please specify 5 2.4 
Total responses 44 21.1 
User education 10 4.8 
 
From the table above, it can be seen that 8.6% of the respondents were 
concerned about increasing and/or improving the levels of online banking security by 
the banks. 4.8% suggested that educating users was desirable and that the necessary 
education could be provided by banks. 2.9% believed that users of online banking 
should become more vigilant and have better awareness of security measures used in 
online banking. However, only 1.4% was satisfied with current online banking security. 
Thus it can be concluded that the main improvement that respondents expected from 
their banks was increased and/or improved online banking security. 
 
4.6.19 Summary of interviewees’ experience and knowledge of online banking 
attacks 
Sections 4.6.1-4.6.18 examined interviewees’ experiences and knowledge of 
online banking attacks. Respondents’ perceptions of their own knowledge about 
phishing attacks and various other aspects of online banking security have been 
analysed. The interviewer posed questions which also focused on experiences of online 
banking attacks to determine how respondents identified the particular attacks and how 
the problems were solved. Overall, most respondents had heard about online banking 
threats from bank announcements and they knew about phishing. However, most of 
them had only low levels of knowledge about the terminology associated with malicious 
software. In particular, most were not aware of the differences between spyware, 
adware, and Trojans. Furthermore, most respondents were more likely to agree that the 
use of a password combination, in which were included numbers, and upper and lower 
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case characters, was sufficient to guard them against an online banking attack. They also 
believed that using personal details, such as date of birth or phone number, as passwords 
was insecure. Interestingly, a majority of the respondents agreed that changing password 
every 3-6 months could protect their accounts from phishing attacks. Nevertheless, 
respondents who believed strongly that it was necessary to change passwords regularly 
were only slightly more numerous than those who agreed but felt that it was not easy to 
memorise new passwords all the time. 
 
Interviewees were asked about their ability to determine whether an e-mail was 
legitimate or not. Most of the respondents believed they knew how to determine whether 
an e-mail was legitimate by checking the e-mail address of the sender. In addition, many 
reported that they had been informed by the banks that the banks would never send e-
mails asking for personal information. Some had received an e-mail that asked for their 
confidential information and they immediately deleted because they knew that it was a 
scam. Most respondents also knew how to distinguish a legitimate bank webpage by 
checking for the securely locked sign with highlighted colour as well as checking the 
full URL. However, the number of respondents who knew how to determine if a website 
was securely locked was much smaller than those who could identify a legitimate e-
mail. 
 
Upon investigation, very few respondents had experience of phishing attacks. 
Among this group, the case was more that their money had been deducted or used for 
purchasing goods without their knowledge. However, they were unsure if their personal 
information had been used for the commission of further crimes. Interviewees were also 
asked about the vulnerabilities which made successful phishing attacks possible. Most 
answers indicated that user ignorance was a significant factor and that the best ways to 
protect themselves or solve problems caused by phishing attacks were by installing anti-
malware applications and by reporting to the bank immediately.  
 
Additionally, interviewees were asked to provide their opinions about whether 
installing anti-malware application was enough to secure their computers from being 
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attacked or not. Most respondents disagreed, because they believed that a new attack 
was always likely to be one step ahead of existing anti-malware applications and 
because only a single application would not necessarily be enough to secure their 
computers. 
 
 Finally, the last two questions asked the respondents’ opinions about ways to 
secure themselves against phishing e-mails, phishing web pages, and other phishing 
activities that they could encounter in their daily life. The answers conveyed their 
opinions that, if the attack was one in which the user was the weakest point, protection 
should begin with increased self-awareness about accessing and/or using online banking 
security, such as being alerted to any new attacks or keeping up-to-date with details of 
online attacks. They also suggested that banks should have increased or improved online 
banking security systems, which were more robust and complex in order to secure their 
customers against being attacked, while ensuring that online banking functions remained 
easy to use by all levels of users.  
 
4.7 Cross-tabulations results 
Cross-tabulations are computed to evaluate the correlations between qualitative 
and/or quantitative variables. This following section presents data about experiences, 
levels of knowledge, and opinions of clients about online banking access security, 
phishing and related online banking threats. Data has been categorised into two major 
groups of online and non-online banking respondents. Each group has been classified 
into respondents who have phishing and non-phishing attack experiences. Experiences 
reported in this survey include phishing e-mails that pretended to be from their bank and 
asked for personal information, and phishing website which had led the respondents into 
disclosing personal information or losing money.  
 
The total number of cross-tabulations in each column or row could be different 
from the total number of a single variable. Respondents were allowed to answer more 
than one choice in some questions and they could also drop the questions that they 
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wished not to answer. This investigation only analysed the most significant values that 
had been supplied by the respondents.  
 
The frequency of respondents in each group reacted upon the respondents’ 
answers and their perceptions in qualitative aspects rather than comparing and 
contrasting the answers in terms of quantitative attributes. The correlative data 
contributes more deeply of additional research results to evaluate better understanding 
of the study and research purposes. The critical points will be used to discuss in the next 
chapters for appropriate assumptions and recommendations arise from this study. 
However, when data did not make any values to the questions, an N/A (not applicable) 
indication will be displayed in the table.  
 
Table 4.7.1 displays the respondents’ level of knowledge about phishing and 
online banking threats through experienced and non-experienced phishing attacks.  Non-
online banking users were allowed to participate in this activity. Even though they had 
not experienced online banking attacks, they may have received phishing e-mails 
pretending to be from their banks and asking for their personal credentials. In addition, 
knowledge of online banking threats was not only restricted to online banking users. 
The overall result shows that majority of respondents in all groups had heard about all 
kinds of online banking threats. These people could explain what they knew or had 
heard and how the threats could attack online banking users and steal personal 
information from the Internet. In terms of knowledge, most respondents had more 
confidence when explaining about a phishing attack. This includes non-online banking 
respondents. Online banking respondents who had received phishing e-mail had slightly 
less confidence in identifying what phishing was. On the contrary, those non-phishing 
attack experiences on the two left columns of Table 4.7.1 were seen to have more 
confidence in their knowledge of phishing attack when compared within their own 
groups. In the case of malware knowledge, although a majority of the respondents in all 
groups could tell what malware was, in fact they had less confidence in explaining what 
they knew about the threats. Moreover, less people could differentiate between spyware, 
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adware, and Trojan attacks while most respondents, within their groups, said they did 
not know or had heard these terms before. 
 
Table 4.7.2 illustrates respondents’ knowledge about determining general forms 
of phishing methods and the vulnerabilities associated with phishing attacks. The 
questions also covered the ways of mitigating phishing and ways to protect themselves 
from phishing attacks. Solving the risk was not limited to respondents who had 
experienced phishing; people who had not been attacked could also answer this question 
and say what they would do if the incident had happened to them. Most online banking 
respondents identified phishing e-mails by checking e-mail addresses, checking contact 
details and contacting their banks. The significant number within the group which had 
not experienced a phishing attack did not know how to check whether bank e-mails 
were legitimate. On the other hand, non-online banking respondents chose to contact 
their banks to confirm e-mail status. Further discussion found that, most respondents 
who had fallen to phishing decided to delete suspicious e-mails straight away. The 
groups of non-phishing experienced respondents even they followed similar methods, 
would go further, call up their bank and report the incident after deleting the e-mail. 
 
In the case of distinguishing phishing bank websites, the number of respondents 
who did not know how to check legitimate websites was higher than those who did not 
know how to check e-mails. Those who believed that they knew how to check tended to 
rely on the name of the URL and the secure web icon which is a padlock located on the 
address bar. Most respondents who were confident of their knowledge about phishing 
said that users who neglected to develop their knowledge, or were unaware of the 
explosion in the numbers of phishing attacks, were the most vulnerable to phishing. 
Conversely, all groups of respondents still strongly insisted that trusting themselves 
when dealing with phishing attacks was their first choice before asking for assistance 
from banks. They felt that being aware of fraudulent e-mail contacts and counterfeit 
webpages was sufficient to protect themselves. They felt the use of common sense when 
sharing information was the best practice.  
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Table 4.7.1 Cross-tabulation of level of knowledge about phishing and online banking threat associations 
 
Online banking  Non-online banking  
Non-phishing attack experienced Phishing attack experienced Phishing attack experienced via e-mail 
No attack bank 
experienced  
phishing 
e-mail 
phishing online 
banking account 
phishing 
e-mail 
phishing online 
banking account 
Had received 
phishing e-mail 
Never received 
phishing e-mail 
knowledge of 
threats 
Online banking 
threats 
Yes (41/60) Yes (53/72) Yes (25/27) Yes (6/7) Yes (1/1) Yes (4/5) Yes (4/5) 
 
 
Phishing 
 
Total 
Yes, strongly (22) 
Yes, slightly (15) 
Yes, strongly (29) 
Yes, slightly (23) 
Yes, slightly (12) 
Yes, strongly (11) 
Yes, strongly (3) 
Yes, slightly (2) 
Yes, strongly (1) 
Yes, slightly (1) 
Yes, slightly (2) 
Yes, strongly (1) 
Yes, slightly (3) 
56 71 28 7 2 4 5 
Malware knowledge 
Yes, slightly (34) 
Yes, strongly (5) 
Yes, slightly (41) 
Yes, strongly (8) 
Yes, slightly (16) 
Yes, strongly (4) 
Yes, slightly (6) I do not know (1) Yes, slightly (3) Yes, slightly (2) 
Total 54 67 26 7 1 4 5 
Malware: Spyware Yes (5/22) Yes (8/28) Yes (4/13) Yes (1/3) Yes (1/1) Yes (1/1) I don't know (2/2) 
Malware: Adware Yes (3/19) Yes (6/25) Yes (5/13) Yes (1/3) Yes (1/1) Yes (1/1) I don't know (2/2) 
Malware: Trojan Yes (6/22) Yes (9/29) Yes (5/14) Yes (0/3) Yes (1/1) Yes (1/1) I don't know (2/2) 
Personal info can be 
stolen from the 
Internet 
Yes (40/51) Yes (46/64) Yes (16/24) Yes (5/6) Yes (1/2) Yes (3/4)  Yes (4/5) 
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Table 4.7.2 Cross-tabulation of respondents’ perceptions about risk determinations, mitigations, and protections 
 
Online banking Non-online banking 
Non-phishing attack experienced Phishing attack experienced Phishing attack experienced via e-mail 
No attack bank 
experienced 
phishing 
e-mail 
phishing online 
banking account 
phishing 
e-mail 
phishing online 
banking account 
Had received 
phishing e-mail 
Never received 
phishing e-mail 
knowledge of 
threats 
Determine phishing e-
mails 
E-mail address (9) 
I do not know (7) 
E-mails contents (5) 
Contact details (5) 
Contact bank (5) 
E-mail address (12) 
I do not know (7) 
Contact details (7) 
Contact bank (7) 
E-mail address (3) 
Contact details (3) 
Contact bank (3) 
 
E-mails contents (1) 
Contact bank (1) 
I do not know (1) 
Contact bank (3) Contact bank (3) Contact bank (3) 
Ways to handles 
phishing e-mails 
Varied solutions (6)* Just deleted it (11) Just deleted it (13) Just deleted it (2) 
Varied solutions 
(4)* 
N/A 
Varied solutions 
(3)* 
Distinguish legitimate 
bank websites 
URL (19) 
I do not know (12) 
Secure web icon (9) 
URL (23) 
I do not know (14) 
Secure web icon (12) 
URL (8) 
I do not know (6) 
Secure web icon (3) 
URL (1) 
Bookmark (1) 
I do not know (1) 
Secure web icon (1) URL (1) 
URL (1) 
Secure web icon 
(1) 
Ways to mitigate or 
solve the phishing 
attacked 
Self-awareness practice  
(20) 
Contact bank (9) 
Self-awareness practice 
(23) 
Contact bank (9) 
Installing 
protection/detection 
software (8) 
Self-awareness practice  
(8) 
Contact bank (3) 
Self-awareness 
practice (3) 
Contact bank (3) 
Self-awareness 
practice (1) 
Contact bank (1) 
N/A 
 
Self-awareness 
practice (1) 
Contact bank (1) 
Most vulnerable point to 
phishing attack 
User (27) User (29) User (9) User (4) Password (1) User (2) User (2) 
Installing a single 
security protection is 
sufficient to against 
phishing attacks 
Yes, definitely (22) 
Yes, if…update/ right 
software (10) 
No, definitely (20) 
No, if…not update/ right 
software (10) 
Yes, definitely (27) 
Yes, if…update/right 
software (17) 
No, definitely (24) 
Yes, definitely (6) 
Yes, if…update/right 
software (9) 
No, definitely (11) 
 
No, definitely (4) No, definitely (1) No, definitely (3) No, definitely (4) 
Self-protection from 
phishing activities 
Self-awareness (37) 
Self-awareness (51) 
Installing 
protection/detection 
software (13) 
Self-awareness (22) Self-awareness (3) Self-awareness (3) 
Self-awareness 
(2) 
I do not know (2) 
Self-awareness 
(2) 
I do not know (2) 
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However, smaller groups still believed that contacting their bank to solve any 
phishing incidents was their best solution. The group of online banking users without 
experience of-phishing focused on the installation of monitoring software to detect unusual 
activities occurring on their computers. The self-trusting answer was revealed once again by 
these respondents, that the best way to protect themselves from any unforeseen threats was 
for them to be observant or self-aware. They believed that there was no way users can be 
secure from phishing if they did not protect themselves, have the alertness and learn to 
understand and deal with any suspicious online banking activities themselves. 
 
The respondents were also asked their opinions about installing a single security 
application to protect themselves against phishing attacks. It can be seen clearly that many 
respondents believed that installing only an anti-virus or anti-malware software was effective. 
The number of respondents who disagreed was much smaller than those who agreed. 
However, some respondents believed that they would be secure on the condition that their 
software was up-to-date or if they chose the right software to kill viruses or Trojans. The data 
shows that respondents who had phishing attack experience strongly disagreed about relying 
on a single security protection. In fact, there is no single security application which has the 
ability to protect everything and remain effective all the time (GFI Software, n.d.). Multiple 
appropriate security measures must be put in place to work against phishing effectively.  
 
 Table 4.7.3 shows the comparison between those who had experienced a phishing 
attack and those who had not, categorised by respondents’ background. Female respondents 
who were in the 35-39 age group, who lived in the inner zone and had an average annual 
income of approximately $50,001-$100,000 were the victims of online banking attacks. 
These people had at least a bachelor degree and worked as technicians, trade workers or 
professionals. Moreover, respondents who had received phishing e-mails, in all the groups 
analysed were most often older females. They lived further out from the city, had 
considerably higher annual incomes, graduated with at least a bachelor degree and worked as 
professionals. It can be seen clearly that the younger generation, particularly male students 
who earned less than $20,000 per annum and perhaps were aiming to complete bachelor 
degrees, and did not live too far from the city were the group safest from any phishing attack 
activities. 
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Table 4.7.4 shows the comparison of the phishing attacks experienced, categorised by 
previously accessed banks and currently accessed banks. This cross-tabulation presented the 
list of the banks from which respondents had experience in online banking attack. The above 
and below rolls were comparing the numbers of respondents who had used online banking 
service and the current access use by them. Table 4.6.11 shows that 9 respondents had had 
online phishing through their bank account. However, there are 10 banks were listed by them 
which could be the case that one respondents had more than one online banking account. 
Further discussion found that the respondents, who previously had accessed to Bank West, 
decided not to continue with this bank any longer while other experienced respondents still 
continued their online service with their previous bank. Other results found that the numbers 
of current access banks by non-phishing bank attacked customers had been declined in most 
banks except the National Bank.  
 
Table 4.7.5 illustrates cross-tabulation of respondents who had accessed online 
banking and their security authentication provided by their banks. The results found that there 
were few different points found between respondents who had phishing e-mail and phishing 
bank website experienced and the groups of who had either or both types of attacks. It found 
that most experienced respondents had been locked out from their banks due to the multiple 
incorrect password input. These respondents also accessed their bank with ADSL wired 
broadband connection and used the computer that installed Windows XP operating system. 
Whilst more non-phishing experienced respondents had never been locked out from their 
bank.  They connected their Internet with wireless connection through the computer that 
installed Windows Vista operating system.   
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Table 4.7.3 Comparison of the phishing and non-phishing attack experienced categorised by respondents’ background 
 
Online banking  Non-online banking  
Non-phishing attack experienced Phishing attack experienced Phishing attack experienced via e-mail 
No attack bank 
experienced  
phishing 
e-mail 
phishing online 
banking account 
phishing 
e-mail 
phishing online banking 
account 
Had received 
phishing e-mail 
Never received 
phishing e-mail 
knowledge of 
threats 
Gender 
Male (36) 
Female (30) 
Male (40) 
Female (38) 
Female (17) 
Male (13) 
Female (5) 
Male (4) 
Female (4) 
Male (0) 
Male (4) 
Female (1) 
Female (4) 
Male (2) 
Age 25-29 (22) 25-29 (25) Above 50 (10) 35-39 (3) 45-49 (2) Above 50 (3) 
45-49 (2)  
Above 50 (2) 
Annual income < 20,000 (25) < 20,000 (26) 50,001-100,000 (10) 50,001-100,000 (3) 
30,001-50,000 (1) 
50,001-100,000 (1) 
50,001-100,000 (2) 
30,001-50,000 
 (1) 
50,001-100,000 (1) 
Occupation 
Student (23) 
Professionals (15) 
Student (25) 
Professionals (23) 
Professionals (11) 
Student (6) 
Technicians and trade 
workers (3) 
Professionals (2) 
Professionals (1) 
Home duties (1) 
Retired (1) 
Technicians and 
trade workers (2) 
Retired (2) 
Retired (2) 
Education 
Master degree (24) 
* Bachelor degree (23) 
Bachelor degree (31) Bachelor degree (14) Bachelor degree (3) Bachelor (3) High School (2) Bachelor degree (3) 
Postcode 
6061 (5) 
Zone 2 
6027 (5) 
Zone 3 
6051 (4) 
Zone 1 
6000 (1) zone 1 
6003 (1) zone 1 
6018 (1) zone 1 
6103 (1) zone 1 
6104 (1) zone 1 
6150 (1) zone 2 
6065 (1) zone 3 
6112 (1) zone 4 
6018 (1) zone 2 
6025 (1) zone 3 
6027 (1) zone 3 
6053 (1) outside 
zone 4 
6060 (1) zone 1 
6151 (1) zone 1 
6018 (1) zone 2 
6062 (1) zone 2 
6027 (1) zone 3 
 
 
N/A 
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Table 4.7.4 Comparison of the phishing attacks experienced, categorised by previously accessed banks and currently access banks 
 
 
Lists of the most common online banking previously accessed by respondents 
Total Commonwealth 
Bank 
Bank 
West Westpac ANZ 
National 
Bank Citibank HSBC 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Other 
Experience in 
online banking 
attack by a 
phisher? 
Yes, I 
have 
Count 2 2 1 4 2 1 0 0 2 10 
No, I 
have not 
Count 31 13 14 31 5 4 5 4 12 76 
Total Count 33 15 15 35 7 5 5 4 14 86 
        
 
Lists of the most common online banking for a current accessed by respondents 
Total Commonwealth 
Bank 
Bank 
West Westpac ANZ 
National 
Bank Citibank HSBC 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Other 
Experience in 
online banking 
attack by a 
phisher? 
Yes, I 
have 
Count 2 1 1 4 2 1 0 0 2 10 
No, I 
have not 
Count 25 8 13 26 5 2 3 6 9 74 
Total Count 27 9 14 30 7 3 3 6 11 84 
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Table 4.7.5 Cross-tabulation of respondents who had accessed online banking and their 
security authentication provided 
 
Online banking  
Non-phishing attack experienced Phishing attack experienced 
phishing 
e-mail 
phishing online 
banking account 
phishing 
e-mail 
phishing online 
banking account 
Frequency of online 
banking access 
3-5 times (23) 
3-5 times (23) 
6-10 times (20) 
1-2 times (18) 
6-10 times (9) 
3-5 times (8) 
3-5 times (4) 
Type of online 
banking 
authentication 
provided by bank 
Login + password (48) 
Login + password + 
SMS verification (17) 
Login + password (53) 
Login + password + 
SMS verification  
(21) 
Login + password (20) 
Login + password + 
SMS verification (4) 
Login + password (8) 
Login + password + 
token device  
(2) 
Length of 
passwords used 
when accessed 
online banking 
10 characters (16) 
8 characters (13) 
8 characters (19) 
10 characters (18) 
8 characters (10) 
10 characters (5) 
8 characters (3) 
10 characters (3) 
Have ever been 
locked out from 
back 
No (47) 
Yes (17) 
No (50) 
Yes (25) 
Yes (15) 
No (13) 
Yes (3) 
No (6) 
Allowed to re-log in 
after a while 
No (9) 
Yes (9) 
No (13) 
Yes (12) 
No (8) 
Yes (7) 
Yes (1) 
No (3) 
Ways to report 
login error 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’ page 
(38) 
Direct informed by 
walking to the branch 
office (23) 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’ page 
(47) 
Direct informed by 
walking to the branch 
office (24) 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’ page 
(19) 
Report via e-mail 
provided  (6) 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’ page 
(4) 
Direct informed by 
walking to the branch 
office (2) 
Usual place where 
computer were used 
to access online 
banking 
My house (60) My house (71) My house (27) My house (7) 
Type of Internet 
connection 
ADSL wireless 
broadband (35) 
ADSL wired broadband 
(23) 
ADSL wireless 
broadband (36) 
ADSL wired broadband 
(30) 
ADSL wired 
broadband (14) 
ADSL wireless 
broadband (7) 
ADSL wired 
broadband (4) 
ADSL wireless 
broadband (2) 
Type of operating 
system 
Windows Vista (27) 
Windows XP (24) 
Windows 7 (16) 
Windows Vista (34) 
Windows XP (28) 
Windows 7 (17) 
Windows XP (13) 
Windows Vista (11) 
Windows 7 (7) 
Windows XP (4) 
Windows Vista (2) 
Windows 7 (2) 
Type of security 
protection/detection
/ monitoring 
Anti-virus (50) 
Firewall (24) 
Pop-up blocking (16) 
Anti-malware (13) 
Anti-virus (60) 
Firewall (33) 
Pop-up blocking (21) 
Anti-malware (20) 
Anti-virus (21) 
Firewall (16) 
Anti-malware (11) 
Pop-up blocking (10) 
Anti-virus (5) 
Firewall (4) 
Pop-up blocking (3) 
Anti-malware (2) 
Frequency of 
security update 
Auto-update (21) 
Once a day (9) 
Once a week (7) 
Auto-update (31) 
Once a day (8) 
Once a week (8) 
Auto-update (15) 
Once a day (4) 
Once a week (2) 
Auto-update (2) 
Once a day (2) 
Once a month (2) 
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Table 4.7.6 Cross-tabulation of phishing e-mail experienced and phishing bank website 
experience 
Have you ever used online banking 
Experience in online banking attack by a phisher? 
Total Yes, I have No, I have not 
I am not sure if I 
have or I have 
not 
Yes 
Have ever received 
e-mail from bank 
that asked for 
confidential 
information? 
Yes, I have 4 23 1 28 
No, I have not 4 55 3 62 
Other, please specify 0 0 1 1 
Total 8 78 5 91 
No 
Have ever received 
e-mail from bank 
that asked for 
confidential 
information? 
Yes, I have N/A 2 N/A 2 
No, I have not N/A 3 N/A 3 
I am not sure if I have 
or I have not 
N/A 1 N/A 1 
Total  6  6 
 
 Table 4.7.6 illustrates cross-tabulation of respondents who fell in phishing bank 
website and their experience in receiving any phishing e-mails that pretended to send 
from their banks and asked for personal identity. The data shows that four respondents 
who had online banking attack experience had received phishing e-mail that came from 
their bank and asked for their confidential information. On the other hand, four 
respondents had never received any phishing e-mail from their bank that asked them to 
provide personal information.  However, two non-online banking users claimed that 
even though they did not have online banking service but they had received e-mail from 
their bank and asked for their personal information.  
 
4.7.7 Summary of interviewees’ experience and knowledge of online banking 
attacks 
Sections 4.7 examined cross-tabulations of the interviewees’ experiences of 
online banking services and their knowledge of phishing. The results covered 
respondents’ preferences for secure passwords, based on their knowledge and their 
preferred solutions when they were confronted with unwanted risks, together with ways 
to protect themselves from attacks. Most respondents knew what phishing and online 
banking threats were and how the threats were carried out. They believed that the users 
form the weakest point in a phishing attack because they may be ignorant of bank 
warning information or lack alertness when they encounter suspicious activities towards 
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their computers, e-mails, webpages, or bank accounts. These possible victims were 
sometimes in danger of social engineering attacks in which their information may be 
disclosed unintentionally when their security protection is weak. Nevertheless, trusting 
themselves to have a thorough awareness of how to deal with online and offline 
personal information sharing or money transfers was the best self-practiced. Neither did 
they acknowledge that they would be at risk if they relied on a single security tool to 
defend themselves against phishing.  
 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter has analysed and discussed respondents’ answers to questionnaire 
and interview questions. Relationships between variables have been cross-tabulated and 
results of those analyses presented. An in-depth analysis of the risks faced by 
respondents’ and their vulnerabilities, identified from this survey, will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As previously stated in chapter 1, the primary objective of the study was to 
identify how online banking users perceived threats, such as phishing and malware, via 
online banking channels. This objective also covered the experience in any 
circumstances of online banking attacks and how they dealt with the problems. Another 
aspect of this objective was to identify users’ knowledge of online banking security. 
Clearly, this objective has been achieved, as reflected by the findings revealed in chapter 
4. The respondents’ understanding of phishing and online threats were elicited. To 
answer the research questions in chapter 1, the following are the research questions:  
 
5.2 What are the factors which lead people to use online banking? 
Technology of online banking services benefit bank customers to take controls 
of their own accounts more flexibly. This survey found that convenience was a main 
reason that led most respondents decided to use online banking. Many studies identified 
convenience as the most important factor in the use of online banking services 
(Lichtenstein & Williamson, 2006 citing from ACNielsen, 2005; Pew, 2003; Ramsay 
and Smith, 1999; Thornton and White, 2001; Social Research Centre, 2008). Previous 
studies mentioned that respondents’ behaviours in the adoption of online banking 
services depended on the elements of experience, utility and time saving (Lichtenstein & 
Williamson, 2006). In fact, choices that the respondents chose in this research: fast 
service computer operation, reduction of the time spent waiting in queue or commuting 
to bank may be seen as parts of the convenience. In details, the investigator discovered 
that the convenience of having fast service computer operation was the key. When 
computer technology becomes more accessible to people, the chance of having other 
facilities will then be more easily established. ACNielsen survey (2007) explored that 
bank loyalty in Australia was risen up to 44% or close to half of the respondents who 
were ‘very loyal’ to their bank. The ACNielsen survey supported finding in this study 
that most respondents were satisfied enough to continue their online banking services 
with the banks which had offered them traditional services. In particular, the ANZ Bank 
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and the Commonwealth Bank, because of the levels of trust engendered by their 
traditional services, became the first and second most popular banks with which most 
respondents had chosen to sign up for online services. This may have been influenced 
the respondents to continue their existing bank rather than seeking for the best online 
banking security or an excellent service reputation of the bank to start using a different 
banking service.  
 
The convenience had brought the respondents accessed more frequent to online 
banking in approximately of once a week. Recent statistics found slightly different that 
the Australians engaged in online banking and finance more frequently than once a day 
and following with accessing just once a day in December 2010 (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2011a). However, this data represented the country rather than a single state 
region. Besides, services such as BPAY, money transfer, home loans application, and 
credit redemption are some of the common online services that many banks offer to 
their customers. This research found that money transfers, balance summary viewing, 
and bill payments were the most common activities that the respondents chose to 
perform when they accessed their online banking services accordingly. The result was 
similar to a report of the Australian Government, Department of Broadband, 
Communications and the Digital Economy (2008), which included the top ten online 
activities by Internet users in June 2006. 60% of the home broadband Internet users aged 
14 and over performed account balance checking, 54% accessed their online account to 
transfer funds, and 25% paid bills. Similarly, Nielson’s survey (2006) also revealed the 
most common online transactions activities which included viewing account balances, 
viewing recent transactions, and paying bills. In addition, the same activities were also 
presented in the list of top online activities for home dial-up Internet users (Australia. 
Dept of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, 2008). 
 
On the other side, several respondents discontinued their previous banks. Few 
respondents had changed banks because they did not feel entirely secure with their 
previous banks, while another respondent’s account had been attacked. Thus it could be 
proposed that, in the online banking industries, users continued with a system primarily 
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because their satisfaction had caused them to believe that the banks were trustworthy. In 
addition to the results found in this study some respondents did not want to join online 
banking because they concerned about security of the bank. The high percentage of the 
concern about online security among non-users may confirm the findings of Yeow, 
Yuen, and Tong (2008 quoted from Sathye, 1999), who stated that customers were 
generally more concerned with the security of online banking services compared with 
traditional banking services. While the use of online banking has increased, the 
proportion of internet users aware of online banking risks associated has remained 
unchanged since 2005 (at 22%) although there was new awareness of the threat posed 
by identity theft (Social Research Centre, 2008, p. 6). Lichtenstein and Williamson 
(2006); however, implied that a lack of prior experience using the Internet may have 
inhibited their respondents from utilising online banking services. The study could be 
indicated that customers lacked awareness of the security of the online banking services. 
They needed to be educated to ensure that they recognised that fundamental security, 
such as information privacy, or authentication authority, was in place and be concerned 
in choices of online banking factor. Banks should also establish a non-online banking 
customer-centric infrastructure and encourage them using innovative technology 
(Voutsas & Heinrich, 2011). It is important to show the key benefit of online banking 
and demonstrate bank’s security infrastructure to enhance customers’ trust. They needed 
to base their choice of an online banking system on more specific information than 
purely a sense of trust.  
 
5.3 What are users’ opinions of online banking systems? 
According to this study, respondents knew the fundamentals of how online 
banking systems operated and believed that banks were the firms that they could trust 
more strongly than other types of financial institutions that were available on the 
Internet. Respondents stated that they had trusted the banks’ reputation as well as the 
security protection. Their reasons for trusting their banks were because of high standards 
of security and banks’ images and reputations. Further, good relationships between the 
banking firms and the customers were reflected in loyalty and prolonged commitment to 
bank products and had influenced them to continue using services such as Internet 
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banking. A similar study also found that increased customer loyalty was reflected to the 
positive long-term financial performance (Alrubaiee & Al-Nazer, 2010).  
 
Supportively, most respondents positively believed and satisfied with their 
online banking services regarding the safety of financial status, trust in data protection, 
and confidence in security measures against cyber-attacks. However, one lowest level of 
their confidence was that many respondents had difficulty in distinguish a bank secure 
website. Therefore, they strongly agreed if their bank would offer security metrics 
measuring how secure their online banking was while they were accessing their banks. 
According to a summary of security checklist presented by Subsorn & Limwiriyakul 
(2011) there was no bank that provided an interactive ‘direct’ security metrics 
measuring system. In fact, most banks that available in Australian had not provided live 
check anti-virus protection, intrusion detection system and no information about them. 
The only security protection that most banks (except Westpac, Adelaide, Macquarie, 
and Members Equity banks) have had in place was firewall protection. In addition, 
respondents’ opinions about countermeasures and suggestions pointed to increasing or 
improving level of online banking security and providing user education. They believed 
that caution and knowledge about security protection and threats were important; 
nonetheless, the respondents still required their banks to ensure their safety.  
 
The security measures statements were provided to the respondents and asked 
them to deliver their security preferences of level of agreement. It found that major 
respondents agreed strongly about establishing or improving their online security system 
by their banks. The security they strongly preferred consisted of: 
(i) Multi security protection, such as login and password and SMS mobile 
verification code and digital signature. 
(ii) My bank should offer a tracking facility showing all transactions and detail 
about when I have logged in and out. 
(iii) My bank should never allow more than one computer access to the same 
online banking account at the same time. 
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(iv) My bank should detect, deny and stop all online banking activities if there is 
more than one computer accessing the same online banking account at the 
same time. 
(v) My bank should log off my account automatically when I close the window. 
(vi) My bank should log off my account automatically after I have been logged 
on for 45 minutes. 
(vii) My bank should log off my account automatically if my bank webpage is 
not active for 15 minutes. 
 
According to the summary of the proposed Internet banking security checklist 
wrote by Subsorn & Limwiriyakul (2011), many banks available in Australia have 
complied with the session validation and tracking facility systems. However, additional 
research found that none of the bank provided clear information according to the above 
seven statements. It could be assumed that banks may not see these security measures 
important or much sufficient. Unless, banks posted unclear of exiting security used 
which may have misled bank customers into perceiving that their banks did not have 
such security measures when they actually had implemented. Alternatively, banks had 
employed encryption and digital certificate technologies to enhance level of security 
mechanism with additional of 24/7 bank enquiries services. One important criterion 
about online banking system is an authentication system. Below section is respondents’ 
opinion about their online banking authentication preferences. 
 
5.3.1 What are users' opinions about the available online banking authentication 
systems?  
All data indicated that the respondents had believed the stronger and the more 
complex the authentication was; the more they felt their banks were secure against 
phishing. They had prioritised biometric protection as the strongest protection and the 
normal login with username and password as the weakest one. These research findings 
were supportive with the KeCrypt (2010), a biometrics security company, that 50% of 
those surveyed preferred biometric security to any other methods, such as smart cards 
plus passwords or PINs (20%), and multiple passwords or PINs (30%). In addition, of 
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those preferring biometric authentication, 63% saw it as being more secure and 27% 
found it more convenient than having to remember passwords and PINs (KeCrypt 
Systems Ltd, 2010).  
 
Interestingly, most respondents were willing to pay mandatory fees, if banks 
asked for it for more robust security for their online banking, such as the implementation 
of biometric authentication methods. Therefore, most respondents believed that as long 
as any system could protect them from being attacked, fees between $2 and $5 would be 
acceptable. In fact, most of the banks did not imposed any additional fees or charges 
relating to security measures and authentication mechanisms and in many cases there 
was a reduction of general fees and charges (Australia. Department of Communications, 
Information Technology and the Arts, 2008). The main reasons for the enhanced level of 
trust from the respondents were the robust security protection offered by the banks, 
along with the provision that customers could create or were provided long and strong 
passwords.  
 
Furthermore, much of the work on security focuses on creating strong passwords 
such as mixtures of uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers and special characters. 
Such combinations were preferred by most respondents. In addition, some respondents 
believed that maintaining such complex passwords was their solution in protecting them 
in phishing attacks, but some argued that if a phisher knew how to retrieve passwords 
from victims, any type of password would still be vulnerable and easy to obtain. That is, 
some users mentioned that if a phisher can steal their password, it really does not matter 
how long or complex they make the password. This could also reflect to respondents’ 
preferences about the knowledge-based authentication clearly when many respondents 
neither agreed nor disagreed about bank should employ security question and password 
authentication every time when they accessed to their online banking. Rabkin (2008) 
assisted that “… the user is assumed to be unable to remember arbitrary strings — 
otherwise they would have been able to remember their password”. In addition to this 
respondents’ agreement, if the result was satisfied and had been employed by bank, the 
customers would have failed into spear-phishing attack. It could bypass most knowledge 
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based authentication systems and processes based on external data from public data 
aggregators and the credit bureaus (Litan, 2010). Cormac Herley, a principal researcher 
at Microsoft Research said that “keeping a keylogger off your machine is about a trillion 
times more important than the strength of any one of your passwords,” (Stross, 2010). 
He also claimed that antivirus software could detect and block many kinds of 
keyloggers, but there is no guarantee that it gets everything (Stross, 2010).  
 
Many respondents demonstrated self-efficacy (Milne, Labrecque, & Cromer, 
2009) and preferred to take steps to secure their bank account. They used strong 
passwords and agreed with avoiding creating passwords containing date of birth, phone 
numbers, and residential and work addresses. They believed that such poor passwords 
may have consequent their online banking accounts more vulnerable. They agreed that it 
was necessary to change their passwords periodically, every three months if suggested 
by the banks, as they had believed that their security would have been improved. 
Nonetheless, some protested that it was difficult to keep changing passwords regularly 
as they were hard to remember and would not prevent them from being attacked. Some 
respondents said that they had to write down their passwords on a paper to remind 
themselves. This annoying password reminding could result in people creating 
guessable passwords which could open themselves up to hacking or facing a password 
paradox attack (Greenfield, 2011; Sines, 2011). The average person is limited to such a 
maximum complexity of the passwords they are willing to memorise (Schneier, 2006) 
and they tend to use their passwords in the same pattern. This belief has been supported 
by Hunt (2011) in human password generating that “password are inspired by words of 
personal significance or other memorable patterns.” It could be assumed that the 
passwords which have been created from numbers, symbols, (reverse) phrases, or 
selected from a dictionary are possible to relate to the person’s background such as 
name or place. Even though the phisher may take longer to crack the complicated 
password, they eventually will obtain it (Ingmar, 2011; Naughton, 2011).  
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 What respondents believed and had opinions about may not be told in what they 
really performed into securing their online transaction. Below paragraphs illustrate the 
actions of the respondents when they accessed their online account. 
 
5.4 Are users of online banking taking adequate steps to secure their online 
transactions? 
Respondents’ behaviours and their activities regarding online banking were 
evaluated to examine respondents’ knowledge about their computers, peripheral devices, 
and the security applications that had been installed. Because of the high responses 
indicated about home internet access, most respondents had knowledge about the 
operating systems, types of Internet connection, and security applications used in their 
usual device that was used to access their online banking service. In particular to the 
security installation, approximately one out of every three respondents knew what type 
of security had been installed on their computers. Most of them acknowledged that the 
computer would not have been secured at all if only a single anti-malware application 
had been installed. They understood that one anti-malware application may only be 
effective against a particular threat. In addition, they believed that their computers and 
personal information would not be secure against attack if adequate anti-malware was 
not installed along with proper and regular security upgrading. Practically, however, 
only anti-virus software had been installed in most respondents’ computers. Extra 
security applications, apart from the auto-update option, were lacking. Even though they 
acknowledged their devices and the limitation of an anti-malware protection that had 
been used to access their banks, they failed to employ multiple protection to secure their 
information privacy and computer assets.  
 
In addition to the phishing website attack, the results revealed that the nine 
respondents, who had been attacked, had installed only a single anti-malware protection. 
Four people had installed only a firewall application, three people had installed anti-
virus software, while one was unsure which security application had been installed, and 
another one did not use any security protection. All respondents’ online banking 
authentication systems involved the simple username and password login method. Four 
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had believed that this type of security method was the strongest way to protect 
themselves from phishing, whereas the other five highlighted more complex types of 
authentications such as biometrics, token devices, and mobile verification methods. 
They acknowledged that there were risks in relying on a single anti-malware 
application. Many respondents may try to avoid risks, but their behaviours in relying on 
a single anti-virus application and auto-updating options are in themselves a danger. It 
can be seen that the majority of users installed an anti-virus application to safeguard 
themselves against unpredicted threats; meanwhile, new threats to respondents’ privacy 
and online banking systems are on the rise and may not be apparent until it’s too late.  
 
Further, customers, particularly, who believed that they had less knowledge of 
the Internet, computers or security may have felt it is too challenging to keeping their 
machines updated with new patches or firmware updates which are released constantly. 
This belief could result in becoming a victim of phishing attacks (Milne, et al., 2009).  
 
People will avoid an action if they do not believe they have the ability to 
complete the action and achieve their desired result. Self-efficacy is an import factor in 
determining a person’s use of information security tools (Cox, 2012). According to 
AusCert (2008, p. 3) mentioned about the confidence of users in taking their own self-
efficacy in security practice that 68% were ‘confident’ or ‘very confident’ in managing 
their own computer’s security. This self-confidence was also found throughout this 
survey when asking respondents about ways or how to secure themselves from any 
cyber-attacks. They believed that if users were cautious, and alerted to any suspicious 
activities and trusted their security common sense. This was the first security line 
defense that could be used to mitigate phishing attack and also protect themselves from 
any phishing activities in the future. Therefore, it is essential for the banks to train or 
educate their customers about the potential risks from phishing by keeping the users’ 
computer updated with multi security protections regularly. Perhaps banks may 
safeguard their customers through effective marketing communication so that banks 
could propose phishing awareness and anti-phishing education to enhance consumer 
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response efficacy and self-efficacy in coping and responding on threat reducing or 
removing (Cox, 2012). 
 
5.5 What levels of knowledge do users of online banking have about phishing? 
More than half of the interviewed respondents knew of or had heard about online 
banking attacks and other related threats from their banks. They said they had received 
warning messages from their banks while other channels of communication were less 
often recognised. Only one person had heard warnings from the television and two 
people mentioned hearing warning information on the radio. However, the results 
revealed that the more sophisticated were the types of attacks the less knowledge of 
them the respondents had. Most interviewed respondents knew of, or had heard about, 
online banking threats and how personal information could be stolen from the Internet. 
Nonetheless, their confidence was much less when they were asked about particular 
terms of bank threats, such as phishing, Trojans, adware, and spyware.  
 
To begin with level of phishing knowledge, half of the respondents, who knew 
or had heard about phishing, had a stronger level of confidence about their knowledge of 
phishing. Their answers had been focused on the three main phishing activities: 
scammed email pretending to be from banks, money transfer scams and counterfeited 
bank websites. The results reveal that the respondents’ knowledge of phishing was 
sufficient and was comparable to the government’s statements. More in depth of the 
findings found that many of the online banking respondents who never experienced any 
types of phishing attacks had stronger confidential into believing that they knew what 
phishing was and how it performed. The gaps between who strongly had confidence and 
slightly had confidence were not too high. The critical points found in the groups of 
phishing attack experienced respondents. The level of confidence in phishing knowledge 
for respondents who received phishing e-mail and who had online banking attack 
experience were not different between who strongly believed and slightly believed. In 
fact, they should all have had strongly knowledge of phishing attack since they were the 
victims of the attack. Similar results were found in malware knowledge. The level of 
confidence in malware knowledge was quite low even though they all faced phishing 
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attack. Especially, respondents who had received phishing e-mail, had knowledge in 
specific terms of spyware, adware, and Trojan less than half of the total number in each 
group. Likewise, online banking respondents who never had any experience in phishing 
attacks also had low level of strongly knowledge in malicious attacks. Particularly, only 
a few respondents could differentiate between the three characterisations of Trojans, 
spyware, and adware. The majority of the respondents could only classify between one 
and two of those terms. Respondents were likely to be more familiar with the Trojan 
horse definition than that for spyware or adware. 
 
The results of this study indicate that the general controllability perception of 
online banking threats is positively associated with their self-efficacy in earlier 
discussion. However, most respondents still lacked ‘sufficient’ knowledge and did not 
receive enough information regarding phishing and threats publicly. Therefore, user 
awareness and education/training are critical in maintaining current knowledge of the 
latest cybercrime activities and the best cybercrime prevention measures (Choo, 2011). 
Current security awareness training should emphasise the vulnerabilities related to the 
various information security threats and what should be performed or not be done in 
order to reduce such vulnerabilities. Given the influence of general perception to 
respondents’ self-awareness or self-efficacy, awareness training should also interconnect 
the existence of bank‘s security counteracts and procedures to control online banking 
threats (Rhee, Kim, & Ryu, 2009). 
 
5.5.1 Do bank customers believe that banks are taking adequate steps to prevent 
phishing attacks? 
To begin with the authentication systems provided, it can be seen that methods 
can be categorised into two main groups of a single authentication system and a two-
factor authentication system. Most respondents had been provided with a single 
authentication system which comprised a username (login) and password. This 
authentication method was offered by banks more than two-factor authentication 
methods, such as login with password and SMS mobile verification, which was higher 
than the token devices, biometric authentication systems, grid card, or login and 
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password with a secret question. These two-factor authentication were basically an 
optional that banks had offered to their customers and not many bank employed them 
(Subsorn & Limwiriyakul, 2011). The multiple modes in the more sophisticated devices 
added layers of complexity for customers; nevertheless, there was no indication that 
they had any knowledge about their potential use because they had seen little need for 
complex devices. Interestingly, the statistical results reflected that proved authentication 
security by banks to their customers was parallel to what customers preferred as 
mentioned in 5.4. That means the customers believed that their banks were taking 
adequate steps to prevent phishing attack even though another side believed that using a 
single mechanism was not secure enough to protect their bank account.  
 
The contradict between security concern and actual behaviour found by Weir et 
al. (2009) about user perceptions of security, convenience and usability for e-banking 
authentication tokens that “customers see security as largely a concern of the Bank. 
Their preferences for authentication methods entirely followed usability and 
convenience concerns (p. 60).” That means the concerns for security in online banking 
did not override their desires for convenience and usability (Weir, et al., 2009). 
Respondents tended to choose something that was easy and less complexion to perform 
which would create a chance to get attacked by Trojans in recording data input when 
accessed to the bank. In regarding to this, many banks required customers to create 
strong and long passwords to enhance security. Banks encourage their customers to 
create strong and long passwords which many respondents had eight password lengths. 
This study shows that many respondents perceived that having only a login and 
password as security was ineffective. However, there were a number of people who did 
not realise the danger of having shorter passwords. Therefore, in addition to employing 
robust security and providing an education for customers about their safety, the use of 
mandatory policies about strong and complex passwords was essential. One technique 
that banks could do is to setting up an automatic strong password reset. The system may 
mandatory require customers to change their password every certain period of 3-6 
months. The system should detect if the customer are successfully created their own 
password combined with lower, upper, and special characters with numeric to a 
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minimum of 8 password lengths. If respondents fail in either bank’s policy, they could 
eventually be restricted their access to the online account and are required to re-activate 
their account in person. 
 
In terms of log on validation failure due to a number of inadequate password 
input, approximately half of the respondents had experienced being unable to access 
their own account; with half of those being allowed to re-access their online banking 
account. The majority of the respondents had solved the problem by calling the bank on 
number provided on the ‘contact us’ web page rather than walking in or sending an e-
mail. This method can help the respondent identify the problem immediately as soon as 
they had found out that their bank service had any problems. In contrast, the respondents 
would have failed into man-in-middle attack if the website had imitated by the phisher. 
It is a suggestion that banks should have a call back policy to contact their customers 
immediately over the phone. Alternatively, bank could send the contact number and 
asked them to contact to their bank immediately after three times failing of inacceptable 
password. Banks could further ask customers to come to the nearest branch and reset 
their password on the web to ensure that their account was control securely and setting 
up properly and authentically. 
 
5.5.2 What could be the vulnerable point that leads online banking users into 
phishing attacks? 
 According to 4.7.2, most respondents believed that user was the vulnerable point 
to phishing attack. They claimed that users who had less education in security, 
unawareness or ignorant in any unusual of internet and computer activities could fail to 
the cyber-attacks. Particularly, the nine respondents who had experienced an online 
banking attack, only some had realised themselves that something was wrong with their 
accounts, while the others had been informed of the attack by their banks. Furthermore, 
apart from asking their banks to mitigate the risks, they remained unsure whether their 
information was protected and had not been used for any further criminal activities. This 
example could reflect to the view that if respondents were lack of regular security check 
and being careless on their transaction, they could fail into successful phishing attacks. 
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Other vulnerable points to phishing may include type of operating system, type of 
internet connection, authentication security method, password type and length, and type 
of security protection. 
 
Florian’s blog (2012) shares information from the National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD) of the most targeted operating system in 2011 that Microsoft operating 
systems were the most targeted. The targeted Microsoft versions include Microsoft 
Windows Server 2003, Microsoft XP, Microsoft Windows Server 2008, Microsoft 
Windows 7 and Microsoft Windows Vista. The followed targets were Cisco IOS, Apple 
Mac OS X, Google Chrome OS, and Apple Mac OS X server. Interestingly, Apple iOS 
and Google Android made the entry in the top 15 most vulnerable operating systems in 
2011. Smart phones and tablets therefore also face strong risk of phishing attack as it 
was discussed on chapter 2. As the results of this survey, many respondents who used 
Windows platforms Windows XP, Windows Vista, and Windows7 may have faced 
significant risks of man-in-the-middle exposure. The attacker may use unauthorised 
certificate issued by Microsoft spoof content, perform phishing or man-in-the-middle 
attacks (Microsoft, 2012). The explosion found in the groups of respondents who had 
received phishing e-mail, experienced in phishing bank website, and who had not 
experience in any kind of attacks. In terms of internet connection, the research found 
that most phishing and non-phishing experienced used wired Internet connection to 
access their online banking accounts. Wired Internet connection could be vulnerable to 
denial-of-service (DOS) attack because users often turned on their machine and connect 
to the Internet for days (Kohli, 2008) which could render the device vulnerable to the 
attack. Attacker can take a chance to scan the network for available computer if any are 
connecting to the Internet. The attacker may attempt to deny respondents from accessing 
e-mail, websites, or online accounts (Thorat, Nayak, & Bokhare, 2010). Unfortunately, 
the question was not prepare to ask the respondents if those who used wired Internet 
connection disconnected or turned off their modem or disconnecting cables when they 
did not use the Internet. Therefore, the assumption to this possibility based from finding 
may indicate that the respondents who used DSL Internet connection may have been in 
risk of DOS attack. In fact, wireless internet connection is more vulnerable than wired 
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connection. The signals of most wireless networks extend beyond the walls of users’ 
house and eventually allows anyone can make a connection to the Internet through the 
wireless connection (Evans, Poatsy, & Martin, 2009). Failing of adequate wireless 
configuration may be interfered by passive attack (attacker interpret data gathered 
through snooping) and active attack (attacker modify data stream or creation of false 
stream) (Goyal, Batra, & Singh, 2010). However, one way to identify if these 
respondents were possibly safe from DOS attack is investigating type of security 
protection. For example, if they were suspecting to be in risk of DOS attack, one 
possible solution to secure their computer and data is installing a firewall application 
because it can keeps everything out except identified traffic (DeepSearcher Inc., 2012; 
Thorat, et al., 2010). As type of security protection was already discussed in 5.4, the 
numbers of respondents who installed firewall protection was lesser than anti-virus 
protection. Therefore, the protection that banks could educate customers about the types 
of connection should include a guidance of how to be safe from attacks with different 
types of Internet connection. For instance, Internet cable should be pulled off when 
computer is shut down. Router should be turned off if it is not in used. In addition to a 
secure wireless connection, a wireless router should be configured to difficult-to guess a 
SSID (network name), turn off the SSID broadcasting to make it harder for outsider to 
detect your network and enable security protocols such as WPA or WEP security 
(Evans, et al., 2009). Importantly, multiple software protection should be installed to 
monitor all incoming and outgoing traffic and detect any suspicious activities in the 
computer. 
 
The use of the Internet has become more important for transactions and in 
conjunction with the increase of privacy concerns. Users had decided to access their 
bank with longer password characters. As discussed partly in the previous research 
questions, this survey research found that many respondents had an average of eight 
passwords to manage; some had ten or more. Moreover, two character passwords were 
being used by some respondents, but even fewer respondents used as less as four 
characters. Further research found that the three respondents who had experienced 
phishing attacks were unlikely to change their passwords even if their banks had a 
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mandatory policy to do so, whereas others preferred to change every month (1 person), 
every 3 months (2 people), and every 6 months (2 people). Many respondents agreed it 
was necessary to change their passwords periodically, every three months if suggested 
by the banks. Even though the respondents had long password characters, and believed 
that using combinations of password characters was the strongest choice, they were still 
at risk of phishing attacks. Some protested that it was difficult to keep changing 
passwords regularly as they were hard to remember and would not prevent people from 
being attacked. Dale’s research (2007) found that people had problem with 
remembering and/or forgetting their passwords which resulted in written down the 
passwords in a paper. Consequently, not only the respondents knew about their 
password, but the surrounded people would know how to access their online accounts.  
 
A part from password protection, there is no single security application which 
has the ability to protect everything and remain secure all the time (GFI Software, n.d.). 
Many respondents may try to avoid risks, and relying on an auto-updating software 
protection. However, some people may find auto-updating option may be seen as a 
nuisance and they may turn it off without realising the high potential for harm (Milne, et 
al., 2009). Some big banks in Australia have increased the level of online banking 
security by establishing two-factor authentication for online accounts ("Banks increase 
security measures," 2010; Kavanagh, 2007) as well as focused on the consumer 
education and awareness which is one of the first line of defence to against online crime 
("Banks increase security measures," 2010). The respondents who had been attacked by 
the phisher were at risk because they lacked concrete knowledge of how to protect their 
computer from external threats. Their banks may succeed to provide strong security 
protection but fail in approaching customers to beware of the threats. Other possible 
reasons that users may engage in risk by their unintentional behaviour they may be 
convince by phishing e-mail and in ability to identify phishing bank websites. Social 
engineering may adept at appealing to the user’s emotions to fraudulently obtain 
sensitive and private information (Cox, 2012) via e-mail or pop-up windows message 
which will be discussed below. 
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5.5.3 Do users have enough knowledge to be able to distinguish a legitimate bank's 
e-mail and website from a fraudulent one? 
Overall, the results showed that self-awareness plays an important and direct role 
in online protection behaviours against phishing attacks. As respondents relied on their 
response efficacy in self-perceived abilities of coping and desiring to handle any 
security issues (Cox, 2012). When the respondents felt that they were facing dangers, 
they believed that they had confidence, knowledge and skills in avoiding or dealing with 
the problems. As the results show in sections 4.6.8 to 4.6.10, most respondents were 
confident that they could identify legitimate e-mails that came from their banks. Similar 
confidence was reported in dealing with phishing websites; many respondents believed 
that they had the ability to distinguish legitimate bank websites. Their knowledge and 
confidence in coping with threats were leading them to believe that they knew how to 
protect themselves from any suspicious online threat. 
 
In addition, 84% of the respondents who were interviewed in this question 
answered confidently about their ability in distinguishing legitimate e-mail from scam e-
mail which initially seemed to be from banks. Even though many respondents indicated 
that checking e-mail addresses was the method they believed that they would use; 
nevertheless, many respondents indicated that they felt they would still need assistance 
by contacting their bank to verify the incoming e-mail. It was apparent that most 
respondents did not have sufficient information regarding bank policies about phishing 
e-mail informing or receiving bank information via e-mail. 
 
In fact, no matter how caution the respondents were, if they still relied on the 
URL address, and e-mail content, or provided contact details, they could get trapped by 
the phisher. As demonstrated in chapter 2 that people can be attacked without clicking 
or providing anything in the e-mail as long as they just open it to read. One of the 
simplest ways that could avoid the respondents failing in phishing e-mails is to check 
full e-mail header. E-mail header allows the recipients to see where the message really 
originated from. This research discovered that none of the respondents mentioned about 
full e-mail header check. Further investigation found that no banks in available in 
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Australia warn or educate their customers about the benefit of full e-mail header 
verification. Many banks had warned their customers about bank e-mail sending policy 
or how to check phishing e-mail fundamentally such as e-mail content, e-mail addresses, 
using filter e-mail content and address. Therefore, this is another important step for all 
banks to insert an extra caution to educate their customers I self-verified of phishing e-
mails. 
 
On the other hand, respondents apparently knew less about verifying legitimate 
bank websites compared to verifying e-mails. Nevertheless, most respondents chose to 
check the URL to distinguish legitimate web pages, followed by checking whether the 
secured webpage icon was present. Distinguishing between e-mails seemed to be easier 
than determining whether websites were legitimate. However, there were many 
respondents who did not how to check e-mails and websites and a number who seemed 
to know how to do so, but could not explain or discuss it clearly. The number of 
respondents who somehow believed that they knew how to verify a website but could 
not explain clearly (21 people) was nearly equal to the number of respondents who were 
certain that they knew how to check the website by looking at the URL (28 people).  
 
Generally, respondents understood about web legitimate check. Their knowledge 
was also supported by the Australian Department of Broadband, Communication and 
the Digital Economy (n.d.) and US-CERT, wrote by McDowell & Lytle (2010) in 
regarding checking the digital certificate, https:// and padlock sign was appropriate to 
perform. The researcher found that people who judge by checking for the URL of the 
legitimate website may still fall victim to the URL obfuscation if they believed that the 
correct domain name is the legitimate bank website they visited. As mentioned by 
Johnson (2008) the act of DNS cache poisoning may be done by changing or adding a 
rogue IP address of the bank’s website by the attacker so that the user will be redirected 
to a wrong website instead of the original IP address. In addition, trusting in certificate 
depends on the level of the certificate authority that banks have been used to validate all 
of the information in the requests and ensure the data is secure (McDowell & Lytle, 
2010).  
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One possible solution to protect respondents and educate them at the same time 
is to integrating software and interfaces that prevent users from falling for attacks while 
performing their online transactions or checking their e-mails. Employing blacklists and 
whitelists website classification is another technique to determine whether the current 
visiting URL is on either black or white lists. The list of prohibited website will be 
stored on either clients or hosted at a central server which will be blocked if the 
respondents fall into it (Alkhozae & Batarfi, 2011). Many commercial toolbars or web 
browsers have this kind of detection such as Internet Explorer 7, Nestcape Browser 8.1, 
and Cloudmark AntiFraud Toolbar (Afroz & Greenstadt, 2011). However, the 
traditional blacklisting solution may not work effectively to a zero-day attack, if the 
malicious tool is newer and may bypass the detecting system (Parmar, 2012). Contrary, 
a global white-list approach is likewise hardly possible for to cover all legitimate web 
sites in the entire cyber world (Cao, Han, & Le, 2008). Nevertheless, whitelist solution 
may be practical in building a list of trusted bank websites that users access on a regular 
basis (Alkhozae & Batarfi, 2011). Characteristics of a website will be scan to detect 
phishing rather than filtering a list. These characteristics can be the URL address, 
HTML source code, page feature such as the page content (Alkhozae & Batarfi, 2011), 
or DNS-IP mapping (Cao, et al., 2008).  
 
To summarise the respondents’ knowledge in phishing verification, they all had 
standard concepts of ways to verify the legitimate and counterfeit e-mails and websites. 
Conversely, their knowledge was lacked of latest security attack information to guide 
them that more complex of phishing attack has developed beyond their exiting 
knowledge. Non-of the bank’s website provided any information that could educate 
their customers to be updated about latest phishing technique or demonstrate a more 
advance security self-practice to identify sophisticated threats. In fact, it is a customer 
responsibility to keep updating themselves about the new types of threats and follow 
news or media in association to their bank risk and safety. Bank still can educate their 
customers and provide more information and ensure that the self-protection guideline is 
up to date and remind the customers that they cannot rely on bank to be in charge 100% 
without customers’ self-awareness. 
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5.6 Limitations of the study 
 
There were some limitations with respect to the analysis and data that may have 
affected the results and discussion evaluation parts. 
 
First of all, this study was limited to the investigation of the use of online 
banking in Western Australia. The result might not be the same if a study of a similar 
topic were undertaken in other regions in Australia or in other countries where the use of 
online banking is also accessible and practical. 
 
Second of all, this is a pioneer study that concerns WA bank users whereas 
similar previous studies that were found in Australia did not focus on the knowledge and 
experience of phishing attacks that were discovered from the online banking 
respondents. Even though similar topics have been investigated in other countries, 
different experiences in the use of online banking and the knowledge about phishing are 
likely to have been reported, due to the differences of geographic, economic and cultural 
demands on online banking services.  
 
Thirdly, the results of this study reveal interesting and useful information 
regarding the use of online banking by the WA population. Hopefully, this might be the 
starting point for further researchers, security developers and bank technicians to use in 
designing more secure online banking authentication security for the bank customers 
later on while ensuring that their customers are safe from using any additional devices. 
 
Fourthly, there were some missing values in the data which were excluded from 
the analysis and this made the sample size for some of the time periods smaller than 
others. Therefore, it is possible that some values were shown to be significant in 
sometime periods but not in others due to the sample size (Dobbs & Maxwell, 2002). 
 
Fifthly, phishing techniques have rapidly developed in the cyber world. This 
results in a number of various types of phishing techniques that are used to attack banks’ 
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customers. This research did not cover all aspects of all phishing methods and did not 
include any discussion of still-developing techniques. This study; therefore, focused 
only on the experiences and the information provided by the respondents. 
 
Finally, it could be difficult for respondents to “…recall information or to 
provide the truth about a controversial question” (Barribeau et al., n.d.). This would 
result in the information given to be analysed in this research not being the same if 
repeated with different groups.  
 
5.7 Discussion summary 
This study has attempted to understand the factors influencing respondents’ in 
adapting to online banking and their knowledge and behaviour in the use of online 
service. Security concepts in association to online banking and possible threats have 
substantial explanatory factors regarding respondents’ online banking security practice. 
Particularly, it involves security countermeasure used by banks and customers’ security 
preferences, and security conscious. The research found that self-awareness and practice 
influences respondents’ behaviours and their level of knowledge in risk determining and 
mitigating. The weakness in user practice and knowledge pose bigger threats to 
financials security than any other components. Thus, the biggest challenge online 
security professionals is how to transform users from the biggest vulnerability into the 
first line of defense by providing and educating more specific security issues to enhance 
their self-efficacy and adequate knowledge. The use of robust security measures is also 
encouraged to continuing develop and ensured that it is mandatory used to all 
respondents by the ease and convenience is a key approach. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Summary of the study 
This research examined users’ behaviours in online banking authentication 
security and their levels of understanding and experience of phishing. The objective was 
to identify their online self-awareness, opinions, knowledge, experience, and attitudes 
regarding phishing attacks and how their knowledge could protect themselves against 
these attacks. This study consisted of a survey of 226 people from various groups, 
according to gender, careers, ages, areas of living, and salary, of the Western Australian 
population. This ensured that the selected samples could be represented as 
generalisations and could correspond with government statistical records. It was found 
that self-efficacy and banks’ security support services have differential impacts on the 
levels of respondents’ risks, behaviours and opinions of online banking security. 
 
Overall, phishing education is an effective tool to lessen susceptibility to 
phishing attacks. Lack of strong knowledge about phishing tends to mean that bank 
clients are more vulnerable to the attacks. Information about phishing and online attacks 
or threats is often only available from the banks themselves; the communications media 
generally only report massive international attacks. Self-awareness and high level 
cognitive skills are the key factors that minimise levels of personal liability to phishing 
and mean that individuals have appropriate solutions to the threats. Nevertheless, the 
respondents who have knowledge about phishing and have strong passwords still could 
be fooled by the threats if they rely on a single protection method.  
 
Moreover, most respondents tended to choose simple security authentication to 
be their preference as they believed it would secure them from the hazards. 
Interestingly, their preferences were similar to the methods that their banks had provided 
for them. In other words, respondents chose their authentication security preferences 
based on their attitudes to usability and convenience rather than on methods they 
perceived to be increasingly secure. Many respondents saw security as largely the 
concern of the bank. Consequently, the majority was not prepared to act upon what they 
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believed would increase security, even though they knew basically what was good for 
them. Only a minority was willing to carry out recommended security measures, even if 
they were more complex. 
 
Banks and security practitioners could take advantage of the respondents’ 
loyalty, trust and confidence to bridge these gaps by providing education about anti-
phishing techniques. According to respondents’ experience, e-mail was the most 
sensitive tools that most respondents had experience with and they tended to fall in 
phishing attacks if they relied on unaware self-efficacy as discussed in chapter 5. 
Instead, providing educational and training showing the acts of users that could 
consequent into phishing attacks, and demonstrating effective use of multiple software 
protections should be available in enticingly and understandably forms in various 
channels. Channels that may increase users’ perception should include (Quagliata, 
2011): 
(i) Computer-based training 
(ii) Policies and procedures 
(iii) Newsletters 
(iv) E-mail 
(v) Leader-led training 
(vi) Video 
(vii) Posters 
(viii) Brochures 
However, too many educational materials may decrease participants' tendencies 
to click on legitimate links. This suggests that banks need to find a better solution to 
educate users how to distinguish phishing from non-phishing so that they avoid false 
positives. Obviously, e-mail seems to be the unsuccessful tool in this regard because 
users these days are aware phishing e-mail. Whilst, the use of mandatory policies and 
procedures may be more appropriate because it is forcefully the users to follow bank’s 
processes before moving to the next step of online transaction activities such as 
password changes, or robust password creation. 
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Strategies for protecting users from phishing generally fall into three major 
categories: eliminating the threats, warning users about the threats, and training users 
not to fall for phishing. These categories of anti-phishing strategy mirror three high-
level approaches to usable security by banks: building robust systems without, or 
requiring less, intervention on the part of users, ensuring security is intuitive and easy to 
use, and educating users how to perform security-critical functions. These three 
approaches should be complementary to each other. Findings from this research also 
showed that users’ education should be complemented with other countermeasures such 
as mandatory policies for password protection. Public warning campaigns are also 
desirable.  
 
Where possible, the first layer of defence should always be automated solutions 
to filter and increase the default security offered to bank users' computers and web 
applications. Many phishing emails are filtered out at email gateway services, but 
consumers still need to be able to recognise those malicious emails which have 
proceeded through the filtering mechanisms. Without this first layer of defence, even 
well-trained users would be inundated with phishing messages that could paralyse their 
decision-making and cause them to take unnecessary risks.  
 
Given that it may be quite difficult even for security practitioners to notice a 
compromised browser URL bar, users' computers can be infected with malware even 
without any preliminary user actions. In this study, more than 65% of the respondents 
needed proper phishing education. Hence user education in related aspects such as 
strong password creation, multi anti-malware installations, along with detection 
software and proper software updating, would not be sufficient to alleviate the problem. 
It is also essential to strengthen browsers, computer operating systems, and Internet 
connections.  
 
However, bank users also need to acknowledge that such systems may not be 
entirely accurate in detecting phishing attacks. It could be said that there is neither a 
single tool nor a technique that will ever be completely secure and protect against 
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phishing attacks accurately. At the same time as automated protection, monitoring and 
detection systems which have the ability to defence against more complex intrusion 
activities, there still remains other trust decisions and solutions that the respondents 
should look into in order to act upon their decisions independently. Hence, a further step 
of defence is to develop a corresponding approach to assist the respondents so that they 
can help themselves in a crisis situation with the appropriate decision support. There are 
two options for this approach: educate users to stay away from the suspicious activities, 
or build and/or implement easy-to-use software and interfaces that prevent users from 
falling for attacks while performing their online transactions or checking their emails. 
Importantly, users have to be encouraged to demand stronger authentication from the 
online banks themselves. Whist low-cost authentication devices with sufficient secure 
and authenticated functions are acceptable, more services should be offered. Banks 
should focus on using the Internet’s unique characteristics and capabilities to make their 
websites more reliable and easy to access. Moreover, banks may increase the users’ 
perceptions of security in communicating with their online banking websites by 
addressing three key areas. They are addressing user concerns about current phishing 
activities, money fraud, or computer crime, enhancing privacy invasion protection by 
alerting the users for any transaction activities in their accounts, and providing and 
allocating sufficient information or security resources for further and comprehensive 
self-efficacy. 
 
It is not only the bank trying to develop the best security to protect their 
customers and to educate users to be aware of the current threats, and encourage them to 
be more vigilant about any suspicious activities that could impact upon their financial 
accounts. Local, state and the federal government teams are also introducing ways that 
customers can be protected from cybercrime especially phishing attacks by addressing 
information on their websites or broadcasting on the television channels. In addition to 
the best practice, the government could run training programs about threats, new 
cybercrime attacks to customers and financial business employees. This information 
could add the practical guidelines that enable customers and financial staff to be 
proactive about the latest phishing or online frauds as well as some solutions to mitigate 
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the threats on their online account or inside the computer. However, expecting 
assistance from a helper will not be the final solution if users are not training themselves 
to distinguish between legitimate and counterfeit online banking platforms, and other 
information or material that look suspicious. Importantly, they should be aware and alert 
for any news or advertisements about phishing, scams, or any other fraudulent activities 
that could harm their finances or privacy. 
 
6.2 Future research 
This section consists of recommendations for further study as suggested by the 
present study. In future research, a larger scale investigation could be made. It is 
recommended that future research uses different types of question and multiple survey 
methods to capture information across a wide set of phenomena. In this research, some 
respondents were unwilling to disclose all their information credentials due to security 
and privacy concerns. Future research could also explore situations to other states in 
Australia and then other countries. 
 
Also, a lack of in depth quantitative work exists in this field which would yield 
insights into some of the results in this and other studies. It would be of interest to 
examine the functions of online banking security mechanisms and to testify and 
compare their utilities in the online banking environment to ensure the security quality 
and to protect users from criminal activities.  
 
Research that continues to monitor and investigate online banking users’ 
protective and risk behaviours is also required. People are increasing using the Internet 
for the transactions; hence, an investigation of the relationship between age, career, 
genders and other factors with the self-efficacy, capability in dealing with phishing and 
interest in the online environment is an important direction for future research. 
Additionally, research is required to examine more intensive how self-efficacy of online 
banking users varies over time when the new technological challenges arrive and result 
in their online privacy and security changes. 
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Finally, the results of this study reveal interesting and useful information 
regarding security perception towards the use of online banking by the WA population. 
Current threats to bank customers were discussed in the literature chapter to examine 
what has happened to them and why was significant. The collected data also revealed 
ways that customers may have fell into phishing attacks and what recommendations 
should be more concerned to enhance security awareness and robust protection that 
banks may have overlooked. 
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APPENDIX A: Glossary of term 
Adware A form of pop-up or any software package which automatically plays, 
displays, or downloads advertisements to a computer. Some may 
integrate with spyware purposed for interfere users’ computer or gain 
personal information. 
Backdoor  A program that allows unauthorised users remote access to a targeted 
computer without requiring user identification.  
Botnet  A number of infected computer that are controlled by cyber-criminals 
to carry out their degenerate tasks, such as sending spam mails, 
performing denial-of-service attacks, or stealing personal credentials 
(Stone-Gross et al., 2009). 
Rootkit A program that hides the presence of another application in the 
computer system. It is used to gain a privilege to access to a computer 
and become undetectable by an anti-malware and alter the standard 
functionality of the system in a malicious and stealthy way  
(Mell, et al., 2005). 
Spyware  A software that silently installed in a users’ computer intended to 
collect user’s information especially username, password, bank 
account details. The collected data will be transferred to the fraudster 
or the sender without users’ knowledge. 
Virus A program which is designed to self-replicate and make copies of 
itself to files or computer system and disk drives (Warrell, 2011). It 
can damage application and data files and affect computer hardware. 
Trojan horse  A harmful piece of software that looks legitimate and may allow an 
attacker remote access to a target computer system. It can attack 
computer hard drives, deleting files and re-writing system files. 
Worm A standalone self-replicating program that is completely self-
contained and self-propagating (Mell, et al., 2005). It is aimed to gain 
access to computer silently and take up memory and network 
bandwidth. Effects of worm can slow down Internet traffic and stop 
responding.
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APPENDIX B: Informed consent document to offline survey 
participants 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND INTERVIEW SURVEY 
 
Dear Research participants 
 
You are invited to participate in this survey of “Security Awareness in Western 
Australian Online Banking Users of Phishing Attacks”, part of the requirement for 
Doctor of Information Technology degree, School of Computer and Security Science 
(SCSS) at Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia. 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine your awareness of security issues relating to 
use of online banking. This survey will take approximately 5-10 minutes to complete. 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may decline to answer 
any question you do not wish to answer. You should also be aware that you have every 
right to withdraw from this research process at any time. A focus group interview may 
be requested if the information you provided in questionnaire is of interest. If you do 
decide to terminate the interview, you will also be able to remove all information you 
have provided, if you so wish.  
 
This research has been approved by the ECU Human Research Ethics Committee. 
Ensuring confidentiality and anonymity is part of the researcher’s responsibility. All 
data provided will be used only in the aggregate without identifying any person or 
organisation at any time and any place. In addition, if you agree to participate in a focus 
group interview, it will involve voice recording and video recordings only for the 
purpose of accuracy of data recording. If recordings are not possible, only notes will be 
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taken. All data and documents will be preserved in a secure place. Other than my 
supervisor(s), no one will have any access to any data I collect during this research. 
If you require any further information concerning this research, please contact: 
Miss Nattakant Utakrit 
Contact address: School of Computer and Security Science (SCSS), Faculty of 
Computing, Health and Science, Edith Cowan University, Mt. Lawley, Western 
Australia, 6050. 
E-mail: nattakau@student.ecu.edu.au   
Tel: +61 422 228 393 
 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the research project and wish to talk to an 
independent person, you may contact the: 
Research Ethics Officer 
Edith Cowan University 
100 Joondalup Drive, Joondalup 
Western Australia, 6027 
Phone: (08) 6304 2170 
E-mail: research.ethics@ecu.edu.au 
 
Informed Consent Document 
Security Awareness in Western Australian Online Banking Users of Phishing 
Attacks  
I, the participant, have read the information above and clearly understand the contents 
provided. I also am informed that I have a full right to withdraw from this study at any 
time. 
 
I willingly agree to participate in this study. 
 
Participant …………………………...................  Date ............... 
Investigator …………………………...................  Date................
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APPENDIX C: Informed consent document to online survey 
participants 
 
ONLINE SURVEY 
 
Dear Research participants 
 
You are invited to participate in this online survey of “Security Awareness in Western 
Australian Online Banking Users of Phishing Attacks”, part of the requirement for 
Doctor of Information Technology degree, School of Computer and Security Science 
(SCSS) at Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia. 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine your awareness of security issues relating to 
use of online banking. This survey will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may decline to answer 
any question you do not wish to answer. You should also be aware that you have every 
right to withdraw from this research process at any time.  
 
This research has been approved by the ECU Human Research Ethics Committee. 
Ensuring confidentiality and anonymity is part of the researcher’s responsibility. All 
data provided will be used only in the aggregate without identifying any person or 
organisation at any time and any place. All data and documents will be preserved in a 
secure place. Other than my supervisor(s), no one will have any access to any data I 
collect during this research. 
 
 If you require any further information concerning this research, please contact: 
Miss Nattakant Utakrit 
Contact address: School of Computer and Security Science (SCSS), Faculty of 
Computing, Health and Science, Edith Cowan University, Bradford 
Street, Mt. Lawley, Western Australia 6050. 
E-mail: nattakau@our.ecu.edu.au  
Tel: +61 422 228 393 
 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the research project and wish to talk to an 
independent person, you may contact the: 
Research Ethics Officer 
Edith Cowan University 
100 Joondalup Drive, Joondalup 
Western Australia, 6027 
Phone: (08) 6304 2170 
E-mail: research.ethics@ecu.edu.au 
 
Informed Consent Document 
Security Awareness in Western Australian Online Banking Users of Phishing 
Attacks  
 
I, the participant, have read the information above and clearly understand the contents 
provided. I also am informed that I have a full right to withdraw from this study at any 
time. 
 
I willingly agree to participate in this study. 
 
Participant …………………………...................  Date ............... 
 
(Click accepted to start online survey or click unaccepted to leave from the survey) 
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APPENDIX D: A copy of questionnaire survey 
This questionnaire includes 4 parts as follows: 
Part A: Your background 
Part B: Your experiences in using online banking  
Part C:  You experience in relation to online banking security 
Part D: Your preferences in a deployment of online banking security protection  
 
PART A: Your background. Please cross (X) in the box for your most appropriate 
answer and fill in the blanks when necessary 
A1. Gender  1.Male   2. Female    
 
A2. Age 
       1. Under 20      2. 20 – 24   
       3. 25 – 29      4. 30 – 34 
       5. 35 – 39      6. 40 – 44  
       7.45 – 49      8. Above 50  
 
A3. Average annual income  
      1. Less than $ 20,000   2. $20,001-$ 30,000 
      3. $30,001-$ 50,000   4. $50,001 - $ 100,000 
      5. More than $100,000   6. I prefer not to answer  
 
A4. Occupation Please specify…………………………………………………… 
 
A5. Highest or current education level 
       1. PhD/ Dr.                                      2. Master Degree 
       3. Bachelor Degree                        4. Diploma  
       5. High School                               6. Others, please specify ……………………… 
 
A6. Usual place of residence           Postcode……………… 
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PART B: Your experiences in using online banking 
B1. Have you ever used online banking services? (eBay, PayPal, and online shopping 
are not included) 
 1. Yes (go to question B2)   2. No (go to question B10)  
 
B2.Why did you decide to use online banking? You may choose more than one 
 1. Avoid waiting in a queue  2. Faster service computer operation  
 3. Reduce time spent commuting  4. Uncertain 
       5. Other, please specify ………………………………………………………… 
 
B3. Which online banking websites have you accessed? You can choose more than 
one 
       1. Commonwealth bank 2. BankWest 3. Westpac 
 4. ANZ bank 5. National bank 6. Citibank 
       7. HSBC bank 8. I prefer not to answer 9. Other ….. 
 
B4. Which online banking websites are you still using?  
       1. Commonwealth bank 2. BankWest 3. Westpac 
 4. ANZ bank 5. National bank 6. Citibank 
       7. HSBC bank 8. I prefer not to answer 9. Other …… 
 
B5. From question B4, if you have stopped using some internet banking sites, why 
did you stop using online banking accounts?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
B6. How often do (did) you use an online banking website each month? 
 1. None        2. 1 or 2 times       3. 3-5 times 
      4. 6-10 times 5. 11-20 times        6. More than 20 
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B7. What is (was) your main purpose for using online banking? You may choose 
more than one 
       1. Update personal information 2. Money transfer 3. Pay bill 
       4. Viewing balance and summary information           5. Other, please specify …… 
 
B8. What is (was) the most important reason that you chose a particular bank as 
your major Internet bank? You may choose more than one 
       1. I have (had) a traditional bank account with the same bank 
       2. The brand name of the bank  
       3. The excellent service offered by this bank 
       4. The security protection offered by bank for online banking 
       5. Other, please specify………………………………………… 
 
B9. Where do (did) you usually access an online banking website? You may choose 
more than one  
 1. My house    2. School/ university/ college            3. My friend’s house 
      4. Internet café         5. Public library                                 6. My workplace 
 7. I access online banking via mobile phone / palmtop 
      8. Other, please specify ………………………. 
 
B10. From question 1, why have you never used online banking? You may choose 
more than one option. 
 1. I am not interested in online banking.             
 2. I do not know how to use online banking.  
      3. I do not know how to use Internet.    
4. I do not know how to use computer.  
5. I have never heard of online banking.               
6. I do not have an Internet connection. 
      7. I do not have an online banking account.   
8. I do not have a computer. (Continued on the next page ----->) 
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9. I am concerned about security.    
10. I have not had time to open an account. 
      11. I do not see any real value in using online banking or having an online banking 
account. 
 12. It is too new. I would like to see how it works, and then I may open an account. 
      13.  It is not available through my bank.    
 14. Other, please specify ………………… 
 
Note. If you have never used an online banking and finished answer question B10, 
this is end of your questionnaire. Thank you for your participation. Alternatively, 
if you have used an online banking and finished answer above questions, please 
continue to the following pages.
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PART C:  You experience in relation to online banking security 
C1. What type of Internet connection do you use when accessing online banking? 
You may choose more than one  
      1. Analog (Dial-up modem) 2. ADSL wired broadband  
 3. Coaxial Cable 4. ADSL wireless broadband  
 5. ISDN broadband  
6. I am not sure what type of internet connection I use 
      7. Other, please specify ………………………………………………………… 
 
C2.What type of operating system is installed on your computer? You may choose 
more than one  
       1. Windows 98 2.Windows 2000 3. Windows XP 
 4. Windows Vista 5. Windows 7 6. Windows Mobile 
 7. Linux 8. Macintosh 9. MS-DOS  
 10. I am not sure what operating system I use 
      11. Other, please specify ………………………………………………………… 
 
C3. Do you have security protection on your computer? What type of security 
protection do you deploy on your computer (i.e. the computer with which you most 
often access online banking websites)? You may choose more than 1.  
       1. Yes, I have installed firewall application (e.g., Zone Alarm, Webroot, and 
Norton).  
       2. Yes, I have installed anti-virus software (e.g., Norton, AVG, Mcafee, and 
NOD32).  
       3. Yes, I have installed anti-spyware/ adware/ Trojan/backdoor (e.g., SpyBot, Spy 
Sweeper, and Spyware Doctor). 
       4. Yes, I have installed popup windows blocker (e.g., Super Ad Blocker,Pop-Up 
Stopper Anti-Spyware, and Pop-Up Sentry).  
       5. Yes, I have installed security protection, but I am not sure what type of security 
protection I have installed in my computer. (Continued on the next page) 
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 6. I am not sure whether I have security protection or not (go to question C5).   
 7. No, I do not use computer security software protection (go to question C5).  
      8. Other, please specify ……………………………………………………………… 
 
C4. How often do you update your security protection? 
      1. Once a day 2. Once a week  3. Once a month 
 4. Twice a day 5. Twice a week 6. Twice a month 
 7. Every 2 weeks 8. Every 3 months 9. Every 4-6 months 
 10. I do not need to update 11. Auto update 12. I am not sure 
      13. Other, please specify ………………………………………………………… 
 
C5. Which of the following statements best explains your online banking situation?  
       1. Your bank provides you with an application software program that operates on 
your PC. Then you dial into the bank via modem, download data, and operate the 
program that is resident on your PC. 
       2. You use a Web browser, but the actual banking software resides on the bank's 
server in the form of bank's home page.  
       3. I am not sure 
       4. Others, please specify ……………………………………………………… 
 
C6. Which security authentication are you provided when accessing an online 
banking website? You may choose more than one if you have more than one online 
banking account 
       1. Login + password 
       2.  Login+ password+ biometric  
       3. Login+ password+ token device  
       4. Login + password + mobile (SMS) verification code 
       5.  Login + password + static verification code attached on your credit card, 
EFTPOS, or written on your paper given by bank  
       6.  Login + password + challenge-response (random verification) code (e.g., 
C A P T C H A  or ) (Continued on the next page)  
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       7. Login + password + security questions (e.g., what is your mother's maiden 
name?)  
       8. Others, please specify …………………………………………………………… 
 
C7. How many characters (letters or numbers) are there in your online banking 
password? 
 1. 4 2. 6 3. 8 
 4. 10 5. Other, please specify……. 
 6. I prefer not to answer 
 
C8. Have you ever been locked out from your online account due to providing 
incorrect passwords multiple times?  
 1. Yes (go to question C9) 2. No (go to question C10) 
 
C9. From question 8, when you have been locked out from your online banking 
account, did the online banking system allow you to log in again after sometime?  
 1. Yes  2. No  
 
C10. If you have (had) a problem with accessing your online banking, how would 
you report your problem? You may choose more than one. 
       1. Report via e-mail provided 
       2. Report via the report form on web page 
       3. Call number provided on ‘contact us’ page 
       4. Report to police 
       5. Direct inform by walk in to the branch office 
       6. I am not sure 
       7. I do not report 
       8. Other, please specify ……………………………………………………
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C11. Which type of financial institution do you believe has the strongest online 
security?  
 1. Banks 2. Credit Card Company 
3. Online Stock Brokers 4. Online Auction websites  
5. I am not sure  
      6. Online Payment Processing Company (e.g., PayPal) 
      7. Online Shopping Websites (e.g., Ebay, Amazon)                 
      8. Others, please specify ………… 
 
C12. From question C11, What do you like about their security? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………… 
       I do not know  
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PART D: Your preferences in a deployment of online banking security protection  
D1. If your bank asks you to pay mandatory fees for the use of additional security 
measures such as biometric (physical security authentication) or token devices, are 
you willing to pay for this service? 
 
Biometrics is used as a form of identity access control in which refers to 
methods for uniquely recognizing humans based upon intrinsic physical or behavioral 
traits such as such as retina scan, fingerprint scan, and voice recognition.  
Security Token is a random numeric code device; known as digital token, that is 
used to identify one's identity electronically as in the case of a customer is who they 
claim to be trying to access their bank account.  
 
 1. Yes (go to question D2) 2. No (go to question D3) 
 
D2. How much are you willing to pay for using biometric or token devices? 
      1. $1 per month    2. $2-$5 per month               3. $6-$10 per month  
      4. More than $10 per month    5. I am not sure  6. Other……. 
 
D3. Which type of password would you prefer to secure your online banking 
account from online banking scam? 
  1. Numbers               2. Lower case alphabets (e.g., abc)  
       3. Upper case alphabets (e.g., ABC)            4. Special characters (e.g., @#%&*) 
       5. Mixed of numbers and lower case alphabets      
  6. Mixed of numbers and upper case alphabets 
       7. Mixed of numbers and special characters 
       8. Mixed of numbers, special characters, lower case and upper case alphabets 
       9. I prefer not to answer 
       10. Others, please specify …………………………………………………… 
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D4. Which security options give you a feeling of security about your online 
experience? You may please choose more than one.  
       1. Login + password 
       2. Login+ password+ biometric such as retina scan, fingerprint scan, and voice 
recognition    
       3. Login+ password+ token device 
       4. Login + password + mobile (SMS) verification code 
       5. Login + password + static verification code attached on your credit card, 
EFTPOS, or written on your paper given by bank 
       6. Login + password + challenge-response (random verification) code (e.g., 
C A P T C H A  or ) 
       7. Login + password + security questions (e.g., what is your mother's maiden 
name?)  
       8. Others, please specify ………………………………………………… 
 
D5. If your bank asks you to change your online banking password periodically in 
order to protect your account from unauthorized use, would you agree to make the 
change? 
 1. Yes, I would agree. 
 2. No, I would not agree. Please specify your reason …………………………… 
 
D6. How often would you prefer to change your online banking password? 
       1. Every month             2. Every 3 months                   3. Every 6 months 
       4. Once a year                             5. I am not sure             6. Never 
       7. Other, please specify ………………………………………………………… 
 
D7. In your opinion what minimum length of passwords should be in your online 
banking system? Please specify the number 
………………………………………………  
(Next page >)
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D8. These are the most common online banking security protection methods.  Please prioritise your online banking 
security methods from the maximum protection to the minimum protection in your opinion by indicating number 1, 2, 
3...to 7. 
 
1: the maximum protection7: the minimum protection 
1. Login + password 7  
2. Login+ password+ biometric  3  
3. Login+ password+ token device 1  
4. Login + password + mobile (SMS) verification code 6  
5. Login + password + static verification code attached on your credit card, 
EFTPOS, or written on your paper given by bank 
5  
6. Login + password + challenge-response (random verification) code  
(e.g., C A P T C H A  or ) 
4  
7. Login + password + security questions (e.g. what is your mother's maiden name?) 2  
 
For 
example 
 
Your 
ranks 
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Question D9 – D10 please rate (x) on the scale where you think it is appropriate.  
5 = strongly believe  4 = believe     3= neither believe nor do not believe 
2 = do not believe  1 = strongly do not believe 
D9. Your opinion in relation to the safety of using online banking? 5 4 3 2 1 
1. Using an online banking system is financially secure.      
2. I trust an online banking system to protect my personal information      
3. I have confidence in the security measures that my online banking 
system uses. 
     
4. Attack incidents against online banking systems have no influence in 
my level of confidence about online banking 
     
5. I am able to distinguish if a financial institution’s website is secure.      
6. I am satisfied with the security protection of my online banking 
account. 
     
7. I consider that security features are a main factor in my decision 
whether or not to do business with an Internet based company 
     
8. My bank should offer security metrics to measure how secure my 
online banking is that would be valuable to me. 
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5 = I strongly agree  4 = I agree  3= neither agree nor disagree 
2 = disagree   1 = I strongly disagree 
D10. Your opinion about security of your online banking system. 5 4 3 2 1 
1. My bank should apply multi security protection, such as login and 
password and SMS mobile verification code and digital signature. 
     
2. My bank should prompt me with a security question, such as ‘what 
is your mother's maiden name?’ every time I log on to my online 
banking account. 
     
3. My bank should offer a tracking facility showing all transactions 
and detail about when I have logged in and out. 
     
4. My bank should never allow more than one computer access to the 
same online banking account at the same time. 
     
5. My bank should detect, deny & stop all online banking activities if 
there is more than one computer accessing the same online banking 
account at the same time.  
     
6. My bank should log off my account automatically when I close the 
window. 
     
7. My bank should log off my account automatically after I have been 
logged on for 45 minutes.  
     
8. My bank should log off my account automatically if my bank 
webpage is not active for 15 minutes.  
     
 
D11. Do you have any comments about using online banking or security protection 
for online banking? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX E: A copy of interview/open-ended questionnaire 
 
This semi-instructional form attempts to gain direct information from respondents in 
online scam threat experience. Please provide your information/ opinion as much as 
possible. 
 
1. Have you ever heard of any online banking threat from media, your friend or your 
bank? Please tell us about that (ATM skimming device is not included). 
 
2. What do you know about “phishing” (online banking scam)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. What do you know about spyware/adware/ Trojans? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Do you know anything about how your personal information can be stolen from the 
Internet? 
 
 
 
 
 
5. What is your opinion about using a combination of numbers and both upper and 
lower case characters can help you from an online banking scam? 
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6. Do you think that a password using your personal detail such as date of birth or 
phone number is insecure?  
 
 
 
 
 
7. Could you tell me your opinion with the sentence “changing password every 3-6 
months can protect your online banking account from phishing”? 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Have you ever received an e-mail from a bank that asked you to provide your 
confidential information? What did you do? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. How do you determine that e-mails that appear to be from the banks are not e-mail 
scam? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. How do you distinguish your online banking webpage whether it is a legitimate 
webpage or a counterfeit webpage?  
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11. Have your online banking account ever been attacked by a scammer? What did you 
do? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. From the question above, was the attacker successful in obtaining anything from 
your account? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. Was the attacker successful in the use of or attempt to use your personal information 
for some other fraudulent purpose such as medical care, a job, or government 
benefits, renting accommodation, giving your information to the police when they 
were charged with a crime or traffic violation, or something else? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. In your opinion what are the vulnerable points that make the phishing successful in 
online banking attacks? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. What did you do to protect yourself or solve the problem? 
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16. Do you think that installing either anti-virus or anti-spyware/Trojan is enough to 
secure your computer from being attacked? If not, please clarify your reason. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. Please tell us about how to secure yourself from phishing e-mails, phishing 
webpages and any other phishing activities that could occur in your daily life? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18. Do you have any comment or anything that you would like to tell us or banks about 
phishing, online banking security, or the future of online banking attacks? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
End of Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for your participation 
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APPENDIX F: Online Survey Poster 
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APPENDIX G: Focus Group/ Seminar Poster 
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APPENDIX H: Data of respondents’ background  
No. Gender Age Income Actual Occupation Occupation Types Education Postcode 
1 Male 20 - 24 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Student Student Bachelor Degree 6027 
2 Male Above 50 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Retired Retired High School 6151 
3 Female 45 - 49 30,001-50,000 Library Assistant 
Clerical and administrative 
Workers 
Diploma 6007 
4 Male 40 - 44 > 100,000 Information Architect Professionals Bachelor Degree 6151 
5 Female 40 - 44 No answer Home keeper Home Duties Bachelor Degree 6014 
6 Female 40 - 44 < 20,000 Home Executive Professionals Diploma 6010 
7 Female 35 -39 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Importer Technicians and Trades Workers Bachelor Degree 6018 
8 Female 45 - 49 
I prefer not to 
answer 
House Wife Home Duties Bachelor Degree 6018 
9 Female 45 - 49 50,001-100,000 Business Owner Professionals High School 6014 
10 Female 25 -29 20,001-30,000 Sales Assistant Sales Workers High School 6066 
11 Female 25 -29 30,001-50,000 Sales Assistant Sales Workers High School 6155 
12 Female 45 - 49 < 20,000 Home duties Home Duties Bachelor Degree 6014 
13 Male 30 - 34 < 20,000 Tutor Miscellaneous Master Degree 6060 
14 Female Above 50 
I prefer not to 
answer 
IT Consultant Professionals High School 6006 
15 Male 25 -29 < 20,000 Student Student Bachelor Degree 6107 
16 Male 40 - 44 50,001-100,000 Teacher Professionals Bachelor Degree 6027 
17 Female 25 -29 20,001-30,000 Customer Service 
Clerical and administrative 
Workers 
Master Degree 6104 
18 Male 25 -29 < 20,000 Student Student Master Degree 6051 
19 Female 25 -29 < 20,000 Student Student Bachelor Degree 6027 
20 Male 30 - 34 30,001-50,000 Student Student Bachelor Degree 6061 
21 Female 20 - 24 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Student Student Master Degree 6059 
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No. Gender Age Income Actual Occupation Occupation Types Education Postcode 
22 Male 20 - 24 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Small Office Home 
Office 
Miscellaneous Master Degree 6052 
23 Male 25 -29 < 20,000 Student Student Master Degree 6062 
24 Male 30 - 34 50,001-100,000 Swedish Miscellaneous Bachelor Degree 6027 
25 Male 25 -29 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Student Student Master Degree 6059 
26 Female 25 -29 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Student Student Bachelor Degree 6016 
27 Female 25 -29 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Student Student 
Other, please 
specify 
6014 
28 Female 30 - 34 < 20,000 Student Student Diploma 6061 
29 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 Manager Managers Master Degree 6006 
30 Male Above 50 20,001-30,000 Retired Retired High School 6009 
31 Male 20 - 24 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Student Student High School 6060 
32 Male 20 - 24 < 20,000 Student Student Master Degree 6021 
33 Female 25 -29 < 20,000 Student Student Bachelor Degree 6163 
34 Male 30 - 34 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Student Student Bachelor Degree 6060 
35 Male 35 -39 50,001-100,000 ESL Teacher Professionals Bachelor Degree 6147 
36 Male 20 - 24 < 20,000 Student Student Diploma 6062 
37 Male 25 -29 50,001-100,000 IT engineer Professionals Diploma 6008 
38 Male 20 - 24 < 20,000 No answer No answer Bachelor Degree 
No 
answer 
39 Male 20 - 24 50,001-100,000 Student Student High School 6014 
40 Female 35 -39 > 100,000 Home Business Owner Professionals Diploma 6107 
41 Female 20 - 24 < 20,000 Student Student High School 
No 
answer 
42 Female 20 - 24 20,001-30,000 Student Student Bachelor Degree 6021 
43 Female 20 - 24 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Walker for Salmart 
Community and Personal 
Service Workers 
Bachelor Degree 6020 
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No. Gender Age Income Actual Occupation Occupation Types Education Postcode 
44 Male Under 20 < 20,000 Service Cashier Sales Workers High School 6169 
45 Female 20 - 24 < 20,000 Student Student Bachelor Degree 6157 
46 Female 20 - 24 30,001-50,000 Library Technician Technicians and Trades Workers Bachelor Degree 6103 
47 Female Under 20 < 20,000 Student Student High School 6028 
48 Female Above 50 50,001-100,000 University Lecturer Professionals Master Degree 6055 
49 Male 20 - 24 20,001-30,000 Student Student Master Degree 6060 
50 Female 35 -39 < 20,000 No answer No answer Master Degree 6027 
51 Male 45 - 49 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Instructional Designer Professionals Diploma 6151 
52 Female 20 - 24 < 20,000 Student Student Master Degree 6059 
53 Male 45 - 49 > 100,000 
High School Vice 
Principal 
Professionals Master Degree 
No 
answer 
54 Female 25 -29 50,001-100,000 Project Administrator 
Clerical and administrative 
Workers 
High School 6153 
55 Male 25 -29 < 20,000 
Senior Pre-Sale Network 
Engine 
Technicians and Trades Workers Master Degree 
No 
answer 
56 Female Above 50 50,001-100,000 Director Professionals Master Degree 6052 
57 Male 45 - 49 50,001-100,000 Designer Professionals PhD/Dr. 6163 
58 Female 25 -29 < 20,000 Student Student Master Degree 6061 
59 Female Above 50 30,001-50,000 Medical Secretary 
Clerical and administrative 
Workers 
High School 6026 
60 Female Above 50 30,001-50,000 Receptionist 
Clerical and administrative 
Workers 
Bachelor Degree 6025 
61 Female Above 50 50,001-100,000 Instructional Designer Professionals Diploma 
No 
answer 
62 Female Above 50 50,001-100,000 Administrator 
Clerical and administrative 
Workers 
High School 6006 
63 Male Above 50 > 100,000 Group Manager Managers Bachelor Degree 6006 
64 Female 30 - 34 < 20,000 Shop Worker Technicians and Trades Workers Bachelor Degree 6018 
65 Male 30 - 34 30,001-50,000 Programmer Professionals Master Degree 
No 
answer 
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No. Gender Age Income Actual Occupation Occupation Types Education Postcode 
66 Male 25 -29 < 20,000 Student Student Master Degree 6018 
67 Male 25 -29 50,001-100,000 
Software Security 
Engineer 
Professionals Bachelor Degree 
No 
answer 
68 Male 25 -29 50,001-100,000 Web Developer Professionals Diploma 6062 
69 Female Above 50 50,001-100,000 Academic Professionals PhD/Dr. 6003 
70 Female Above 50 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Student Student Bachelor Degree 6065 
71 Female 45 - 49 
I prefer not to 
answer 
System and Business 
Consultant 
Professionals Bachelor Degree 6151 
72 Female Above 50 50,001-100,000 Teacher Professionals Master Degree 6012 
73 Male Above 50 > 100,000 Educator, Manager Managers Bachelor Degree 6101 
74 Female 45 - 49 > 100,000 Recruitment Professionals Bachelor Degree 6151 
75 Female 25 -29 < 20,000 Student Student Diploma 6060 
76 Female 30 - 34 < 20,000 Student Student Master Degree 6003 
77 Male 25 -29 < 20,000 Student Student Master Degree 6009 
78 Female Above 50 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Library Technician Technicians and Trades Workers Bachelor Degree 6066 
79 Male 35 -39 50,001-100,000 Library Manager Managers Master Degree 6027 
80 Female 25 -29 50,001-100,000 Engineer Professionals Bachelor Degree 6009 
81 Male 25 -29 50,001-100,000 Draftsman 
Machinery Operators and 
Drivers 
Bachelor Degree 6008 
82 Female 25 -29 50,001-100,000 Engineer Professionals Bachelor Degree 6065 
83 Female 20 - 24 30,001-50,000 Mortgage Specialist Professionals Bachelor Degree 6103 
84 Male 35 -39 50,001-100,000 Manager Managers High School 6000 
85 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 No answer No answer Diploma 
No 
answer 
86 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 Retired Bookkeeper Retired Bachelor Degree 6155 
87 Female Under 20 No answer Student Student High School 6014 
88 Female 40 - 44 > 100,000 Lawyer Professionals Bachelor Degree 6014 
89 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 Retired Labourers Diploma 6018 
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90 Female 40 - 44 
I prefer not to 
answer 
No answer No answer High School 6062 
91 Male Under 20 < 20,000 Shop assistant Sales Workers High School 6018 
92 Female 
No 
answer 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Retired Retired High School 6065 
93 Female Above 50 50,001-100,000 Economist-Finance Professionals Bachelor Degree 6027 
94 Male 45 - 49 30,001-50,000 Food technologist Technicians and Trades Workers Master Degree 6027 
95 
No 
answer 
Above 50 50,001-100,000 Butcher Labourers High School 6030 
96 Male 
No 
answer 
No answer No answer No answer No answer 
No 
answer 
97 Male Above 50 30,001-50,000 Retired Retired High School 6065 
98 Female 45 - 49 30,001-50,000 Student Student Bachelor Degree 6027 
99 Male 30 - 34 50,001-100,000 Bricklayer Labourers High School 6020 
100 Female Above 50 30,001-50,000 Library Office 
Clerical and administrative 
Workers 
High School 6503 
101 Male Above 50 20,001-30,000 Retired Retired Diploma 6065 
102 Female Above 50 No answer Retired Retired Bachelor Degree 6027 
103 Female Above 50 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Marketing Manager Managers High School 6023 
104 Female 25 -29 50,001-100,000 OHS Advisor Professionals No answer 6065 
105 Female 25 -29 50,001-100,000 Journalist Professionals Bachelor Degree 6020 
106 Female Above 50 50,001-100,000 No answer No answer Bachelor Degree 6069 
107 Female 45 - 49 50,001-100,000 No answer No answer Diploma 6025 
108 Male Under 20 < 20,000 Student Student High School 6014 
109 Female 45 - 49 50,001-100,000 Pharmacy Assistant 
Clerical and administrative 
Workers 
Diploma 6014 
110 Male 45 - 49 30,001-50,000 Chef Technicians and Trades Workers Bachelor Degree 6051 
111 Male Above 50 < 20,000 Retired Mechanic Retired Diploma 6062 
112 Male Above 50 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Accountant Professionals Bachelor Degree 
No 
answer 
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113 Male 40 - 44 50,001-100,000 Accountant Professionals Diploma 6011 
114 Female 30 - 34 > 100,000 Lawyer Professionals Bachelor Degree 6022 
115 Male 20 - 24 20,001-30,000 Bartender Labourers Diploma 6018 
116 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 Building Construction Professionals Bachelor Degree 6010 
117 Male Above 50 30,001-50,000 No answer No answer High School 
No 
answer 
118 Male 20 - 24 < 20,000 Student Student Bachelor Degree 6010 
119 Male 45 - 49 > 100,000 Company Director Professionals Bachelor Degree 6014 
120 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 Social Worker 
Community and Personal 
Service Workers 
Bachelor Degree 6022 
121 Female Above 50 50,001-100,000 No answer No answer Bachelor Degree 6018 
122 Male 45 - 49 > 100,000 No answer No answer Bachelor Degree 6014 
123 Female 45 - 49 30,001-50,000 Journalist Professionals Bachelor Degree 6014 
124 Female 40 - 44 No answer Housewife Home Duties High School 6014 
125 Female 30 - 34 < 20,000 
IT research and 
development 
Professionals Master Degree 
No 
answer 
126 Female Above 50 50,001-100,000 No answer No answer Diploma 6019 
127 Female 35 -39 50,001-100,000 Business Owner Professionals High School 6030 
128 Female 30 - 34 30,001-50,000 Teacher Professionals Bachelor Degree 6503 
129 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 Financial Planner Professionals Diploma 6024 
130 Female Above 50 50,001-100,000 Women Gym Manager Managers High School 6024 
131 Female Above 50 < 20,000 Home duties Home Duties High School 6020 
132 Female 40 - 44 
I prefer not to 
answer 
No answer No answer High School 
No 
answer 
133 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 Accountant Professionals Bachelor Degree 6023 
134 Female 30 - 34 30,001-50,000 Graphic Designer Professionals Bachelor Degree 6151 
135 Male 30 - 34 < 20,000 Student Retired Master Degree 6003 
136 Female 30 - 34 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Student Retired Master Degree 6003 
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137 Male 40 - 44 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Business Owner Professionals Bachelor Degree 6018 
138 Female Above 50 
I prefer not to 
answer 
No answer No answer Master Degree 6014 
139 Female 40 - 44 50,001-100,000 Health Professional Professionals Bachelor Degree 6156 
140 Male 
No 
answer 
No answer No answer No answer No answer 
No 
answer 
141 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 Consultant Professionals Master Degree 6014 
142 Male 45 - 49 20,001-30,000 Painter Labourers High School 6027 
143 Female Above 50 20,001-30,000 Florist Sale Assistant Sales Workers High School 6059 
144 Female 30 - 34 20,001-30,000 Student Student PhD/Dr. 6064 
145 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 No answer No answer Bachelor Degree 6018 
146 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 Heavy vehicle driver 
Machinery Operators and 
Drivers 
High School 6062 
147 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 Truck Driver 
Machinery Operators and 
Drivers 
High School 6025 
148 Female Above 50 
I prefer not to 
answer 
No answer No answer High School 
No 
answer 
149 Female 25 -29 50,001-100,000 Engineer Professionals Bachelor Degree 
No 
answer 
150 Female Above 50 30,001-50,000 Cleaner Labourers High School 6169 
151 Female 40 - 44 30,001-50,000 Deli Assistant Sales Workers High School 6063 
152 Female 40 - 44 30,001-50,000 Travel Agent Technicians and Trades Workers High School 6027 
153 Female 30 - 34 30,001-50,000 No answer No answer 
Other, please 
specify 
6064 
154 Male Above 50 20,001-30,000 Small Business Owner Technicians and Trades Workers High School 6064 
155 Female Above 50 30,001-50,000 Retail Sales Sales Workers High School 6163 
156 Male 45 - 49 50,001-100,000 CEO Professionals High School 6062 
157 Male 25 -29 50,001-100,000 Concreter Labourers High School 6064 
158 Female Above 50 20,001-30,000 No answer No answer High School 6430 
159 Male 35 -39 50,001-100,000 No answer No answer High School 6060 
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160 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 Consultant Professionals PhD/Dr. 6919 
161 Male 45 - 49 50,001-100,000 Administration 
Clerical and administrative 
Workers 
Diploma 6064 
162 Male Above 50 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Disability Pensions Miscellaneous High School 6063 
163 Female 35 -39 30,001-50,000 Function Manager Managers High School 6066 
164 Male 40 - 44 < 20,000 No answer No answer Bachelor Degree 6066 
165 Female 40 - 44 50,001-100,000 Electrician Technicians and Trades Workers 
Other, please 
specify 
6060 
166 Male Above 50 30,001-50,000 No answer No answer Diploma 6064 
167 Male 35 -39 30,001-50,000 Baker Technicians and Trades Workers High School 6061 
168 Female 40 - 44 30,001-50,000 Dry Cleaner Labourers Diploma 6108 
169 Male 20 - 24 < 20,000 Student Student High School 6014 
170 Male 30 - 34 50,001-100,000 Part Interpreter Miscellaneous Master Degree 6019 
171 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 Health Worker 
Community and Personal 
Service Workers 
Diploma 6018 
172 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 No answer No answer High School 6015 
173 Female 30 - 34 30,001-50,000 Carer 
Community and Personal 
Service Workers 
Diploma 6016 
174 Male Above 50 30,001-50,000 Wool Classer 
Machinery Operators and 
Drivers 
Other, please 
specify 
6014 
175 Male 40 - 44 50,001-100,000 Civil/ Structure Engineer Professionals Bachelor Degree 6062 
176 Female Above 50 < 20,000 Medical Secretary 
Clerical and administrative 
Workers 
High School 6026 
177 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 A/C Tech Technicians and Trades Workers High School 6018 
178 Male 35 -39 50,001-100,000 Computer Technician Technicians and Trades Workers Bachelor Degree 6112 
179 Female Under 20 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Student Student High School 6014 
180 Male 25 -29 20,001-30,000 Hotline technician Technicians and Trades Workers Diploma 6059 
181 Male 25 -29 20,001-30,000 IT Executive Professionals Master Degree 
No 
answer 
 220 
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182 Male 25 -29 30,001-50,000 No answer No answer Bachelor Degree 
No 
answer 
183 Male 30 - 34 30,001-50,000 Business Miscellaneous Bachelor Degree 6100 
184 Male 30 - 34 30,001-50,000 IT Technician Technicians and Trades Workers Diploma 
No 
answer 
185 Female 20 - 24 < 20,000 Student Student Bachelor Degree 6018 
186 Female 20 - 24 < 20,000 Student Student Master Degree 6051 
187 Male 30 - 34 20,001-30,000 Hospitality Technicians and Trades Workers Master Degree 6062 
188 Female 40 - 44 < 20,000 Student Student Master Degree 6007 
189 Male 30 - 34 30,001-50,000 Helpdesk Support Technicians and Trades Workers Master Degree 6000 
190 Male 40 - 44 < 20,000 Tai Chi Instructor Miscellaneous 
Other, please 
specify 
6018 
191 Male 45 - 49 20,001-30,000 Student Student Bachelor Degree 6066 
192 Female 30 - 34 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Student Student Master Degree 6014 
193 Male 20 - 24 < 20,000 Student Student Bachelor Degree 6152 
194 Male 20 - 24 
I prefer not to 
answer 
No answer No answer Master Degree 6127 
195 Male Under 20 < 20,000 No answer No answer Diploma 6014 
196 Male 25 -29 < 20,000 Engineer Professionals Master Degree 6107 
197 Male 25 -29 < 20,000 Student Retired Master Degree 6009 
198 Male 25 -29 < 20,000 Technician Technicians and Trades Workers Bachelor Degree 
No 
answer 
199 Male 20 - 24 < 20,000 Student Student Master Degree 6107 
200 Male 25 -29 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Student Student Master Degree 6052 
201 Female 20 - 24 30,001-50,000 Customer Service 
Community and Personal 
Service Workers 
Bachelor Degree 6051 
202 Male 20 - 24 < 20,000 Customer Service 
Community and Personal 
Service Workers 
Bachelor Degree 6051 
203 Male 20 - 24 < 20,000 Student Student Master Degree 6051 
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204 Male 20 - 24 < 20,000 Student Student Master Degree 6010 
205 Female 25 -29 20,001-30,000 
Food and beverage 
attendant 
Technicians and Trades Workers Master Degree 
No 
answer 
206 Female 30 - 34 30,001-50,000 No answer No answer PhD/Dr. 6150 
207 Male Above 50 50,001-100,000 Lecturer Professionals PhD/Dr. 6065 
208 Female 20 - 24 < 20,000 Shop Assistant Sales Workers Bachelor Degree 6061 
209 Male 30 - 34 
I prefer not to 
answer 
No answer No answer Bachelor Degree 6061 
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APPENDIX I: Data of respondents’ experiences in using online 
banking 
 
Part 1: Respondents’ online banking information 
Respondent’s 
ID B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
1 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
2 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
3 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
4 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
National bank 
Citibank 
St. George 
Citibank 
St. George 
Changed 
bank(CBS,NBA); 
insecure bank 
site (Bank West) 
5 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Convenience 
Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
6 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
National bank 
National bank 
Changing from 
Commonwealth 
Bank to NB. 
7 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
24 hours service. 
Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
8 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
9 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
To keep us with modern system. 
Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
10 Yes Reduce time spent commuting Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
11 Yes Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
12 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
13 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Avoid physical attack from robbers. 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Not applicable 
14 Yes Convenience. 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Not applicable 
15 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
First Interstate 
Bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
No answer 
16 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ANZ bank 
HSBC bank 
ANZ bank 
I closed my 
account. 
17 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
18 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
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Respondent’s 
ID B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
19 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
HSBC bank 
ANZ bank No answer 
20 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
21 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
22 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
23 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
24 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Easy to pay bills. 
SEB SEB Not applicable 
25 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
26 Yes Reduce time spent commuting 
Bank West 
ANZ bank 
Bank West 
ANZ bank 
Not applicable 
27 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
28 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
ANZ bank 
HSBC bank 
ANZ bank 
HSBC bank 
Not applicable 
29 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue Bank West Bank West Not applicable 
30 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Convenience. 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Not applicable 
31 Yes Faster service computer operation ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
32 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
Not applicable 
33 Yes 
Uncertain 
I thought it's more secure. 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
34 Yes Faster service computer operation ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
35 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Convenience. 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Not applicable 
36 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
37 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ANZ bank Not applicable 
I've received an 
e-mail from 
stranger similar 
to ANZ e-mail to 
provide him my 
personal detail. 
38 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
39 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Westpac 
ANZ bank 
Westpac 
ANZ bank 
Not applicable 
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Respondent’s 
ID B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
40 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Not applicable 
41 Yes Reduce time spent commuting Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
42 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
43 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
44 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
45 Yes Reduce time spent commuting Bank West Bank West Not applicable 
46 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Convenience. 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
47 Yes 
Uncertain 
Parents opened the account for me 
when I was younger. 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
48 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Bank West Bank West Not applicable 
49 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Not applicable 
50 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
51 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
52 Yes Faster service computer operation ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
53 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Citibank 
CIBC 
Citibank 
CIBC 
Not applicable 
54 Yes 
Uncertain 
I wanted an account that was not linked 
to a card so that I could save money. 
And this account offered a higher rate 
of interest. 
Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
55 Yes Faster service computer operation 
I prefer not to 
answer 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Not applicable 
56 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
I can do it at a time to suit me. 
Bank West 
Westpac 
ANZ bank 
HSBC bank 
ANZ bank 
HSBC bank 
No answer 
57 Yes 
Uncertain 
We are living in a rural area, more 
convenient-can't get to a bank during 
business hours. 
Citibank 
ANZ bank 
St. George 
Bank 
ME Bank 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Closed the 
accounts-
Changed home 
loans, refinanced 
for better rate. 
58 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
59 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Citibank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Citibank 
Not applicable 
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Respondent’s 
ID B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
60 Yes 
Uncertain 
It is convenient- all of your banking 
details are clearly displayed and is easy 
to follow and understand. 
Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
61 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
62 Yes 
Uncertain 
More convenient. 
Westpac 
Credit Union. 
Westpac 
Credit Union. 
Not applicable 
63 Yes Faster service computer operation 
National bank 
Big Sky Credit 
Union 
National bank 
Big Sky Credit 
Union 
Not applicable 
64 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
65 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Reduce time spent commuting 
I prefer not to 
answer 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Not applicable 
66 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Not applicable 
67 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
National bank 
HSBC bank 
First Direct 
Barclays 
Ing Direct 
National bank 
HSBC bank 
First Direct 
Barclays 
Ing Direct 
Closed Account 
68 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Convenience. 
Bank West Bank West Not applicable 
69 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Reduce time spent commuting 
National bank National bank Not applicable 
70 Yes 
Uncertain 
Bank does not have branches only by 
machine on Internet. 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
71 Yes 
Uncertain 
Convenience- doing when I want to do 
it. i.e. late at night. 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
72 Yes 
Uncertain 
I can do my banking at a time that's 
convenient. 
ANZ bank 
Cooperative 
UK 
ANZ bank No answer 
73 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Bank West Changed bank 
74 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Westpac 
ANZ bank 
St. George 
Bank 
Westpac 
ANZ bank 
St George Bank 
No answer 
75 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Not applicable 
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Respondent’s 
ID B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
76 Yes No answer 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
77 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
78 Yes Faster service computer operation 
I prefer not to 
answer 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Not applicable 
79 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Bank West 
Westpac 
Westpac 
Moved to a 
different Bank. 
80 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Not applicable 
81 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
A lot more convenient than physically 
going to a bank. 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Westpac 
Westpac No answer 
82 Yes No answer 
Bank West 
ANZ bank 
Bank West 
ANZ bank 
Not applicable 
83 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Citibank No answer No answer 
84 Yes Easy to use. Bank West Bank West Not applicable 
85 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
No answer 
86 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Westpac 
ANZ bank 
Citibank 
Westpac 
ANZ bank 
Citibank 
Not applicable 
87 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
88 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
89 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
90 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
91 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
92 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
93 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
94 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
95 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
96 Yes Not applicable No answer No answer Not applicable 
97 Yes Faster service computer operation No answer No answer Not applicable 
98 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
Bendigo 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
Bendigo 
 
Not applicable 
99 Yes Convenience Bank West Bank West Not applicable 
100 Yes Reduce time spent commuting 
Bendigo 
Police-Nurses 
Bendigo No answer 
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ID B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
101 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
United Credit 
Union 
Ing Direct 
United Credit 
Union 
Ing Direct 
Not applicable 
102 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
103 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Westpac 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Westpac 
Not applicable 
104 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Bank West 
ANZ bank 
St. George 
Bank West 
St. George 
No answer 
105 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
St. George 
Commonwealth 
bank 
St. George 
Not applicable 
106 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
107 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
108 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
109 Yes Faster service computer operation 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
Not applicable 
110 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
National bank 
National bank No answer 
111 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
112 Yes Faster service computer operation 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
ANZ bank Not applicable 
113 Yes Reduce time spent commuting No answer No answer Not applicable 
114 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Bank West 
Forgot 
login/password. 
115 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
116 Yes Faster service computer operation ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
117 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
118 Yes Faster service computer operation 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Bank West Not applicable 
119 Yes Faster service computer operation 
National bank 
Macquarie 
National bank 
Macquarie 
Not applicable 
120 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Not applicable 
121 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ME Bank ME Bank Not applicable 
122 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Westpac 
ANZ bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
No answer 
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123 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
124 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
125 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Reduce time spent commuting 
HSBC bank 
SCB 
KBANK 
BBG 
HSBC bank 
SCB 
KBANK 
BBG 
Not applicable 
126 Yes Uncertain 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Not applicable 
127 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
128 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
129 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue 
Commonwealth 
bank 
National bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
National bank 
Not applicable 
130 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
Macquarie 
Commonwealth 
bank 
National bank 
Not applicable 
131 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Westpac 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Westpac 
Not applicable 
132 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Bank West 
ANZ bank 
Bank West 
ANZ bank 
No answer 
133 Yes More convenient 
Bank West 
Westpac 
National bank 
Bank West 
Westpac 
National bank 
Not applicable 
134 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Bank West 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
ANZ bank 
Closed account 
and has changed 
to another bank. 
135 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Not applicable 
136 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
ANZ bank No answer 
137 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue National bank National bank Not applicable 
138 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
139 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Bank West 
Westpac 
Bank West 
Westpac 
Not applicable 
140 Yes No answer No answer No answer Not applicable 
141 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ANZ bank 
HSBC bank 
DBS 
ANZ bank 
HSBC bank 
DBS 
Not applicable 
142 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
143 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
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144 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Bank West 
Has transferred 
to main account. 
145 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
146 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
147 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Ad-hoc convenience 
Westpac 
National bank 
Westpac 
National bank 
Not applicable 
148 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Westpac 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Not applicable 
149 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
150 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
151 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
I prefer not to 
answer 
Not applicable 
152 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
153 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
154 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Westpac 
ANZ bank 
ANZ bank 
No longer have 
an account with 
that. 
155 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Convenience 
Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
156 Yes Faster service computer operation ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
157 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue 
Other, please 
specify 
No answer Not applicable 
158 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
159 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Flexibility of managing my account. 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Westpac 
ANZ bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Westpac 
ANZ bank 
Not applicable 
160 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Macquarie 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
Macquarie 
Not applicable 
161 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue 
Bank West 
Westpac 
St. George 
Bank West 
Westpac 
St. George 
Not applicable 
162 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
163 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
No answer Not Trust 
164 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Bank West 
Westpac 
ANZ bank 
No answer No answer 
165 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
166 Yes Faster service computer operation ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
167 Yes Faster service computer operation ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
168 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
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169 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Bank West 
Westpac 
Westpac No answer 
170 Yes Faster service computer operation ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
171 Yes Faster service computer operation 
ANZ bank 
Bank of 
Queensland 
ANZ bank 
Bank of 
Queensland 
Not applicable 
172 Yes Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
National bank 
Citibank 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
Changed bank 
173 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Not applicable 
174 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
175 Yes 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Prices are more faire. 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
176 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Police and 
Nurses Credit 
Society 
Police and 
Nurses Credit 
Society 
Not applicable 
177 No Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
178 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue ANZ bank 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
Not applicable 
179 Yes Faster service computer operation 
I prefer not to 
answer 
National bank 
National bank Not applicable 
180 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Westpac 
Westpac 
National bank 
Not applicable 
181 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ANZ bank National bank Not applicable 
182 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Westpac 
Westpac 
National bank 
Not applicable 
183 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Bank West 
Westpac 
ANZ bank 
Bank West 
Westpac 
No answer 
184 Yes 
Certain goods are only available on the 
net. 
Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
185 Yes Reduce time spent commuting Bank West Bank West Not applicable 
186 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
187 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue Bank West Bank West Not applicable 
188 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
189 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
190 Yes Faster service computer operation National bank National bank Not applicable 
191 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
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192 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
193 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Not applicable 
194 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
195 Yes Avoid waiting in a queue No answer No answer Not applicable 
196 Yes Uncertain Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
197 Yes Faster service computer operation ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
198 Yes Reduce time spent commuting No answer No answer Not applicable 
199 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
ANZ bank No answer 
200 Yes 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
ANZ bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
I have money 
these account. 
201 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
Not applicable 
202 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
ANZ bank 
National bank 
Not applicable 
203 Yes Faster service computer operation Westpac Westpac Not applicable 
204 Yes Faster service computer operation 
Bank West 
ANZ bank 
Bank West 
ANZ bank 
Not applicable 
205 Yes Faster service computer operation ANZ bank ANZ bank Not applicable 
206 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Bank West 
ANZ bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
ANZ bank 
Because I have 
lost my money 
for 3,000$ from 
online banking. 
207 Yes Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
208 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Not applicable 
209 Yes 
Avoid waiting in a queue 
Faster service computer operation 
Reduce time spent commuting 
Commonwealth 
bank 
GE Money 
ING Direct 
Commonwealth 
bank 
GE Money 
ING Direct 
Not applicable 
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Part 2: Respondents’ behaviours when using online banking services 
Respondent’s 
ID B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 
1 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I am not interested in 
online banking. 
I do not have an 
online banking 
account. 
I am concerned about 
security. 
2 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I am not interested in 
online banking. 
I am concerned about 
security. 
3 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I am concerned about 
security. 
4 
More than 
20 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
5 3 - 5 times Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
6 1 or 2 times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
Best lending rate. My house Not applicable 
7 3 - 5 times Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My workplace Not applicable 
8 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I am not interested in 
online banking. 
I do not know how to 
use online banking. 
I do not have an 
online banking 
account. 
I am concerned about 
security. 
9 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
10 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
11 1 or 2 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
12 
More than 
20 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
 233 
 
Respondent’s 
ID B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 
13 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
Buy mortgage. 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
14 
More than 
20 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
It was my first 
employer. 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
15 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
16 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
Recommendation My house Not applicable 
17 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
18 
11 - 20 
times 
Update personal 
information 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
Friend's recommended. My house Not applicable 
19 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
There are branch banks 
in my home country. 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
20 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
My sponsorship sends 
money to this bank. 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
Not applicable 
21 1 or 2 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The brand name of the 
bank 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
Not applicable 
22 1 or 2 times Pay bill(s) 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
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ID B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 
23 6 - 10 times 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
Not applicable 
24 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house 
My friend's 
house 
Internet cafe 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
25 1 or 2 times 
Update personal 
information 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
26 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The brand name of the 
bank 
High interest rate. 
My house Not applicable 
27 1 or 2 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
28 6 - 10 times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I needed to access my 
accounts, which are in 
the different countries, 
but at the same bank. 
My house Not applicable 
29 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
30 
More than 
20 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
31 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
32 3 - 5 times Money transfer 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
33 6 - 10 times Money transfer 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house Not applicable 
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34 1 or 2 times Money transfer 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
35 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
36 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My friend's 
house 
Not applicable 
37 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
Have many ATMs 
available. 
My house Not applicable 
38 1 or 2 times Pay bill(s) 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
39 3 - 5 times Money transfer 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
40 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
41 1 or 2 times Money transfer 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My friend's 
house 
Not applicable 
42 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The brand name of the 
bank 
No answer Not applicable 
43 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I do not have an 
online banking 
account. 
I am concerned about 
security. 
44 
More than 
20 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
Not applicable 
45 3 - 5 times Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
46 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
47 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
Parents use it. 
My house Not applicable 
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48 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
49 No answer No answer No answer No answer Not applicable 
50 6 - 10 times 
Update personal 
information 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
Not applicable 
51 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
52 6 - 10 times Money transfer 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
53 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
54 6 - 10 times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
55 1 or 2 times 
Update personal 
information 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
56 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
57 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
Had set up home loan & 
general accounts at the 
same time. 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
58 1 or 2 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
59 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
60 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
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61 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
62 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
63 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
64 1 or 2 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My friend's 
house 
Not applicable 
65 No answer No answer 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
66 1 or 2 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
Friend Recommended. 
My house Not applicable 
67 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
68 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
69 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
70 
More than 
20 times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
71 1 or 2 times Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
72 3 - 5 times Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
73 6 - 10 times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house Not applicable 
74 
More than 
20 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
 238 
 
Respondent’s 
ID B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 
75 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
76 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
Not applicable 
77 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The brand name of the 
bank 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
Not applicable 
78 3 - 5 times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
79 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
My mortgage is with 
this bank. 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
80 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
Convenience and bank 
special interest rates. 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
My friend's 
house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
81 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
Online Investing 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My workplace Not applicable 
82 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
83 1 or 2 times 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
84 
More than 
20 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
85 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My friend's 
house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
86 
More than 
20 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
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87 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I am not interested in 
online banking. 
I do not have an 
online banking 
account. 
I do not see any real 
value in using online 
banking or having an 
online banking 
account. 
88 1 or 2 times Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
89 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house Not applicable 
90 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
91 
More than 
20 times 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
92 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I do not know how to 
use computer. 
I do not have an 
online banking 
account. 
93 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I am concerned about 
security. 
I have not had time to 
open an account. 
 
94 
 
Not 
Applicable 
 
Not applicable 
 
Not applicable 
 
Not applicable 
 
I am not interested in 
online banking. 
I am concerned about 
security. 
95 3 - 5 times Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
96 No answer Not applicable No answer No answer Not applicable 
97 
More than 
20 times 
Update personal 
information 
Pay bill(s) 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
98 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house 
Public library 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
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99 
11 - 20 
times 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
100 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
No answer No answer Not applicable 
101 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
102 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable No answer 
103 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My workplace Not applicable 
104 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
105 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
106 1 or 2 times Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
107 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable No answer 
108 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
No answer My house Not applicable 
109 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
Share trading 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
 
110 
 
1 or 2 times 
 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
 
No answer 
 
I do not see any real 
value in using online 
banking or having an 
online banking 
account. 
111 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable No answer 
112 6 - 10 times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
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113 1 or 2 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
114 3 - 5 times Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
115 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
116 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
117 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I am not interested in 
online banking. 
118 3 - 5 times Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My workplace Not applicable 
119 3 - 5 times Money transfer Don't really care. 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
120 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
Best interest on money 
and loan. 
My house Not applicable 
121 6 - 10 times 
Update personal 
information 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
122 1 or 2 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
123 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I do not know how to 
use online banking. 
I do not have an 
Internet connection. 
I am concerned about 
security. 
124 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I am not interested in 
online banking. 
My husband does so 
I don't need to. 
125 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
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126 1 or 2 times Pay bill(s) 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
127 3 - 5 times 
Update personal 
information 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
128 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I am not interested in 
online banking. 
I am concerned about 
security. 
It is too new. I would 
like to see how it 
works, and then I 
may open an account. 
129 1 or 2 times Money transfer 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
130 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
131 6 - 10 times 
Update personal 
information 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
132 6 - 10 times 
Update personal 
information 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house 
Public library 
Not applicable 
133 
More than 
20 times 
Update personal 
information 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
134 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
135 3 - 5 times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The brand name of the 
bank 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
136 3 - 5 times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house Not applicable 
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137 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My workplace Not applicable 
138 1 or 2 times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
139 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
140 No answer No answer No answer No answer Not applicable 
141 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
142 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I do not have an 
online banking 
account. 
143 1 or 2 times 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
144 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
145 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
146 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I am concerned about 
security. 
147 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
148 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
149 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
150 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I do not know how to 
use Internet. 
I am concerned about 
security. 
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151 1 or 2 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
152 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
153 1 or 2 times Money transfer 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
154 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
155 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
156 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
157 3 - 5 times 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
Internet cafe Not applicable 
158 
More than 
20 times 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
159 6 - 10 times 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
Business banking 
benefits. 
My house 
My workplace 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
160 1 or 2 times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
161 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
Ease of use and feature 
offered 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
162 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable No answer 
163 1 or 2 times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
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164 
11 - 20 
times 
Update personal 
information 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
165 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I do not see any real 
value in using online 
banking or having an 
online banking 
account. 
166 
11 - 20 
times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My workplace Not applicable 
167 1 or 2 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house 
Internet cafe 
Not applicable 
168 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I am not interested in 
online banking. 
I am concerned about 
security. 
169 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
Internet cafe 
My workplace 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
170 6 - 10 times 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
171 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The brand name of the 
bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
172 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
Once provided to 
personal bankers-This 
has now changed. 
My house 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
173 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house Not applicable 
174 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I am not interested in 
online banking. 
I am concerned about 
security. 
175 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
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176 1 or 2 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
177 
Not 
Applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
I am concerned about 
security. 
I do not see any real 
value in using online 
banking or having an 
online banking 
account. 
178 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house Not applicable 
179 3 - 5 times Money transfer 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
180 6 - 10 times 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
Relative said it was easy 
to open a bank account. 
My house Not applicable 
181 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house Not applicable 
182 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
My workplace 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
183 
More than 
20 times 
Update personal 
information 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
184 6 - 10 times 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
Easy to open a bank 
account over the web. 
My house Not applicable 
185 1 or 2 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information  
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
Not applicable 
186 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
187 3 - 5 times Money transfer 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
188 1 or 2 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
Not applicable 
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189 
11 - 20 
times 
Update personal 
information 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
My workplace 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
190 3 - 5 times 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
191 3 - 5 times Pay bill(s) 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
192 6 - 10 times 
Update personal 
information 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
Public library 
Not applicable 
193 
More than 
20 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house 
In the bank. 
Not applicable 
194 1 or 2 times 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
195 No answer Money transfer 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
Not applicable 
196 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house Not applicable 
197 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
198 3 - 5 times Check the bill 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
199 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
My workplace 
Not applicable 
200 3 - 5 times Money transfer 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
201 
11 - 20 
times 
Update personal 
information 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
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202 
11 - 20 
times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
203 1 or 2 times Money transfer 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house Not applicable 
204 3 - 5 times 
Update personal 
information 
The brand name of the 
bank 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house 
School/ 
university/ 
college 
Not applicable 
205 6 - 10 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house Not applicable 
206 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
The brand name of the 
bank 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
My house Not applicable 
207 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The brand name of the 
bank 
The excellent service 
offered by this bank 
The security protection 
offered by bank for 
online banking 
My house Not applicable 
208 3 - 5 times 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
The brand name of the 
bank 
My house Not applicable 
209 3 - 5 times 
Money transfer 
Pay bill(s) 
Viewing balance and 
summary information 
I have (had) a traditional 
bank account with the 
same bank 
My house 
via mobile 
phone/palmtop 
Not applicable 
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Part 1: Respondents’ devices information 
Respondent’s 
ID C1.1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
1 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
2 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
3 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
4 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
5 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
I am not 
sure 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
6 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
I am not 
sure 
I am not sure. 
7 
Coaxial 
Cable 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
Auto 
update 
I am not sure. 
8 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
9 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 98 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
10 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
My 
partner 
checks 
our 
internet 
security. 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
11 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Macintosh 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Every 3 
months 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
12 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
day 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
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13 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Every 4-
6months 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
14 
Dial-up 
modem 
Windows 
Vista 
Managed by my employer 
Done 
automatic
ally by 
my 
employer 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
15 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Linux 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
16 
Coaxial 
Cable 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
day 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
17 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 7 
No, I do not use computer 
security software protection (go 
to question C5). 
No 
answer 
I am not sure. 
18 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
I do not 
need to 
update 
I am not sure. 
19 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
20 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
day 
I am not sure. 
21 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
I am not sure. 
22 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Auto 
update 
Not applicable 
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23 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
month 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
24 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
No, I do not use computer 
security software protection (go 
to question C5). 
Don't 
have 
computer 
security 
software 
protection
. 
I am not sure. 
25 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
week 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
26 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
27 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
month 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
28 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
29 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
30 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
day 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
31 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
32 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
week 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
33 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
I am not sure whether I have 
security protection or not (go to 
question C5). 
No 
answer 
I am not sure. 
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34 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Macintosh 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
week 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
35 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
36 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
day 
I am not sure. 
37 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
day 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
38 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
week 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
39 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Every 3 
months 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
40 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
day 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
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41 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
Windows 
Vista 
No, I do not use computer 
security software protection (go 
to question C5). 
No 
answer 
I am not sure. 
42 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Twice a 
month 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
43 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
44 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 
Vista 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
45 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
day 
I am not sure. 
46 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
47 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Every 2 
weeks 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
48 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Complete
d by IT 
central at 
university
-updated 
regularly. 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
49 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
No answer No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer 
50 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
I am not 
sure what 
operating 
system I use 
I am not sure whether I have 
security protection or not (go to 
question C5). 
No 
answer 
I am not sure. 
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51 No answer Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
52 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
month 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
53 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Macintosh 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
month 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
54 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
I have an 
IT 
consultant 
that looks 
after my 
computer 
security at 
home. He 
looks after 
the 
updates 
too. 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
55 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Windows 7 
Banking 
Sim Card 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
56 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
57 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Mail server protection, spam 
assas in & phulk brute force 
attack protection on my Linux 
mail server. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
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58 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
59 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
2 yearly 
subscripti
on 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
60 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
2000 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
61 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
62 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
63 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
2000 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
Company 
Installed 
and 
updated 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
64 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 98 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
week 
I am not sure. 
65 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
I am not 
sure 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
66 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Other, please specify 
67 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Linux 
Macintosh 
Little Snitem (MAC OS) 
Once a 
week 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
68 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 7 
Linux 
No, I do not use computer 
security software protection (go 
to question C5). 
No 
answer 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
 256 
 
Respondent’s 
ID C1.1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
69 No answer 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Every 3 
months 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
70 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
71 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
month 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
72 
Coaxial 
Cable 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
73 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
74 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
2000 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
75 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Every 4-
6months 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
76 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
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77 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
week 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
78 
ISDN 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
79 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
80 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 
Vista 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
No 
answer 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
81 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
I am not 
sure 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
82 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Macintosh 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
83 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
I am not sure whether I have 
security protection or not (go to 
question C5). 
Auto 
update 
I am not sure. 
84 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
day 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
85 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 98 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
I am not 
sure 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
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86 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Once a 
week 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
87 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
88 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
2000 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Twice a 
week 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
89 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Every 4-
6months 
I am not sure. 
90 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
I am not 
sure what 
operating 
system I use 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
91 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Twice a 
week 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
92 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
93 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
94 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
95 No answer No answer No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer 
96 No answer No answer No answer 
Every 4-
6months 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
97 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Once a 
week 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
98 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
month 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
99 
Not 
applicable 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
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100 No answer No answer No answer 
I do not 
need to 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
101 No answer No answer No answer 
I am not 
sure 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
102 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
103 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
I am not 
sure 
I am not sure. 
104 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
105 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
106 No answer No answer No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer 
107 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
108 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
I am not sure. 
109 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 98 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
day 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
110 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Windows 
Mobile 
I am not sure whether I have 
security protection or not (go to 
question C5). 
No 
answer 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
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111 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
112 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
day 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
113 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
week 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
114 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
day 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
115 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
week 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
116 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Macintosh 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
day 
No answer 
117 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
118 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Macintosh 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
Once a 
week 
I am not sure. 
119 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Once a 
week 
I am not sure. 
120 No answer No answer No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer 
121 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Every 4-
6months 
I am not sure. 
122 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
123 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
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124 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
125 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Macintosh 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Every 4-
6months 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
126 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
Windows 98 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
month 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
127 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
128 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
129 No answer 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Every 4-
6months 
I am not sure. 
130 No answer 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Other, 
please 
specify 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
131 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
I am not 
sure what 
operating 
system I use 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
I am not 
sure 
I am not sure. 
132 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
I am not 
sure 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
133 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
I am not 
sure what 
operating 
system I use 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
134 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
135 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Macintosh 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
136 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
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137 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Every 4-
6months 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
138 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
139 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
140 No answer No answer No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer 
141 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
142 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
143 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
Windows 
XP 
No, I do no t use computer 
security software protection (go 
to question C5). 
No 
answer 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
144 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Every 3 
months 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
145 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Twice a 
week 
I am not sure. 
146 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
147 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
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148 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 7 
I am not sure whether I have 
security protection or not (go to 
question C5). 
 
No 
answer 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
149 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
No answer No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer 
150 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
151 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
day 
Auto 
update 
I am not sure. 
152 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Every 4-
6months 
I am not sure. 
153 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
I am not 
sure what 
operating 
system I use 
No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer 
154 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
day 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
155 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
I am not 
sure 
I am not sure. 
156 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 98 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Every 4-
6months 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
157 
Other, 
please 
specify 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 7 
No, I do not use computer 
security software protection (go 
to question C5). 
No 
answer 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
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158 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
2000 
I am not sure whether I have 
security protection or not (go to 
question C5). 
No 
answer 
I am not sure. 
159 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
week 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
160 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Macintosh 
No, I do not use computer 
security software protection (go 
to question C5). 
No 
answer 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
161 
Coaxial 
Cable 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Once a 
week 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
162 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
163 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Every 4-
6months 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
164 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 
Vista 
No, I do not use computer 
security software protection (go 
to question C5). 
No 
answer 
I am not sure. 
165 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
166 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
day 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
167 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 98 
Windows 
2000 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Once a 
week 
Bank provides a software 
that operates and resident  
on PC and coonect the the 
bank. 
168 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
169 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 
Vista 
Windows 
Mobile 
No, I do not use computer 
security software protection (go 
to question C5). 
No 
answer 
Other, please specify 
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170 
ISDN 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
day 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
171 No answer No answer No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer 
172 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Every 4-
6months 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
173 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
week 
I am not sure. 
174 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
175 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
176 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
I am not 
sure what 
operating 
system I use 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
177 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not Applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
178 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Once a 
day 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
179 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Macintosh 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
Once a 
week 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
180 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 
Vista 
Windows 7 
Linux 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
day 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
181 
I am not 
sure what 
type of 
Internet 
connection 
I use 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Every 4-
6months 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
 266 
 
Respondent’s 
ID C1.1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
182 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Twice a 
month 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
183 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 
Vista 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
week 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
184 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Windows 7 
Linux 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Once a 
day 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
185 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
week 
I am not sure. 
186 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Macintosh 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
187 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
day 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
188 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
189 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Twice a 
month 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
190 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
I am not 
sure 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
191 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
week 
I am not sure. 
192 
Other, 
please 
specify 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
I am not 
sure 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
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193 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Auto 
update 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
194 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
day 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
195 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
2000 
Yes, I have installed security 
protection, but I am not sure 
what type of security protection 
I have in my computer. 
No 
answer 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
196 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
197 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Yes, I have installed anti-
spyware/ adware/ Trojan/ 
backdoor. 
Once a 
day 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
198 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
199 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Macintosh 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
I am not 
sure 
I am not sure. 
200 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Every 3 
months 
I am not sure. 
201 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Twice a 
week 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
202 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Windows 7 No answer 
Once a 
day 
Bank provides software that 
operates and residents on 
PC and connects to the 
bank. 
203 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
I am not 
sure 
I am not sure. 
204 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 7 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Once a 
day 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
205 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Once a 
day 
I am not sure. 
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206 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
XP 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
month 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
207 
ADSL 
wireless 
broadband 
Windows 
Vista 
Yes, I have installed anti-virus 
software. 
Once a 
month 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
208 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Macintosh 
I am not sure whether I have 
security protection or not (go to 
question C5). 
No 
answer 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
209 
ADSL 
wired 
broadband 
Macintosh 
Yes, I have installed firewall 
application. 
Yes, I have installed popup 
windows blocking tool. 
Auto 
update 
Web browser, but the actual 
banking resides on the 
bank's server in the form of 
bank's home page. 
 
Part 2: Respondents’ authentication security provided 
Respondent’s 
ID C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
1 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
2 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
3 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
4 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Login + password + static verification 
code attached on your credit card, 
EFTPOS, or written on your paper 
given by bank. 
8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
5 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
6 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
6 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
8 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
7 Login + password + token device 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
I do not report 
8 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
9 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
10 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
4 and 
2 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
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Respondent’s 
ID C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
11 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
12 Login + password 
No 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
13 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
14 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
15 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
8 Yes No 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
16 Login + password 8 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
17 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
18 Login + password + token device 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
19 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Login + password + random 
verification code 
4 and 
6 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Direct call to the bank I 
known, not just use 
'contact us' page. 
20 Login + password 9 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
21 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
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Respondent’s 
ID C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
22 
Login + password 
Login + password + random 
verification code 
10 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
23 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
24 Login + password + token device 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
25 
Login + password + random 
verification code 
4 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
26 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
27 
Login + password + security 
questions (e.g. what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
4 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
28 
Login + password 
Login + password + token device 
8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
29 Login + password 2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
30 Other, please specify 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No answer No answer No answer 
31 
Login + password + random 
verification code 
8 Yes Yes No answer 
32 Login + password + token device 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
33 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
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Respondent’s 
ID C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
34 Login + password 15 Yes No 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
35 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
36 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No 
Answer 
Yes No No answer 
37 Login + password 10 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
38 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
39 Login + password + token device 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report to police 
40 Login + password 10 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
41 Login + password 2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
42 Login + password 11 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
43 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
44 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
45 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
46 Login + password 10 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
47 Login + password 11 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
48 
Login + password + random 
verification code 
10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
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Respondent’s 
ID C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
49 No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer No answer No answer 
50 No answer 9 No 
Not 
applicable 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
51 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
52 Login + password 10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
53 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
54 Login + password 10 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
55 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call Bank Call Centre 
to ask about the 
problem. 
56 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
57 
Login + password 
Login + password + security 
questions (e.g. what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
58 Login + password 10 Yes Yes No answer 
59 Login + password 2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
60 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
61 Login + password 10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
62 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Yes No No answer 
63 Login + password 2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
64 Login + password 10 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
65 Login + password 
No 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
66 Login + password 10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
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Respondent’s 
ID C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
67 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Login + password + security 
questions (e.g. what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
8 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
68 
Login + password 
Login + password + token device 
Use ID and PIN entered via mouse 
(cannot be typed). 
2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
69 Login + password 10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
70 Login + password 8 Yes No No answer 
71 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
72 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
73 Login + password 
No 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
74 
Login + password 
Login + password + token device 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Yes No Other, please specify 
75 Login + password 10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
76 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
77 Login + password 2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
78 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
79 Login + password 2 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
80 
Login + password + random 
verification code 
8 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
81 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
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Respondent’s 
ID C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
82 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Report to police 
Depends on the 
problem. 
83 
Login + password + token device 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
8 Yes No 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
84 Login + password 2 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
85 Login + password 10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
86 
Login + password 
Login + password + token device 
8 Yes Yes 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
87 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
88 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
No answer 
89 Login + password 8 Yes Yes 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
90 Login + password 8 Yes Yes No answer 
91 Login + password 2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
92 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
93 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
94 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
95 No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer No answer No answer 
96 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
9 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
97 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
No answer 
98 Login + password 2 Yes No 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
99 Login + password 9 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
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Respondent’s 
ID C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
100 Login + password + token device 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Other, please specify 
101 
Login + password 
Login + password + token device 
10 No 
Not 
applicable 
No answer 
102 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
103 
Login + password + biometric 
Login + password + token device 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
8 Yes Yes I do not report 
104 
Login + password 
Login + password + static  
verification code attached on your 
credit card, EFTPOS, or written on 
your paper given by bank. 
8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
105 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
8 No 
Not 
applicable 
I am not sure 
106 No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer No answer No answer 
107 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
108 Login + password 8 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
109 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
No answer 
110 
Login + password + biometric 
Login + password + security 
questions (e.g. what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
2 No 
Not 
applicable 
I am not sure 
111 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
112 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
113 Login + password 4 No 
Not 
applicable 
I am not sure 
114 Login + password 2 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
115 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
116 No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer No answer No answer 
117 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
118 
Login + password + security 
questions (e.g. what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
I am not sure 
119 Login + password 2 No 
Not 
applicable 
I do not report 
120 No answer 7 No answer No answer No answer 
121 Login + password 10 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
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Respondent’s 
ID C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
122 Login + password 2 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
123 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
124 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
125 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
126 Login + password 
Other, 
please 
specify 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
127 Login + password 10 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
128 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
129 Login + password 4 No 
Not 
applicable 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
130 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
131 
Login + password 
Login + password + security 
questions (e.g. what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
2 No 
Not 
applicable 
I am not sure 
132 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
2 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
133 
Login + password 
Login + password + token device 
4 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
134 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
135 Login + password 4 No 
Not 
applicable 
I am not sure 
136 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
137 Login + password 8 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
138 Login + password 2 Yes Yes I do not report 
139 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
140 No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer No answer No answer 
141 
Login + password 
Login + password + token device 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
8 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
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Respondent’s 
ID C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
142 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
143 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
144 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
145 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
146 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
147 
Login + password 
Login + password + biometric 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
8 No 
Not 
applicable 
No answer 
148 
Login + password + security 
questions (e.g. what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
149 No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer No answer No answer 
150 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
151 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
2 Yes No I am not sure 
152 Login + password 10 No 
Not 
applicable 
No answer 
153 Login + password 2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
154 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
155 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
I am not sure 
156 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Yes 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
157 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
158 Login + password 2 No 
Not 
applicable 
I am not sure 
159 Login + password 8 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
160 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
161 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
162 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
163 Login + password 2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
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Respondent’s 
ID C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
164 
Login + password 
Login + password + random 
verification code 
Login + password + security 
questions (e.g. what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
165 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
166 Login + password 8 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
167 Login + password 4 Yes Yes 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
168 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
169 
Password via online keyboard+ 
mobile verification codes. 
2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
170 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
10 Yes Yes I am not sure 
171 No answer 
No 
answer 
No answer No answer No answer 
172 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
173 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
174 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
175 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
176 Login + password + token device 2 Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
177 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
178 Login + password 8 Yes Yes No answer 
179 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
180 Login + password 2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
181 
Login + password + static verification 
code attached on your credit card, 
EFTPOS, or written on your paper 
given by bank. 
8 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
182 Login + password 8 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
 279 
 
Respondent’s 
ID C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
183 
Login + password 
Login + password + token device 
2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
184 Login + password 2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
185 Login + password 
No 
Answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
186 Login + password 
No 
Answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
187 Login + password 10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
188 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
8 Yes Yes 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
189 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
190 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
8 No 
Not 
applicable 
I am not sure 
191 Login + password 
No 
answer 
Yes No 
Report via e-mail 
provided 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
192 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
2 No 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable 
193 Login + password 11 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
194 Login + password 
No 
Answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
195 
Login + password + security 
questions (e.g. what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
10 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
196 Login + password 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
197 Login + password 10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
198 Login + password + biometric 10 No 
Not 
applicable 
I do not report 
199 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
10 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
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Respondent’s 
ID C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 
200 Login + password 8 Yes Yes 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
201 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No 
answer 
Yes No 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
Direct inform by 
walking into the branch 
office 
202 
Login + password 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
12 No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number provided 
on ‘contact us’  page 
203 Login + password 2 Yes Yes No answer 
204 Login + password 8 Yes Yes No answer 
205 No answer 
No 
Answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
No answer 
206 Login + password 15 No No I am not sure 
207 
Login + password + security 
questions (e.g. what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
No 
Answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
No answer 
208 Login + password 2 Yes Yes 
Report via the report 
form on web page 
209 
Login + password + mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
I prefer 
not to 
answer 
No 
Not 
applicable 
Call number on card. 
 
Part 3: Respondents’ trust in financial institution 
Respondent’s 
ID C11 C12 
1 Not applicable Not applicable 
2 Not applicable Not applicable 
3 Not applicable Not applicable 
4 Bank I do not know. 
5 
Online payment 
processing 
company (e.g. 
PayPal) 
“In my experience, they SEEM to have the best security.” 
6 I am not sure. Not applicable 
7 
Credit card 
company 
“They scan everyone's credit card habits.” 
8 Not applicable Not applicable 
9 Bank Never had a problem. 
10 Bank 
“The bank website does not store my personal information (login details) whereas 
some sites remember my address & telephone numbers.” 
11 I am not sure. I do not know. 
12 
Online payment 
processing 
company (e.g. 
PayPal) 
“Password authentication.” 
13 I am not sure. Not applicable 
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Respondent’s 
ID C11 C12 
14 I am not sure. I do not know. 
15 Bank “Their high standards.” 
16 I am not sure. I do not know. 
17 Bank “Because, they refund for any unauthorised attack.” 
18 I am not sure. “Password/PIN” 
19 Bank “Protect customer information. Provide convenience service in a security way.” 
20 I am not sure. I do not know. 
21 I am not sure. I do not know. 
22 Bank I do not know. 
23 Bank I do not know. 
24 Bank “My digipass and the strong encryption.” 
25 Bank I do not know. 
26 Bank I do not know. 
27 Bank I do not know. 
28 Bank “Most banks have various levels of protection which make it more efficient.” 
29 I am not sure. Not applicable 
30 I am not sure. Not applicable 
31 Bank “It is safe to visit the bank's homepage.” 
32 
Online shopping 
websites (e.g. 
eBay, Amazon) 
I do not know. 
33 
Credit card 
company 
I do not know. 
34 Bank No answer 
35 I am not sure. I do not know. 
36 I am not sure. I do not know. 
37 I am not sure. Not applicable 
38 Bank “The bank is government built.” 
39 
Credit card 
company 
No answer 
40 
Online payment 
processing 
company (e.g. 
PayPal) 
“Constantly updating & confirming our details.” 
41 I am not sure. I do not know. 
42 Bank No answer 
43 Not applicable Not applicable 
44 
Online payment 
processing 
company (e.g. 
PayPal) 
“Must go into an e-mail and confirm that you have chosen the option on the 
website.” 
45 I am not sure. I do not know. 
46 I am not sure. I do not know. 
47 
Online payment 
processing 
company (e.g. 
“They are anonymous your information which makes it harder for others to steal 
your information/ money.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID C11 C12 
PayPal) 
48 I am not sure. “Often security is not advised i.e. they don't tell you what they have in place.” 
49 No answer No answer 
50 I am not sure. Not applicable 
51 Bank “Confirming transaction by SMS.” 
52 Bank Not applicable 
53 Bank I do not know. 
54 I am not sure. I do not know. 
55 Bank No answer 
56 I am not sure. Not applicable 
57 Bank 
“Randomised virtual keypad for password input. It's painful, because it is encrypted 
and doesn't use the keypad, but rather uses mouse clicks, it's safer from keyloggers.” 
58 I am not sure. Not applicable 
59 I am not sure. Not applicable 
60 I am not sure. Not applicable 
61 I am not sure. I do not know. 
62 I am not sure. Not applicable 
63 Bank No answer 
64 Bank I do not know. 
65 I don't trust anyone. Not applicable 
66 I am not sure. Not applicable 
67 Bank “It is time least bad.” 
68 I am not sure. Not applicable 
69 
Online stock 
brokers 
“They have to provide information for tax purposes, so I guess they are more likely 
to be careful.” 
70 I am not sure. Not applicable 
71 I am not sure. Not applicable 
72 I am not sure. Not applicable 
73 I am not sure. Not applicable 
74 Bank “It has been saved for me.” 
75 Bank I do not know. 
76 Bank I do not know. 
77 Bank I do not know. 
78 Bank Their Guarantee. 
79 I am not sure. “I don't like or dislike it. I just assume they make it a secure as possible.” 
80 Bank 
“Assuming the banks are big organisation, I trust their protection system more than 
the others since they will have more money to invest on online protection.” 
81 Bank I do not know. 
82 I am not sure. Not applicable 
83 Bank I do not know. 
84 Bank “The option to change the password whenever I request.” 
85 Bank “I am with them, so I use their security.” 
86 Bank “If you make a big mistake you must contact the provider to correct it again.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID C11 C12 
87 Not applicable Not applicable 
88 Bank I do not know. 
89 Bank I do not know. 
90 Bank No answer 
91 Bank “Security with accessing account is good.” 
92 Not applicable Not applicable 
93 Not applicable Not applicable 
94 Not applicable Not applicable 
95 No answer No answer 
96 No answer No answer 
97 Bank I do not know. 
98 Bank “They ask authentic question & lock you out if they are incorrect or unsure.” 
99 Bank I do not know. 
100 I am not sure. Not applicable 
101 
Online payment 
processing 
company (e.g. 
PayPal) 
I do not know. 
102 Not applicable Not applicable 
103 Bank “Verification code.” 
104 Bank I do not know. 
105 Bank 
“Needing to use a sms verification code before money can be transferred to a new 
account.” 
106 No answer No answer 
107 Not applicable Not applicable 
108 I am not sure. Not applicable 
109 Bank “Both password and mobile authorise.” 
110 Bank I do not know. 
111 Not applicable Not applicable 
112 I am not sure. Not applicable 
113 Bank “Appears to be secured.” 
114 I am not sure. I do not know. 
115 Bank “Allowed to use long passwords with both letters and numbers for added security.” 
116 No answer No answer 
117 Not applicable Not applicable 
118 
Credit card 
company 
“Security Questions.” 
119 Bank No answer 
120 No answer No answer 
121 I am not sure. Not applicable 
122 I am not sure. Not applicable 
123 Not applicable Not applicable 
124 Not applicable Not applicable 
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Respondent’s 
ID C11 C12 
125 Bank “Notification of accessing the service via e-mail.” 
126 Bank I do not know. 
127 Bank I do not know. 
128 Not applicable Not applicable 
129 Bank No answer 
130 Bank “They invest into security & responsibility for any loss of money from me.” 
131 I am not sure. Not applicable 
132 I am not sure. Not applicable 
133 Bank No answer 
134 Bank No answer 
135 
Online payment 
processing 
company (e.g. 
PayPal) 
“Password security.” 
136 I am not sure. Not applicable 
137 I am not sure. Not applicable 
138 Bank I do not know. 
139 Bank No answer 
140 No answer No answer 
141 Bank “SMS, Token” 
142 Not applicable Not applicable 
143 I am not sure. Not applicable 
144 I am not sure. Not applicable 
145 Bank Not applicable 
146 Not applicable Not applicable 
147 I am not sure. Not applicable 
148 Bank Not applicable 
149 No answer Not applicable 
150 Not applicable Not applicable 
151 Bank Not applicable 
152 
Companies that 
also use an external 
code on special 
remote. 
“Feel safe.” 
153 Bank No answer 
154 Bank “Strong encrypted but still easy to use.” 
155 I am not sure. Not applicable 
156 Bank No answer 
157 I am not sure. Not applicable 
158 Bank No answer 
159 I am not sure. Not applicable 
160 I am not sure. Not applicable 
161 Bank “Offers a level that I need to give me confidence to use their online banking.” 
162 Not applicable Not applicable 
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Respondent’s 
ID C11 C12 
163 No answer No answer 
164 
Online payment 
processing 
company (e.g. 
PayPal) 
I do not know. 
165 Not applicable Not applicable 
166 I am not sure. Not applicable 
167 Bank I do not know. 
168 Not applicable Not applicable 
169 Bank “Sms code.” 
170 
Online payment 
processing 
company (e.g. 
PayPal) 
I do not know. 
171 No answer No answer 
172 Bank I do not know. 
173 Bank No answer 
174 Not applicable Not applicable 
175 I am not sure. Not applicable 
176 Bank No answer 
177 Not applicable Not applicable 
178 Bank I do not know. 
179 I am not sure. Not applicable 
180 
They are all 
equally bad. 
“That you are "usually" insured against financial losses related to hacking.” 
181 Bank I do not know. 
182 Bank “Password encryption and selected with mouse (keyloggers are of no use).” 
183 I am not sure. Not applicable 
184 
Credit card 
company 
“Average user doesn't know who they are to start with.” 
185 Bank I do not know. 
186 I am not sure. Not applicable 
187 Bank I do not know. 
188 I am not sure. Not applicable 
189 Bank “HTTPS secure web.” 
190 Bank “I do not know.” 
191 
Online payment 
processing 
company (e.g. 
PayPal) 
“Strong encryption.” 
192 Bank I do not know. 
193 Bank I do not know. 
194 
Credit card 
company 
No answer 
195 
Online shopping 
websites (e.g. 
I do not know. 
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Respondent’s 
ID C11 C12 
eBay, Amazon) 
196 Bank I do not know. 
197 
Online payment 
processing 
company (e.g. 
PayPal) 
I do not know. 
198 Bank I do not know. 
199 Bank I do not know. 
200 Bank I do not know. 
201 Bank I do not know. 
202 Bank I do not know. 
203 I am not sure. Not applicable 
204 I am not sure. Not applicable 
205 
Credit card 
company 
I do not know. 
206 Bank I do not know. 
207 Bank “SMS code.” 
208 
Online payment 
processing 
company (e.g. 
PayPal) 
“Token Device.” 
209 Bank “SMS Verification Code.” 
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APPENDIX K: Data of respondents’ preferences in a deployment of online banking security protection 
 
Part 1: Authentication security preferences 
Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
1 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
2 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
3 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
4 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Not applicable 8 
5 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Would not remember the 
passwords therefore would 
have to write it down which is 
an added security risk. 
Never 
Unless it has 
been 
compromised. 
8 
6 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Lower case alphabets 
(e.g. abc) 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Never 8 
7 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
upper case alphabets 
Login + password + 
token device 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Convenience. 
I am not sure. 10-20 
8 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
9 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month No answer 
10 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
6 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
11 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
token device 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 15 
12 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Once a year 10 
13 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Only Password doesn't 
protect. 
Once a year 10 
14 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
I am not 
sure 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No answer No answer No answer 
15 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
I am not 
sure 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Just when 
there is a need. 
8 
16 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
8 
17 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Mixed of numbers and 
upper case alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8 
18 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
6 
 289 
 
Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
19 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
For security I agree. But I still 
think not very well ask their 
customers to change always. 
They should do lots of work, 
not customers. 
Never 
If no need, 
never. 
6-8 
20 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
upper case alphabets 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
token device 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) No answer 6 
21 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
No answer Yes, I would agree (go to D7) I am not sure. 10 
22 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Special characters (e.g. 
@#%&*) 
No answer Yes, I would agree (go to D7) I am not sure. 10 
23 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
10 
24 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Numbers 
Login + password + 
token device 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
They all should use digipass. 
No need to 
change when 
using digipass. 
8 
25 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of number and 
special characters 
Login + password + 
random verification 
code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) No answer 7 
26 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer Yes, I would agree (go to D7) No answer 8 
27 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
I prefer not to answer 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) No answer 5-6 
28 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
It means that bank has a 
problem with security system. 
I prefer to change bank. 
No answer 8 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
29 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
I prefer not to answer 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
random verification 
code 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 10 
30 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
I prefer not to answer Other, please specify Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 9 
31 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
upper case alphabets 
Login + password + 
random verification 
code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
No answer 
32 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Special characters (e.g. 
@#%&*) 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
11 
33 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
No answer 
34 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer 
Login + password + 
token device 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) No answer 8 
35 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Already too many passwords 
to remember. 
Never 10 
36 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
No answer 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) I am not sure. 10 
37 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$6-$10 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 12 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
38 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
10 
39 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
More than 
$10 per 
month 
No answer 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) I am not sure. No answer 
40 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 10-12 
41 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$6-$10 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
6 
42 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
static verification code 
attached on your credit 
card, EFTPOS, or 
written on your paper 
given by bank. 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Once a year No answer 
43 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
44 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 8 
45 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
static verification code 
attached on your credit 
card, EFTPOS, or 
written on your paper 
given by bank. 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) I am not sure. 8 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
46 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
random verification 
code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
8 
47 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Never 6 
48 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Not sure if it matters if 
there is a verification 
(image) device + 
passwords are changed 
regularly. Maybe need 
to remind customers to 
change passwords as per 
the university. 
Login + password + 
random verification 
code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
Unlimited 
49 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
50 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Numbers 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 10 
51 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Not applicable No answer 
52 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
10-15 
53 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8 
54 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
No answer No answer 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 8 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
55 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
token device 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8 
56 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
8 
57 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
It's too painful, and takes too 
much admin to track it. 
No answer 7 
58 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
No answer No answer 
Login + password + 
token device 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
I can't remember my 
password. 
No answer 8 
59 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
I am not 
sure 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
random verification 
code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
6 
60 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
6 
61 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer Yes, I would agree (go to D7) No answer No answer 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
62 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Numbers Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
6 
63 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
6 
64 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Numbers 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
12 
65 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
More than 
$10 per 
month 
No answer 
Login + password + 
random verification 
code 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
I cannot think of many decent 
passwords and remember it. 
Security Risk 
(I don't like 
changing, but 
that doesn't 
mean I don't 
change it.) 
16 
66 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Easy to forget the password. 
I am not sure. 8 
67 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Other, please specify 
Login + password + 
biometric 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Frequently changing password 
means I cannot remember 
them so have to write them 
down. 
When I choose 
to. 
8 
68 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Arbitrarily changing 
passwords make people write 
them down. 
Never 8 
69 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) No answer 9 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
70 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$6-$10 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
token device 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) No answer 12 
71 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer Yes, I would agree (go to D7) No answer 7 
72 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
I prefer not to answer 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Once a year 6 
73 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Privacy 
Once a year 6 
74 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
No answer 
Once a year 
More 
than10. 
75 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
10 
76 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
token device 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
6 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
77 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Login + password + 
random verification 
code 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Never 8 
78 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
I am not 
sure 
I prefer not to answer 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
4 
79 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
6 
80 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8 
81 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
I prefer not to answer Login + password 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
I would be skeptical that it is a 
scam; it would depend on how 
they contacted me and the 
procedure to change the 
password. 
Every 3 
months 
8 
82 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) I am not sure. 8 
83 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
token device 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
No answer 
No answer 8 
84 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Upper case alphabets 
(e.g., ABC) 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 6 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
85 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Numbers 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
8-10 
86 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
upper case alphabets 
Login + password + 
token device 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8-10 
87 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
88 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8 
89 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
I am not 
sure 
Lower case alphabets 
(e.g. abc) 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
10 
90 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8 
91 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
6 
92 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
93 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
94 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
95 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
96 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) I am not sure. 9 
97 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 8 
98 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Waste of time to be 
complicated. 
Once a year 6 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
99 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 7 
100 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
Other, 
please 
specify..... 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
token device 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
No answer 
No answer 8 
101 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Never 10 
102 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
103 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Other, please specify Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
16 
104 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of number and 
special characters 
Login + password + 
static verification code 
attached on your credit 
card, EFTPOS, or 
written on your paper 
given by bank. 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
No answer 
Never 8 
105 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
8 
106 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
107 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
108 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Can't be bothered. 
Never 6 
109 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 8 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
110 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of number and 
special characters 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Never No answer 
111 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
112 No answer No answer 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
token device 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
I'd forget. 
Once a year 8 
113 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month No answer 
114 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
I am not 
sure 
Mixed of number and 
special characters 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
6 
115 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Fear of forgetting password. 
Never 8 
116 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
random verification 
code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8 
117 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
118 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
random verification 
code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) I am not sure. 10 
119 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 3-6 months 8 
120 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
121 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8 
122 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) I am not sure. 6-8 
123 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
124 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
125 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Once a year 
More than 
5 
126 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
I am not 
sure 
Numbers Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 6 
127 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8 
128 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
129 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
9 
130 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Once a year 6 
131 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) I am not sure. No answer 
132 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
I am not 
sure 
I prefer not to answer 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
It depends on 
my feeling. 
No answer 
133 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
It's easy to forget 
Never 6-10 
134 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Might get confused 
Never 8 
135 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Other, please specify 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
biometric 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Do not want to remember a 
new password. 
No answer 
More than 
4. 
136 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
6 
137 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
More than 
$10 per 
month 
Numbers 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Never No answer 
138 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Special characters (e.g. 
@#%&*) 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
6 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
139 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
10 
140 No answer 
Not 
applicable 
No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
141 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
token device 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Too troublesome & mess up 
password. Too many versions 
over the time. 
No answer 
Doesn't 
matter 
142 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
143 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Upper case alphabets 
(e.g., ABC) 
Special characters (e.g. 
@#%&*) 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) I am not sure. 6 
144 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
upper case alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
8 
145 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
8 
146 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
147 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
I prefer not to answer 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
I want to choose when to 
change. 
Once a year 8-10 
148 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$6-$10 per 
month 
No answer 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 7 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
149 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
150 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
151 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) No answer 10 
152 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
No answer Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Once a year No answer 
153 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
154 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
All combined from 1-7. Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 8 
155 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
I prefer not to answer Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month No answer 
156 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Lower case alphabets 
(e.g. abc) 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month No answer 
157 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
I prefer not to answer Login + password Not applicable No answer 
Not 
applicable 
158 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
I am not 
sure 
I prefer not to answer 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
No answer 
159 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 7 
160 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Numbers 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
161 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
No answer 
162 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
163 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Other, please specify 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
No answer 
Never 8 
164 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Lower case alphabets 
(e.g. abc) 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) I am not sure. No answer 
165 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
166 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
I am not 
sure 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
8 
167 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Numbers Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 5 
168 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
169 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
10 
170 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Numbers 
Login + password + 
static verification code 
attached on your credit 
card, EFTPOS, or 
written on your paper 
given by bank. 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
No answer 
Once a year 5 
171 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
172 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Not applicable I am not sure. 6 
173 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Mixed of number and 
special characters 
Login + password + 
random verification 
code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month No answer 
174 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
175 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8 
176 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
token device 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Once a year 6-8 
177 Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
178 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Numbers Login + password 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
No answer 
Never 9 
179 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Too difficult. 
I am not sure. 5 
180 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
token device 
Login + password + 
random verification 
code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 8 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
181 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$6-$10 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
static  verification code 
attached on your credit 
card, EFTPOS, or 
written on your paper 
given by bank. 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
6 
182 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
7 
183 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
token device 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
No answer 
I am not sure. 15 
184 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
random verification 
code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
When I feel 
like doing 
(after every 
transaction 
over the web). 
8 
185 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
I prefer not to answer 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
8 
186 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$6-$10 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
8 
187 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
upper case alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Too troublesome. 
Never 10 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
188 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
8 
189 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Mixed of number and 
special characters 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Hard to remember because 
there so many passwords and 
pins these days. 
Every 6 
months 
10 
190 No (go to qD4) 
Already pay 
enough 
bank fees 
for this to be 
covered. 
Lower case alphabets 
(e.g. abc) 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8 
191 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Every month 8 
192 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
193 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
Troublesome. 
Never 8 
194 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
No answer 
Every month 8 
195 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
Lower case alphabets 
(e.g. abc) 
Mixed of numbers and 
upper case alphabets 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
No answer 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
196 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
static verification code 
attached on your credit 
card, EFTPOS, or 
written on your paper 
given by bank. 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Once a year 6 
197 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Once a year 6 
198 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
It makes trouble. 
Never 6 
199 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
No answer 
Every 3 
months 
No answer 
200 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers, 
special characters, lower 
case and upper case 
alphabets 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 6 
months 
8 
201 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of number and 
special characters 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Once a year 10 
202 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
Mixed of number and 
special characters 
Login + password 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Never 8 
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Respondent’s 
ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
203 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
I prefer not to answer 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Login + password + 
mobile (SMS) 
verification code 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) I am not sure. 8 
204 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Numbers 
Lower case alphabets 
(e.g. abc) 
Login + password Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
8 
205 No answer No answer Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Not 
applicable 
206 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
I prefer not to answer 
Login + password + 
biometric 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
15 
207 No (go to qD4) 
Not 
applicable 
I prefer not to answer 
Login + password + 
security questions (e.g. 
what is your mother's 
maiden name?) 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) Once a year 8 
208 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$2-$5 per 
month 
Mixed of numbers and 
lower case alphabets 
Login + password + 
token device 
No, I would not agree, Please 
specify your reason 
It might be a phishing. 
Every 3 
months 
9 
209 
Yes (go to 
qD3) 
$1 per 
month 
I prefer not to answer 
Login + password + 
token device 
Yes, I would agree (go to D7) 
Every 3 
months 
15 
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Part 2: Authentication security prioritised 
Respondent’s 
ID D8.1 D8.2 D8.3 D8.4 D8.5 D8.6 D8.7 
1 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
2 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
3 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
4 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
5 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
6 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
7 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
8 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
9 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
10 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
11 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
12 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
13 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
14 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
15 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
16 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
17 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
18 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
19 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
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Respondent’s 
ID D8.1 D8.2 D8.3 D8.4 D8.5 D8.6 D8.7 
20 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
21 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
22 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
23 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
24 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
25 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
26 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
27 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
28 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
29 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
30 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
31 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
32 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
33 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
34 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
35 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
36 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
37 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
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Respondent’s 
ID D8.1 D8.2 D8.3 D8.4 D8.5 D8.6 D8.7 
38 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
39 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
40 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
41 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
42 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
43 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
44 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
45 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
46 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
47 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
48 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
49 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
50 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
51 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
52 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
53 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
54 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
55 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
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Respondent’s 
ID D8.1 D8.2 D8.3 D8.4 D8.5 D8.6 D8.7 
56 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
57 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
58 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
59 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
60 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
61 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
62 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
63 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
64 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
65 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
66 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
67 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
68 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
69 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
70 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
71 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
72 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
73 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
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Respondent’s 
ID D8.1 D8.2 D8.3 D8.4 D8.5 D8.6 D8.7 
74 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
75 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
76 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
77 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
78 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
79 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
80 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
81 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
82 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
83 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
84 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
85 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
86 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
87 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
88 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
89 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
90 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
91 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
92 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
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Respondent’s 
ID D8.1 D8.2 D8.3 D8.4 D8.5 D8.6 D8.7 
93 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
94 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
95 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
96 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
97 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
98 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
99 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
100 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
101 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
102 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
103 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
104 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
105 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
106 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
107 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
108 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
109 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
110 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
111 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
112 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
113 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
114 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
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Respondent’s 
ID D8.1 D8.2 D8.3 D8.4 D8.5 D8.6 D8.7 
115 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
116 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
117 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
118 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
119 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
120 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
121 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
122 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
123 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
124 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
125 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
126 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
127 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
128 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
129 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
130 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
131 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
132 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
133 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
134 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
135 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
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Respondent’s 
ID D8.1 D8.2 D8.3 D8.4 D8.5 D8.6 D8.7 
136 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
137 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
138 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
139 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
140 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
141 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
142 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
143 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
144 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
145 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
146 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
147 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
148 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
149 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
150 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
151 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
152 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
153 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
154 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
155 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
156 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
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Respondent’s 
ID D8.1 D8.2 D8.3 D8.4 D8.5 D8.6 D8.7 
157 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
158 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
159 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
160 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
161 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
162 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
163 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
164 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
165 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
166 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
167 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
168 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
169 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
170 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
171 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
172 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
173 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
174 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
175 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
176 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
177 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
178 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
179 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
180 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
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Respondent’s 
ID D8.1 D8.2 D8.3 D8.4 D8.5 D8.6 D8.7 
181 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
182 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
183 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
184 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
185 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
186 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
187 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
188 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
189 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
190 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
191 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
192 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
193 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
194 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
195 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
196 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
197 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
198 
uncomplete
d uncompleted uncompleted uncompleted uncompleted uncompleted uncompleted 
199 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
200 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
201 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
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Respondent’s 
ID D8.1 D8.2 D8.3 D8.4 D8.5 D8.6 D8.7 
202 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
203 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
204 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
205 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
206 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
207 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
208 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
209 
The 
minimum 
protection 
The 
maximum 
protection 
The second  
maximum 
protection 
The third 
maximum 
protection 
The fifth 
maximum 
protection 
The fourth 
maximum 
protection 
The sixth 
maximum 
protection 
 
 
Part 3: Respondents’ trust in online banking security system 
Respondent’s 
ID D9.1 D9.2 D9.3 D9.4 D9.5 D9.6 D9.7 D9.8 
1 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
2 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
3 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
4 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe neither neither believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
5 neither neither neither believe not believe neither not 
believe 
believe 
6 believe believe believe believe not believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
7 believe believe believe neither neither believe strongly 
believe 
believe 
8 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
9 believe neither believe No answer believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
No answer 
10 believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
neither 
strongly 
not believe 
neither neither believe 
11 believe believe believe neither neither believe neither strongly 
believe 
12 neither neither believe not believe not believe neither believe strongly 
believe 
13 neither neither believe strongly 
not believe 
believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
14 believe believe believe not believe believe believe neither believe 
15 believe neither believe not believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
neither 
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Respondent’s 
ID D9.1 D9.2 D9.3 D9.4 D9.5 D9.6 D9.7 D9.8 
16 believe believe believe neither neither believe neither neither 
17 
strongly 
not 
believe 
neither neither believe neither believe believe strongly 
believe 
18 neither neither believe neither believe not believe believe believe 
19 believe neither believe believe believe believe believe strongly 
believe 
20 neither believe strongly 
believe 
neither believe 
strongly 
believe 
neither neither 
21 neither neither neither not believe neither believe strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
22 neither believe believe believe neither believe believe neither 
23 neither believe believe believe neither believe not 
believe 
believe 
24 believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe 
25 neither not believe 
strongly 
believe 
No answer No answer believe 
strongly 
not 
believe 
No answer 
26 
strongly 
believe 
neither believe believe not believe neither neither not believe 
27 
strongly 
believe 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe 
28 neither not believe neither neither neither believe believe strongly 
believe 
29 neither neither believe not believe strongly 
not believe 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
30 
not 
believe 
believe believe not believe not believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe 
31 believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
neither believe believe believe 
32 neither neither neither believe not believe believe not 
believe 
believe 
33 believe believe believe not believe neither believe believe believe 
34 neither believe believe believe neither believe believe believe 
35 neither not believe believe believe not believe believe believe believe 
36 neither believe believe neither neither No answer believe believe 
37 
not 
believe 
believe believe neither neither not believe neither strongly 
not believe 
38 believe believe believe not believe neither believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
39 believe 
strongly 
believe 
not 
believe 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
No answer neither believe 
40 neither believe believe believe not believe believe believe strongly 
believe 
41 neither not believe not 
believe 
not believe neither neither 
strongly 
not 
believe 
not believe 
42 believe neither 
not 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
not believe 
neither believe 
strongly 
believe 
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Respondent’s 
ID D9.1 D9.2 D9.3 D9.4 D9.5 D9.6 D9.7 D9.8 
43 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
44 neither neither believe believe strongly 
believe 
believe neither neither 
45 believe neither believe believe believe believe believe believe 
46 believe believe believe believe neither believe believe neither 
47 believe neither believe believe strongly 
believe 
neither strongly 
believe 
neither 
48 neither neither neither believe not believe neither not 
believe 
believe 
49 
strongly 
not 
believe 
not believe 
not 
believe 
not believe believe believe neither believe 
50 neither neither neither not believe strongly 
not believe 
neither strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
51 neither neither believe not believe strongly 
not believe 
neither not 
believe 
believe 
52 believe believe believe neither neither believe believe believe 
53 believe believe believe neither neither believe believe believe 
54 neither believe believe not believe believe believe believe neither 
55 believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
56 believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe not believe believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
57 believe believe believe not believe believe neither strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
58 believe believe believe not believe neither neither believe believe 
59 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
neither 
60 believe believe believe believe neither believe believe believe 
61 believe believe neither 
strongly 
not believe 
not believe neither No answer No answer 
62 believe believe believe believe 
strongly 
not believe 
believe neither neither 
63 believe believe believe neither 
strongly 
not believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
64 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe neither believe strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
65 neither neither neither strongly 
not believe 
neither neither strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
66 neither believe neither neither neither neither believe believe 
67 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
not believe 
neither strongly 
not believe 
strongly 
believe 
not believe believe believe 
68 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe neither 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe neither 
69 neither not believe 
not 
believe 
strongly 
not believe 
strongly 
not believe 
not believe believe neither 
70 
strongly 
not 
believe 
strongly 
not believe 
not 
believe 
strongly 
not believe 
not believe not believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
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Respondent’s 
ID D9.1 D9.2 D9.3 D9.4 D9.5 D9.6 D9.7 D9.8 
71 
not 
believe 
not believe believe believe neither believe neither 
strongly 
believe 
72 believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe 
strongly 
not believe 
believe believe neither 
73 believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe not believe believe believe believe believe 
74 neither neither neither strongly 
not believe 
neither neither strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
75 believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
not believe 
believe believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
76 believe believe believe neither not believe believe 
not 
believe 
neither 
77 believe believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
neither neither 
78 believe believe believe believe neither believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe 
79 neither believe believe neither believe neither believe believe 
80 believe believe believe neither neither believe believe believe 
81 believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
neither believe 
82 neither neither neither believe not believe neither not 
believe 
believe 
83 believe believe neither neither not believe believe not 
believe 
neither 
84 neither believe believe believe believe believe neither neither 
85 believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
86 believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
neither believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
87 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
88 
not 
believe 
not believe 
not 
believe 
not believe not believe neither 
not 
believe 
not believe 
89 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
No answer No answer No answer No answer 
strongly 
believe 
90 
strongly 
not 
believe 
strongly 
not believe 
strongly 
not 
believe 
neither not believe 
strongly 
not believe 
strongly 
not 
believe 
strongly 
not believe 
91 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
92 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
93 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
94 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
95 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
96 believe believe believe believe neither believe believe neither 
97 believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
 324 
 
Respondent’s 
ID D9.1 D9.2 D9.3 D9.4 D9.5 D9.6 D9.7 D9.8 
98 
not 
believe 
neither believe neither 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
99 believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe not believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
100 believe believe believe not believe neither neither believe believe 
101 believe believe believe 
strongly 
not believe 
believe believe 
not 
believe 
neither 
102 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
103 neither neither neither neither neither neither neither neither 
104 neither neither believe neither strongly 
believe 
believe neither believe 
105 neither believe believe neither neither believe strongly 
believe 
believe 
106 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
107 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
108 believe believe believe believe not believe believe believe believe 
109 
not 
believe 
neither believe 
strongly 
believe 
No answer No answer 
strongly 
not 
believe 
No answer 
110 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
111 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
112 believe believe believe not believe 
strongly 
not believe 
believe 
strongly 
not 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
113 neither neither neither not believe not believe believe believe strongly 
believe 
114 neither strongly 
believe 
believe 
strongly 
not believe 
neither believe believe believe 
115 believe believe believe believe not believe believe believe believe 
116 neither neither believe strongly 
not believe 
not believe No answer 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
117 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
118 neither neither not 
believe 
neither not believe neither believe neither 
119 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
120 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
121 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
122 
not 
believe 
not believe neither not believe 
strongly 
not believe 
not believe 
strongly 
not 
believe 
not believe 
123 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
124 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
125 believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
not believe not believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
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ID D9.1 D9.2 D9.3 D9.4 D9.5 D9.6 D9.7 D9.8 
126 
strongly 
not 
believe 
not believe neither 
strongly 
not believe 
strongly 
not believe 
neither strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
127 believe believe believe neither neither neither believe strongly 
believe 
128 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
129 neither not believe 
not 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
not believe 
not believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
130 believe believe believe not believe believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
131 neither neither believe neither neither believe believe strongly 
believe 
132 neither neither believe neither neither neither neither believe 
133 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
not believe 
strongly 
not believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
134 
strongly 
believe 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
neither neither strongly 
believe 
neither neither 
135 believe believe believe believe believe believe believe neither 
136 neither neither believe neither neither neither neither believe 
137 believe believe believe believe neither believe believe believe 
138 neither not believe believe neither neither neither strongly 
believe 
believe 
139 neither strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
No answer believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
140 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
141 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
142 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
143 neither neither not 
believe 
not believe not believe neither 
not 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
144 believe believe believe neither neither believe believe believe 
145 believe believe believe believe believe believe believe believe 
146 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
147 neither neither believe neither not believe neither not 
believe 
not believe 
148 believe believe believe believe not believe believe believe believe 
149 believe believe neither neither neither believe believe believe 
150 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
151 neither neither neither neither neither neither neither neither 
152 neither neither neither neither neither neither believe strongly 
believe 
153 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
154 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe 
155 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
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ID D9.1 D9.2 D9.3 D9.4 D9.5 D9.6 D9.7 D9.8 
156 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
157 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
158 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
159 believe believe neither not believe not believe neither believe believe 
160 
not 
believe 
not believe 
not 
believe 
believe 
strongly 
not believe 
not believe neither neither 
161 believe believe believe neither believe believe believe neither 
162 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
163 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
164 believe neither neither neither strongly 
not believe 
believe neither neither 
165 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
166 neither not believe neither neither strongly 
not believe 
neither neither strongly 
believe 
167 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
168 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
169 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
170 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
171 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
172 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe believe neither believe believe believe 
173 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
174 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
175 neither neither neither neither neither believe not 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
176 believe believe believe not believe neither believe believe believe 
177 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
178 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
179 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
not believe believe believe believe neither 
180 
not 
believe 
not believe 
not 
believe 
believe believe not believe neither neither 
181 neither believe believe not believe neither believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
182 believe believe neither believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
not believe 
183 neither neither neither neither neither neither neither neither 
184 
not 
believe 
not believe 
not 
believe 
neither not believe 
strongly 
not believe 
strongly 
not 
believe 
neither 
185 believe believe neither not believe neither neither neither strongly 
believe 
186 
not 
believe 
not believe 
not 
believe 
believe believe neither 
strongly 
believe 
neither 
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Respondent’s 
ID D9.1 D9.2 D9.3 D9.4 D9.5 D9.6 D9.7 D9.8 
187 believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
188 No answer neither believe 
strongly 
not believe 
strongly 
not believe 
neither 
not 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
189 neither not believe believe 
strongly 
not believe 
not believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
190 believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
neither not believe believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
191 neither believe believe neither neither believe strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
192 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
193 believe believe neither neither neither believe strongly 
believe 
believe 
194 
strongly 
believe 
believe neither not believe No answer No answer No answer strongly 
not believe 
195 
strongly 
believe 
believe neither not believe strongly 
not believe 
not believe 
not 
believe 
neither 
196 neither not believe neither strongly 
not believe 
not believe believe neither believe 
197 believe neither neither neither neither believe believe believe 
198 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
199 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
200 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
201 
strongly 
believe 
believe neither not believe believe neither believe neither 
202 believe believe believe neither neither believe neither neither 
203 neither not believe 
not 
believe 
not believe neither neither neither believe 
204 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
205 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
206 believe neither neither believe neither believe believe believe 
207 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
208 believe believe believe neither believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
strongly 
believe 
209 believe believe believe believe believe believe believe 
strongly 
believe 
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Part 4: Respondents’ security system preferences 
Respondent’s 
ID D10.1 D10.2 D10.3 D10.4 D10.5 D10.6 D10.7 D10.8 
1 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
2 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
3 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
4 I agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither Neither 
5 I agree I agree I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree 
6 I strongly agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree I agree 
7 I strongly agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
8 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
9 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
10 Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
11 I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
12 Disagree Disagree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
13 I strongly agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
14 Neither Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
15 I strongly agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
16 Disagree Disagree I agree No answer I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree I agree 
17 I agree I agree I strongly agree I agree I agree I strongly agree Neither I agree 
18 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree 
19 I strongly agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree I strongly agree 
20 Disagree I agree Neither I strongly agree I agree Neither I agree I agree 
21 I strongly agree Neither I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree Neither 
22 I agree I agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I agree 
23 I strongly agree Neither I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree I strongly agree 
24 I agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree 
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Respondent’s 
ID D10.1 D10.2 D10.3 D10.4 D10.5 D10.6 D10.7 D10.8 
25 No answer I agree Disagree No answer I strongly agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
Disagree No answer 
26 I strongly agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
27 I strongly agree Neither I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree 
28 I agree Disagree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither 
29 Neither I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
30 I strongly agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree 
31 I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree 
32 I strongly agree I agree Neither I strongly agree I agree I agree Disagree Neither 
33 I strongly agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
34 I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
35 I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
36 I strongly agree I agree I agree Neither Neither I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree 
37 I agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
Disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
38 I agree I agree I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
39 I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree Neither Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree 
40 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
41 I agree I agree I strongly agree Neither Neither I strongly agree I agree I agree 
42 I agree I agree I agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree Disagree I agree 
43 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
44 Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
45 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
46 Neither I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
47 I agree Disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree Disagree 
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Respondent’s 
ID D10.1 D10.2 D10.3 D10.4 D10.5 D10.6 D10.7 D10.8 
48 Neither Neither I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
49 Disagree Disagree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree 
50 Neither Neither Neither Neither Neither I strongly agree Neither I agree 
51 I agree Disagree I agree Neither I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
52 I agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
53 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree 
54 No answer I agree I agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
55 I strongly agree Neither I agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree I strongly agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
56 Disagree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
57 I strongly agree Disagree I strongly agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree I strongly agree 
58 I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
59 I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
60 I strongly agree Neither I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree I agree I strongly agree 
61 I agree Neither I strongly agree Neither Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
62 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
63 I agree Disagree I strongly agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree Disagree I strongly agree 
64 Neither Neither 
I strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither I strongly agree Disagree Disagree 
65 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
66 I agree I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
67 I agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
68 I agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I agree Neither Disagree I agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree 
69 Neither Neither Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree 
70 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
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Respondent’s 
ID D10.1 D10.2 D10.3 D10.4 D10.5 D10.6 D10.7 D10.8 
71 I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree 
72 Neither 
I strongly 
disagree 
Neither I agree Neither I strongly agree Neither I agree 
73 Neither Disagree I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree Neither I agree 
74 I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree No answer I strongly agree 
75 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
76 Disagree Disagree I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree Neither Neither 
77 I agree I agree I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
78 I agree Neither I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree 
79 I agree Neither I agree I agree I agree I agree I agree I agree 
80 I strongly agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
81 I strongly agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree Disagree 
82 I agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
83 Neither 
I strongly 
disagree 
Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
84 I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
85 I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
86 I agree Disagree I agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree Disagree I agree 
87 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
88 Disagree I strongly agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Disagree I agree 
89 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
90 I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
91 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
92 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
93 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
94 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
95 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
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Respondent’s 
ID D10.1 D10.2 D10.3 D10.4 D10.5 D10.6 D10.7 D10.8 
96 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
97 I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither 
98 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
99 I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Disagree Disagree 
100 I agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
101 Neither Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
102 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
103 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
104 I strongly agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
105 I strongly agree I agree I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
106 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
107 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
108 Disagree Disagree Disagree I agree I agree I agree Neither I agree 
109 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree I agree Neither Disagree No answer No answer No answer 
110 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
111 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
112 I agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree 
113 I agree I agree I agree Neither Neither I agree I agree I strongly agree 
114 I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
115 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Disagree Neither 
116 I agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
117 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
118 I agree Neither Neither Disagree I agree Neither Neither Neither 
119 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
120 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
121 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
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Respondent’s 
ID D10.1 D10.2 D10.3 D10.4 D10.5 D10.6 D10.7 D10.8 
122 I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
123 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
124 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
125 Disagree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
126 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
127 I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither 
128 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
129 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
130 I strongly agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
131 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree Neither Disagree Disagree 
132 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
133 I strongly agree Disagree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Disagree Neither 
I strongly 
disagree 
134 Neither Disagree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
135 Disagree Disagree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
136 Neither Disagree I agree I agree I agree I agree Neither I agree 
137 I strongly agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
138 I strongly agree I agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
139 I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
140 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
141 I strongly agree Disagree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
142 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
143 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree No answer 
144 I agree I agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree 
145 I strongly agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
146 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
147 I agree Disagree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
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Respondent’s 
ID D10.1 D10.2 D10.3 D10.4 D10.5 D10.6 D10.7 D10.8 
148 I agree I agree I agree I agree I agree I agree I agree I agree 
149 I agree Disagree I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Disagree 
150 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
151 
I strongly 
disagree 
Neither 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
152 I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree 
153 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
154 Neither 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
155 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree 
156 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
157 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
158 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
159 I strongly agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
160 I agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
161 Disagree Disagree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
162 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
163 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
164 Neither Neither Neither Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
165 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
166 I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
167 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
168 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
169 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
170 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
171 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
172 I strongly agree I agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree 
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Respondent’s 
ID D10.1 D10.2 D10.3 D10.4 D10.5 D10.6 D10.7 D10.8 
173 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
174 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
175 Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
176 I agree I agree I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
177 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
178 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
179 Disagree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
180 I agree Disagree Neither I agree I agree I agree Disagree Disagree 
181 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree I strongly agree 
182 Neither 
I strongly 
disagree 
Neither I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
183 Neither I agree Neither No answer Neither Neither I agree Neither 
184 I agree Disagree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree I agree I agree 
185 I agree Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree 
186 I agree Neither I agree I agree I agree I agree I agree I agree 
187 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
188 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
189 I agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
190 I strongly agree Disagree Neither Neither Neither I strongly agree Disagree Neither 
191 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Neither I strongly agree 
192 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
193 I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
194 Neither I agree No answer I strongly agree Disagree 
I strongly 
disagree 
No answer No answer 
195 I strongly agree No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
196 Neither I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
197 I agree I agree Neither Neither Disagree I agree Neither I agree 
198 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
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Respondent’s 
ID D10.1 D10.2 D10.3 D10.4 D10.5 D10.6 D10.7 D10.8 
199 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
200 I agree I strongly agree I agree I agree I agree I agree Neither I strongly agree 
201 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I agree I strongly agree 
202 I agree Disagree I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I agree Neither 
203 I agree I agree I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
204 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
205 No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer No answer 
206 I agree I agree Neither I agree I agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
207 I agree I agree I agree I agree I agree Disagree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
208 I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree Disagree I strongly agree 
209 I strongly agree 
I strongly 
disagree 
I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree I strongly agree 
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Respondent’s 
ID D11 
6 “I have no opinion.” 
7 “It's been revolutionary for worldwide navel and ease of banking & paying bills.” 
9 
“My bank provides many security measures so it's unfair for me to rate as I don't know what other 
security measures that bank offers.” 
10 
“I always triple check the screen to identify the log in status (i.e.) [You are currently logged out] 
perhaps this screen can be clearer to promote a sense of security leaving/exiting the banks screen/ 
or computer.” 
13 “I have no opinion.” 
15 “Educating people about online security.” 
16 “I have no opinion.” 
17 “Banks should try to update their security every time.” 
18 “I think the bank should offer more questions to us to answer when we open an account.” 
19 “Banks should provide any strong security online service.” 
20 “I have no opinion.” 
21 
“Account security is really important to every customer, so if the basic requirement for security 
cannot be reached, no one will trust online banking system.” 
22 “I have no opinion.” 
24 
“Not more than I know that if banks could motivate their customers to use bank services online. 
They will save millions of dollars. So it is in their interests. European bank somewhat is better 
than Australian bank.” 
25 “If hacker hacks my bank account I will stop using this bank.” 
26 “I have no opinion.” 
27 “I have no opinion.” 
28 
Online banking service is very convenient service for me. However, the rank of bank based on the 
level of security protection. It will be the main reason for chasing up bank. 
31 “The bank must do something after someone's money in his account was stolen.” 
32 “Improve our knowledge of Internet.” 
34 “I have no opinion.” 
37 
“My bank should prompt me with a security question, such as 'what is your mother's maiden 
name?' every time I log on to my online banking account.” 
40 
“Very convenient. Haven't access into a bank in over 6 months-very happy about that, but do get 
worried sometimes about Internet banking security.” 
41 
“Police or other should find the reason when people are attacked and then give them some 
solutions.” 
42 “Online banking provides us convenience.” 
45 
“I find online banking is very convenient to use. I enjoy using it and it allows me to pay my bills 
at any time of the day.” 
46 “Banks need to educate their users but not make it too hard because then people won't use it.” 
47 
“When using online banking, if you have credit cards you should always keep a close eye on your 
transactions especially if you shop online.” 
48 
“A difficult situation-ease of use versus security. If banks make it difficult or inconvenient, people 
will stop using the facility. They also cannot rely on individuals to have the knowledge or 
education to take multiple precautions with their personal information. Therefore, banks need to 
ensure max level of security exist from their end. If they provide the service then responsibility for 
security falls legally in their domain.” 
51 “I have no opinion.” 
55 “I have no opinion.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID D11 
56 
“Banks need to increase security to keep up with level of attacks etc. They need to stay 
competitive so should do this to prevent & retain customers. Banks make phenomenal profits- 
they should use some of this to protect their customers.” 
58 “I have no opinion.” 
59 
“Online banking is acceptable to me because as I work full time, I am not able to go into a bank. I 
would however prefer not to use online banking.” 
60 
“Online banking is very important to me. I use it often- is very convenient. I need it especially 
when travelling oversea. Banks need to be alert to any new scams that may occur.” 
62 “I have no opinion.” 
64 “I have no opinion.” 
65 “I hate having to use it, but it is life.” 
66 “I have no opinion.” 
71 
“It is an extremely convenient way to bank; however, I believe that the security needs to be 
regularly reviewed by the banks to ensure its customers' accounts are safe from fraudulent 
activity.” 
73 “Feel safe so far. Bank guarantee to return stolen money, not in the bank interest to be unsecured.” 
74 “I have no opinion.” 
75 “I have no opinion.” 
77 “I have no opinion.” 
80 
“Bank should promote security measures and efforts taken to ensure banking security to users. It 
should encourage user to be aware/ should their main website is secure/ should automatically 
deactivate any ongoing internet banking security immediately/ should a suspicious activity is 
detected.” 
83 “I have no opinion.” 
84 “I have no opinion.” 
86 “I have no opinion.” 
89 “Do not use the system overly much.” 
93 
“Please improve more people not computers, profit & satisfaction or citizen will be as much as 
appreciation.” 
97 “I have no opinion.” 
101 “I have no opinion.” 
103 
“I think it is a great facility, but it should be secure and the banks are responsible to our safety or 
delete the option of Internet banking.” 
105 
“Hacking into bank accounts + identifying fraud to be a growing problem. So, Banks should be 
looking at new ways to increase security.” 
109 “My only problem with online banking is doing scam activity.” 
115 “The online banking should be secured but not compromised user friendliness.” 
116 “Generally satisfied with ANZ due to 'FALCON' system.” 
118 “I have no opinion.” 
121 “I have no opinion.” 
129 
“This is very good survey concerning about online banking security. Bank and government should 
use this information to improve bank security and customer satisfaction.” 
130 
“I would appreciate being continuously informed and educated about the best and cheapest 
computer security software available to me as I feel like a novice and don't know where to go to 
find the best security.” 
133 “I have no opinion.” 
155 “I have no opinion.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID D11 
163 “I would not use Internet banking. There is new scam daily.” 
179 “I have no opinion.” 
181 “I have no opinion.” 
184 “I have no opinion.” 
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APPENDIX L: Data of respondents’ interview  
 
Respondent’s 
ID 
Knowledge about online banking threat (I1) 
1 “Yes, through key loggers.” 
2 “No.” 
3 
“Yes. Most of what I know come from the ASIC website, they have a hyperlink/webpage called 
Scam. I personally have received e-mail from people with long difficult to pronounce names saying 
that I have won a huge amount of money and that all they need is my bank account details.” 
4 “Yes, from media (online news stories) and my bank (warnings when logging into online banking). 
5 
Yes. E-mails to say that bank is changing your banking password. Click on link to make change. I 
never did log in or click on link so don't know what would have happened if I had.” 
6 “No.” 
7 
“Client and needed customers banking details. Commonwealth Bank out a news announcement to 
stake this was a scam.” 
9 
“Yes, I have a rental (holiday) property and I enquiry asked for my bank details to deposit money. 
This deposit was a scam from one bank to another.” 
10 “No. I have never heard of any threats.” 
11 “Yes, media. The e-mails sent asking your bank account to update info.” 
12 “I receive a lot of e-mails from friends.” 
13 “Certainly, I think it is a big threat for every banking sector including their customers.” 
14 “Nothing” 
15 
“Yes, spam e-mails that mislead some people to provide their online bank username and passwords 
then online theft can use that money to transfer online.” 
16 “I've heard of spam e-mails that ask for your username + passwords.” 
17 
“Yes, it happened with my sister. Her credit card money was used by another person. Twice that 
third party got my sister's money. It was about $160 and $200.” 
18 “Yes, I have heard.” 
19 
“Yes, I have. Always have some related information/news about online banking threat, and may be 
in order to raise our awareness of that.” 
20 “Yes, I have heard this from newspaper and on TV.” 
21 “Yes, bank security system attacks by hacker.” 
22 “No.” 
23 “I only watch this kind if threat in movies.” 
24 “Yes.” 
25 “Yes, I have heard about it.” 
26 “No.” 
27 “Yes, I have heard it. One of my friends’ credit was used by one of American company.” 
28 “I've heard about hacking the computer system from media.” 
29 “Yes, fake e-mails from banks.” 
30 
“I was on IT auditor (recently retired) so I am very conversant with the several threats. I worked in 
banking for 38+years.” 
31 
“Yes, I always had seen that someone's online bank's code was stolen and lose a large number of 
money in the newspaper.” 
32 “No opinion” 
33 “No.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Knowledge about online banking threat (I1) 
34 “No.” 
35 “Warning from bank about false websites requesting account number, password etc.” 
36 “No. May be thing I will worry about is they system breakdown/ hacker attacks.” 
37 “No.” 
38 “No.” 
39 “Yes, transfer money.” 
40 “No.” 
41 “Yes, from friends.” 
42 “No.” 
44 
“Scammers can get information through mail inside the website when the user enters their account 
information.” 
45 “Yes, fake e-mail asking for private/personal details.” 
46 
“Yes, there are warnings about phishing scams on the bank homepage. Also, discussed at 
university.” 
47 “Yes, from the media about not giving away banking information via e-mail.” 
48 
“Yes, ANZ reports of hackers put clients' accounts online. I have also received many requests for 
account information via both university and home e-mail.” 
49 “No.” 
50 “No.” 
51 
“Yes, where e-mails are sent to people pretending to be from banks, asking them for their PIN and 
other information.” 
52 “No, I haven't.” 
53 
“I have heard reports on the news (print and TV) of people hacking into online accounts and 
accessing people's funds/accountable /credit card etc.” 
54 “Yes.” 
55 “Yes.” 
56 
“Yes, e-mail asking me for my details - if I don't respond, it could stop me from using my bank 
account. These e-mails seem to come from well-known banks.” 
57 “Yes, homepage of several of my accounts have warnings about phishing e-mails.” 
58 
“Yes, it is from media I have heard that several times. It is about someone lost his/her money from 
the Internet banking because of the virus in their computer and let someone know their passwords.” 
59 
“I have had an e-mail from my bank warning not to respond to any request per information as the 
bank will never ask this.” 
60 
“From media, friends, and banks. Also, e-mail warning from employer. Banks issue warnings on 
website.” 
61 “No opinion” 
62 “No.” 
64 “Yes, I've heard from bank advertisement.” 
65 
“One of my friends got $600 withdrawn from her saving while paying for petrol of $50 
something.” 
66 “I have heard the news from the Internet.” 
67 “Yes, they are phishing, spyware, Trojan horse, rootkit/backdoor, social engineering.” 
68 
“I have received e-mail from my bank warning of phishing scams. My bank display warnings on its 
homepage.” 
69 “Spam/phishing e-mails from 'banks' where I don't have an account.” 
70 “No opinion” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Knowledge about online banking threat (I1) 
71 
“Yes, have heard through the media and had notifications from my bank. They informed us not to 
answer any e-mails asking for account verification.” 
72 
“Yes, I have received warning from my bank that some e-mails ask for account details are 
fraudulent.” 
73 “Yes, from media only.” 
74 “Yes, mainly from media and from the bank. I often have e-mails directed to our business.” 
75 “I have heard that term phishing from my husband but still don't know much more about it.” 
77 “Yes, hacker attack, phishing website, suspect web link.” 
78 
“I read an article that a number of years ago a computer in Asia were found to have all the 
customers banking details from a bank in Australia.” 
79 
“Password security - things like phishing scams were you get an e-mail pretending to be from your 
bank asking for account details. Identity theft - dangers of discarding bank statements etc. without 
shredding. False webpages designed to look like bank webpages - try to get your account and 
password details.” 
80 
“Yes. Banks have been promoting through online ads and television advertisement. Banks try to 
make online banking as convenient as possible, stressing on the ease of use and great accessibility 
having 24hrs access to one's own account.” 
81 
“Yes, my sister has had her banking account "hacked" information before and a substantial amount 
stolen.” 
82 “Bank warns about fraudulent e-mails directing to false websites.” 
83 “Yes, I work in a bank and I've heard of other people hacking into personal accounts.” 
84 “Via Internet-browsing through travel forums and reading about how tourists have been targeted.” 
85 “No.” 
86 
“Have received information from my bank requires internet banking and my user to change 
password.” 
102 “Yes.” 
106 “Yes.” 
107 “Yes, bogus e-mails requesting personal information.” 
111 “Yes, from media reports.” 
140 
“Yes. Heard about isolated cases but I have been doing online banking for 15 years without 
problem. The token security is good and what's better is a sms notification of any transaction.” 
143 “No.” 
149 “Yes.” 
165 “Happened to a family's friend, fraud using PayPal. I've seen many reports on television.” 
177 “Yes, I have heard.” 
180 “From a friend originally from New Zealand. He said he gets phishing e-mails regularly.” 
181 “Yes, user’s information was disclosed to online & tele-sales as [CONTACTS].” 
183 “No.” 
187 “No.” 
188 “No.” 
189 “Yes. Fake website collecting personal and account information.” 
191 “No.” 
200 “Yes.” 
206 “No.” 
207 “Yes.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Knowledge about online banking threat (I1) 
208 “No.” 
209 “Yes, I am aware of threats such as phishing and pharming.” 
 
Respondent’s 
ID Knowledge about phishing (I2) 
1 “To be from a bank and asks for account information.” 
2 “Only by way of information that has been put on the TV.” 
3 
“Not much, my time is valuable and I do rely on the expertise of Internet service providers, various 
pieces of legislation, the police, various 'watch dog' organisations both conservative and liberal and 
software designers to ensure my safety and privacy on the Internet.” 
4 
“E-mails from people pretending to be banks, etc., that try to get customers to click a link to a web 
page that subsequently steals their user id and password.” 
5 “Nothing.” 
6 “Nothing.” 
7 “Yes.” 
9 “Very little” 
10 “No.” 
11 “Nothing” 
12 “Not much.” 
13 
“According to my understanding phishing is a fraudulent activity in which users are provided with 
identical but fake websites.” 
14 “Nothing” 
15 “Stealing others' online identification to use in illegal thing.” 
16 “I believe it works as described in number1. Spam e-mail asks for username + password.” 
17 
“As per you said 'phishing' is like fishing which means trying to get another person money from 
his/her account either stealing identity or not.” 
18 “Monitoring software.” 
19 “I don't know about it unless the interviewer introduces it to us.” 
20 “There are some people "professional" who will transfer your balance "account" to their account.” 
21 “Sending e-mail to somebody by pretending bank office.” 
22 “Stealing people's money.” 
23 “I am not really sure. It is some kind of internet theft.” 
24 “That it is common and people got affected.” 
25 “Phishing is something like hacking.” 
26 “Stealing personal ID.” 
27 “I have no idea about phishing.” 
28 
“I just read some information about it on the Internet. That is one of the ways of getting private 
bank information by sending mails or giving calls behalf of bank.” 
29 “It tries to get into your computer to steal information.” 
30 “Fully aware of attempts to contact/extract info using phishing.” 
31 
“I think it is a common appearance, not only in Australia but also around the world. It is an illegal 
act.” 
32 “Nothing.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Knowledge about phishing (I2) 
33 “I just know phishing is stealing money from someone's bank account.” 
34 “It is a fraud which is done with the credit card detail in website.” 
35 “People try to access to your log on details.” 
36 
“In the field of computer security, phishing is the criminally process of attempting to acquire 
sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, and credit card numbers.” 
37 “Stealing money from someone account like fishing in the sea.” 
38 
“Some people know your password and some information of you then they could use your online 
banking.” 
39 “I am not sure about it.” 
40 “Do not know about this.” 
41 “Get money from other’s online account.” 
42 “Steal money from others' account.” 
44 
“When a user enters account information on a non-banking website that looks similar to the 
original.” 
45 “It steals your personal information and most importantly your bank account.” 
46 
“E-mail sent to you that looks like it’s from your bank, but requires you to authenticate yourself, it 
is sophisticated.” 
47 “Only that it is a threat.” 
48 
“I receive regular phishing requests via e-mail. Phishing relies on people supplying private 
information to someone who is not who they claim to be.” 
49 “No.” 
50 “I think it is junk information which may spread virus on computer.” 
51 
“Not much. I think it's a fake website that pretends to be a bank and gets you to put in your 
passwords and user names etc. to steal your identity.” 
52 
“Oh, use fake name and account to threat. Like we might receive an e-mail said that "I'm from xxx 
bank, your account is in danger now, please sending us your account name and password, and we 
can fix that out." Ha-ha, I think this is right.” 
53 “Nothing.” 
54 “Nothing. I don't care and know what the term phishing means.” 
55 
“It is one of the thief identity methods via online network. Usually, e-mail and rough website are 
used by hacker to accumulate an identity from victims. In order to do this, e-mail will ask victims 
to access a rough website before the information will be gained by capturing any activity on the 
screen.” 
56 “I've heard the word but I'm not entirely sure what it is.” 
57 
“They attempt to get details such as account and card numbers & logon details by having you go to 
a site that is supposedly a bank site and entering data into a form which keeps a log of your entry 
so the scammers have access to your account to steal money from it.” 
58 
“What I know and what I am using is a past word key looks like a flash drive. No matter when I 
have to use my Internet banking, I should insert that flash drive key to log on.” 
59 “Not personally.” 
60 “Criminal and fraudulent attempt to acquire personal banking information.” 
61 “No opinion” 
62 “Never Heard of it.” 
64 “Phishing seems like "Junk mail" to ask your personal detail.” 
65 “No opinion” 
66 “Just know the hackers want to take our password.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Knowledge about phishing (I2) 
67 
“Specially created e-mail/conversations that mimic legitimate conversations from an advertised 
institution to gain credentials.” 
68 
“Involves the creation of a website or e-mail or both that look to be from the bank but are not. 
Entering details into the site or replying to the e-mail will send details to the scammer.” 
69 “E-mails, usually, trying to capture passwords/ account details.” 
70 “People tried to get access to your bank details.” 
71 “Nothing.” 
72 
“It's a way of persuading people to part with information that they might otherwise wish to keep 
secret.” 
73 “Stealing information.” 
74 
“I see it quite often at work. We get direct e-mails sent to me and through our resume e-mail 
address.” 
75 “As I know it is unauthorised activity.” 
77 “Heard about it. Never experienced. Simply know how it works.” 
78 
“That e-mails are sent out from what is supposed to be your bank asking for your details. Such as 
passwords and customer numbers.” 
79 
“I see e-mails on a daily basis requesting banking details... I just delete.  But I am aware that some 
people must fall for this trick and respond with their details. My bank never contacts clients by e-
mail for password related issues so I just deleted these.” 
80 
“Online banking is prone to internet hackers who can hack into one's account and saving the 
entered password for their remote access without user realising.” 
81 “It is an attempt to get someone to give private information as to steal it and use for identity theft.” 
82 
“People create fake websites for real companies, banks, etc.to try to trick users into giving personal 
information.” 
83 “Not much so I can't really explain.” 
84 
“According to what I have read, the scammer sets up a clumsy website similar to the bank or 
business and then tries to direct consumers to this. Once they will steal as much information as 
they can in order to take that person’s identity.” 
85 “No.” 
86 “They send you a security question to confirm and will access to your bank account.” 
102 “It's kinds of Nigeria and winning lotto.” 
128 
“Phishing is where hackers send e-mails to people disguised as legitimate businesses to try to gain 
people's account information.” 
140 
“Something about a false site that looks similar to the original bank site. Advice is not to go on a 
bank site the e-mail links. Use Https directly.” 
149 “No.” 
165 “It is the same as skimming.” 
177 
“Persons pretending to be your bank or others and trying to obtain personal details such as bank 
account numbers.” 
180 “Seen the e-mail version and the webpage version.” 
181 “A duplicate of website/ e-mail from an organization to gain users information illegally.” 
182 “It is a deception.” 
188 “Nothing.” 
189 
“Phishing is trying to persuade user to click some websites that look exactly as the original website 
but collecting account information in a fraudulent way.” 
191 “Cheating to get confidential details.” 
206 
“They can be around the house that has wireless and access to the network to copy password from 
people in the house.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Knowledge about phishing (I2) 
208 “Phishing is an e-mail fraud scam conducted for the purposes of information or identity theft.” 
209 “User is directed to a fake bank website and their login details are captured.” 
 
Respondent’s 
ID Discussion about malicious threats (I3) 
1 “Programs installed on a computer to track user activities, gain confidential information etc.” 
2 “Nothing.” 
3 “Not much again, heavily reliant on ISPs and software designers to guard against this.” 
4 
“Software that is loaded to a computer usually without the user’s permission that collects data such 
as keystrokes or restricts access to web sites.” 
5 “Nothing.” 
6 “Nothing.” 
7 “Very little” 
9 “Trojans-computer viruses.” 
10 “All I know is that the above indicates someone is trying to access my information/screen/account.” 
11 “No opinion” 
12 “Spyware is trying to access my computer.” 
13 
“They are piece of programs that installed in the system without users permission and lead the 
system to malfunction such as delaying, displaying unwanted & unnecessary info & changing the 
location of files or folders.” 
14 “No” 
15 
“Spyware: software designed to spy on users and send personal information to the spyware's 
programmer. Adware: software sends ads, popups and spam e-mails to people. Trojans: malicious 
software that may damage the system.” 
16 “I know that Trojans can be to control your computer, for example to shut down the Internet.” 
17 “I think it's a virus name.” 
18 “Hacker” 
19 “No, I don't know.” 
20 “I don't know anything.” 
21 “I am not sure.” 
22 “Computer virus.” 
23 “These are some kind of viruses.” 
24 “That it is common and people got affected.” 
25 “These are viruses that made by hackers.” 
26 “No.” 
27 “Nothing.” 
28 
“Virus programs, created by hackers, to manage or destroy remote computers, particularly bank 
computers.” 
29 “Tracks your use of computer.” 
31 “All of these are computer viruses which can send viruses from the senders to the computer users.” 
32 “Steal account detail and password.” 
33 “I don't know much. I just know those are attacking on Internet.” 
34 
“Spyware is the software that spy on our computers. Adware appears like some advertisements and 
pass virus into the computer.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Discussion about malicious threats (I3) 
35 “Often comes with the free software downloads. Can affect PCs performance.” 
36 
“Spyware is a type of malware that is installed on computers and collects little bits of information 
at a time about users without their knowledge. Trojan is a non-self-replicating malware that appears 
to perform a desirable function to user.” 
37 “It's kind of terrible viruses.” 
38 “If you visit unsafe network. It may have the spyware that will damage your online account.” 
40 “They protect the data on my computer.” 
41 “Nothing.” 
42 “No, I don't know.” 
44 “Virus or mini-programs that track and record online activity.” 
45 “I'm not sure but have heard of them.” 
46 “These programs collect personal information for unauthorised used.” 
47 “Only that they are threats.” 
48 
“There are codes attached to e-mails & websites that can infiltrate your computer system when you 
activate an e-mail or enter a website. They can then be used to get into your personal files & e-mail 
accounts.” 
49 “I don't know.” 
50 
“I know that spyware and adware are the program for detecting virus and Trojans, are the most 
serious virus that is difficult to clean it.” 
51 
“Spyware records keystrokes and tells what sites you've visited, etc. Adware causes popups to 
appear on your desktop, spamming etc. Trojans are viruses and other programs that get into your 
computer attached to other programs, files or e-mails.” 
52 
“Is that means if we receive an unnamable website from MSN for example, and we click that, we 
might be hacked by hackers.” 
53 “Nothing.” 
54 
“I know that you can get software to protect you from these things. It is an important piece of 
software to install on your computer if you plan on using the Internet. Otherwise people can access 
information that you have recently submitted or viewed on your computer.” 
55 
“They are one the example threats on the online network. Many approaches are used by these 
things to warn the information on our company. For example, damaging the information on storage, 
thieving our secure information from our computer, monitoring our activity during using computer. 
By these activities, our information is in a great danger if we do not have any method to encounter 
them.” 
56 “I've heard of it but not sure what it is.” 
57 
“They can drop keyloggers into your system and monitor data entry such as card details, account 
logins etc., save the results and periodically e-mail them using their own hidden SMTP or pop 
client.” 
58 
“What I know is Trojan which is a kind of virus or spyware which may let somebody else know my 
password.” 
59 “Yes, but not related to online banking.” 
60 “Trojan is malicious software. Spyware is virus. Adware is uninvited advertising.” 
61 
“Spyware is software that gleans information from a personal computer without the user's 
knowledge. Adware is advertising supported software. Trojans are malware posing as legitimate 
programs in order to introduce Spyware or other malicious software to your (personal) computer.” 
62 “Never heard of the terminology.” 
64 “No, I don't know anything about that.” 
65 “No opinion” 
66 “Just know they want to use them to collect our password and send it to another destination.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Discussion about malicious threats (I3) 
67 “Viruses software and malware can damage files, steal data, password and connect to botnets.” 
68 
“Software that steals information; displays ads or otherwise compromises a computer. Often hidden 
in an apparently legitimate program.” 
69 “I know a little from students’ works.” 
70 
“It comes via computer attachments and follows computer use - Websites visited, watches banking 
passwords etc.” 
71 “Nothing.” 
72 
“Spyware sends information back to someone about your computer use. Adware is advertising you 
didn't request. A Trojan is usually something you download or accept onto your computer which 
when activated allows hackers access to your computer or information.” 
73 “Able to copy information and send on to alien party.” 
74 
“Spyware and adware are security protection software and Trojans are a mean for hackers to gain 
access to PC/laptop.” 
75 “They are computer programs which harms.” 
77 
“My anti-virus always warns those three items. For safety, I never install those which were warned. 
Adware is annoying. Trojans appears frequently although most of times it's because the anti-virus is 
too sensitive.” 
78 
“These can infect your computer. Spyware can send out information to another person (Hacker) 
without the knowledge of the user. Adware uses a package which downloads adverts to your 
computer system. These can sometimes be classed as spyware. Trojans are malware which target a 
particular file allowing a hacker to enter your computer system.” 
79 “Software that downloads without your knowledge and looks for and records passwords.” 
80 
“They include some form of tracking device/ code which monitors users' input, revealing classified 
details to a third party.” 
81 “Programs designed to automatically steal a person’s private information.” 
82 
“Spyware - software, often unintentional installed, that silently collect user data. Adware- Also 
often unintentionally installed ads, banners, etc. on pc. Trojans- Pretend to be software you want, 
but give access to your pc to others.” 
83 “No.” 
84 
“These are set up to keep track of the Internet users online surfing. Once a pattern has been 
established. The Trojan operate then learn what sites the user should visit by installing popups.” 
85 “Yes.” 
86 “They usually alter, access, or delete your information and send back to the sender.” 
102 “Nothing.” 
140 “They are viruses that can mess-up the computer and also steal the information from the computer.” 
143 “No opinion” 
146 “When the computer is infected it will allow the hacker to gain access to your personal detail.” 
149 
“The Trojan program sends a bug to your PC and it can log in everything to the Trojan user. It thus 
makes the Trojan user capable of controlling the PC and extract data.” 
165 “I only know that they are bad things and you don't want them.” 
177 “Bugs in computer to relay your information/details to others.” 
178 “No opinion” 
180 
“They are different ways of classifying the way some malicious software work. Their purpose is the 
same though.” 
181 “Each has got their own way of working and illegally accessing user info.” 
188 “No idea.” 
189 
“Malicious computer programs that try to access users personal information and account details 
such as username passwords or there security questions.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Discussion about malicious threats (I3) 
191 “I'm not sure.” 
206 
“There are many kinds of these viruses working differently such as copy password, keyboard 
change etc.” 
209 
“Adware collects you information to sell to marketers, spyware collects information for hackers, 
and Trojan is a backdoor that can be used to obtain access over the computer.” 
 
Respondent’s 
ID Respondents’ opinions on how personal information can be stolen from the Internet (I4) 
1 “Characters, or cached by a search engine.” 
2 “No.” 
3 
“I have a general awareness of legislation like the Privacy Act 1986 or the Electronic Funds 
transfer Act19?? There may be illegal software available” 
4 “Fake login sites can collect user id, password, and credit card details.” 
5 “No.” 
6 “Only banking online credit card details.” 
7 “Yes. I'm shocked how easy it is.” 
9 “Not really.” 
10 “If a site is not secured, my personal details can be copied & my finances can be stolen.” 
11 “No” 
12 “Never disclose any personal information” 
13 “They are a variety of possibilities including phishing, hacking and identity theft.” 
14 “No” 
15 “Spyware, keylogger, and hacking.” 
16 “I'm not sure about how this can be done.” 
17 
“I do not know, but I think if we forget to log off our Internet bank website or if we tell our 
password to other third party then they can steal our personal information.” 
18 “Same people who is good at computer may use monitoring software to steal others information.” 
19 “I have heard related information, but I don't know more details.” 
20 “By cracking my "password".” 
21 “Hacker, e-mail by pretending bank office and weakness of bank system.” 
22 “Yes, PC damaged by computer virus.” 
23 “May be fake websites.” 
24 “Yes.” 
25 
“Yes, I know. Some hackers may hack online account of customers by stolen money from the 
Internet.” 
26 “Phishing.” 
27 “By tracing my password.” 
28 
“Personal information can be stolen by request private information behalf of bank (by mail or by 
phone call). Moreover, the duplicate of bank Internet page may be created by changing at least one 
letter in spelling. For example, "original address: zaiffaizenbank.com. Another forge address: 
zeiffaizenbank.com > created for stealing information.” 
29 “By spyware and Trojans.” 
31 
“Yes, as example, you get caught from some websites; the hacker can get your personal 
information by attacking the website.” 
32 “No opinion” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Respondents’ opinions on how personal information can be stolen from the Internet (I4) 
33 “Website, for example, Facebook or others which are used by many people.” 
34 “It can be stolen through the virus programs which enters the computer without permission.” 
35 “Keystroke logger or Trojans.” 
36 
“Yes. If you click some strange links from website, and activate Trojan, then your password and 
account will send to other people automatically.” 
37 “No.” 
38 “Yes, I do. I think the Internet is not very safe that everyone can find information about you.” 
39 “Some people can use computer to steal my pin number such as e-mail information.” 
40 “Yes, from hacker using a virus.” 
41 “I'm not sure.” 
42 “Someone invades your computer and gets the information.” 
44 “No.” 
45 “Not really, it just a brief idea of clicking on fake e-mails from ‘banks’.” 
46 “Spyware, dodgy online shopping sites, ‘FREE’ websites etc. Also, hacking your account etc.” 
47 
“Yes, through cookies. When you sign up to social networking sites such as Facebook, you may 
agree without your knowledge to give out your personal information.” 
48 
“Yes, with social networking & aggregated software using mobile technologies, personal 
information can be sourced from multiple sites including printed sources such as the phone book.” 
49 “I don't know.” 
50 
“Yes, my personal information can be stolen in case of using some network such as Hi5 & 
Facebook.” 
51 “Recording my keystrokes, going to phishing sites and inputting my info here.” 
52 “If we provide our account and password to others??” 
53 
“I know that apparently people can access your account through "stolen" debit card and credit card 
numbers, which can sometimes be lifted when making a purchase at stores or when using credit 
cards for online purchases.” 
54 
“I don't know a great deal that I would be able to explain. I have been taught a set of rules to follow 
to protect personal information over the Internet. These are: 1 I will not use internet banking in an 
internet cafe. (This is probably not necessary, but makes me feel safer.) 2. I change my passwords 
for banking etc. regularly. And I try to make the passwords complicated. 3. I also set my age at 13 
when setting up a Hotmail account as this helps me avoid spam mail.” 
55 “Yes.” 
56 “No, but I'm aware it can be done.” 
57 “Yes.” 
58 
“My personal information can be stolen by spyware, and some adware or website, which always 
required me to type a lot of information to become a member.” 
59 “I only know if you respond to any e-mails/ calls as mentioned.” 
60 “False e-mails can be sent.” 
62 “No.” 
64 “Yes, I know there is an object can be installed to steal information.” 
65 “No opinion” 
66 “Through Trojans and viruses.” 
67 
“Data can be sent using common protocols, crosssite scripting, buffer exploits, worms, counterfeit 
websites.” 
68 
“Yes, through phishing, key loggers, on a website, theft of a database, hacking into a user account 
etc.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Respondents’ opinions on how personal information can be stolen from the Internet (I4) 
69 “No opinion” 
70 “Hacking may be able to view my computer screen. Phish for my login information.” 
71 “No.” 
72 “Phishing, key loggers, hacking.” 
73 “No opinion” 
74 “Not really. I do not have a number of security protection software in a place though.” 
75 “No idea.” 
77 “As mentioned above. Attack website.” 
78 
“Yes. Personal information can be taken from other websites such as Facebook. By a user not using 
a secure site and placing credit cards details or personal details on these websites.” 
79 
“Most communications are non-encrypted on the net. So you need to be careful about that data you 
use and when you use data the site must be encrypted or secure. Even that the hackers seem to be 
just as quick to circumvent these systems. I attempt to minimise my risk the best I can.” 
80 
“If personal info have been entered to an untrusted site, and downloaded files and corrupted contain 
with virus, these information can be revealed. What is your opinion about using a combination of 
numbers and both upper and lower case characters can help you from an online banking scam?  
They make it slightly harder for those who have seen the password to guess. The combination 
makes the password harder to read in a quick glance.” 
81 “Through phishing, spyware, Trojans, and keyboard tracking.” 
82 “Through spyware, Trojan, and phishing.” 
83 “No opinion” 
84 “Via misdirected e-mails and attractive looking survey asking the consumer about their details.” 
85 “Yes.” 
86 “No opinion” 
102 “Giving your password.” 
107 “Computer in the banking system is not always foolproof. I work in a bank for a number of years.” 
140 “Not having anti-virus, anti-spyware software installed. Using public access Internet.” 
143 “No.” 
149 “I've heard but unsure on how it works.” 
165 
“Once you put something on the Internet, it can never be taken down again. Generally personal info 
is given away by social networking sites.” 
177 “Yes, as above. Bugs in computer to relay your information/details to others.” 
178 “No opinion” 
180 “Either directly or by attacking organisations, that does have information of me.” 
188 “No.” 
189 
“Yes, Internet is full of such malicious programs and links and fraud people who always attempt to 
persuade users to click links that install Trojans, spyware to steal user information.” 
191 “Yes, it can be used for illegal purposes.” 
206 “Yes.” 
209 “A little bit, Facebook, cookies, spyware, fake websites etc.” 
 
Respondent’s 
ID 
Using a combination of letters and numbers in passwords can protect an online banking 
account  (I5) 
1 “Good idea” 
2 “It has to be more secure than straight out 'Words'.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Using a combination of letters and numbers in passwords can protect an online banking 
account  (I5) 
3 “I do not know.” 
4 “They can definitely help but can be hard to remember.” 
5 “The more complex the pw the more difficult to ‘break the code’.” 
6 “Too confusing.” 
7 “I think computer security is more important.” 
8 “Yes, more combination than only number.” 
9 “Good idea.” 
10 
“I have no problem using this combination (or any for that matter) if it ensures security to my 
income/ investments.” 
11 “Great.” 
12 “Good idea.” 
13 
“Online banking scam, phishing, captured all information entered by the user in a fake webpage. 
So, confusing password may protect from other fraudulence; however, will have less effect for 
phishing.” 
14 “Secure as long as you change on a regular basis.” 
15 “Yes, it can but not 100%, it makes it difficult for bad guys.” 
16 “I don't know.” 
17 “Not really, because scammers are really clever. They can find out combination of numbers easily.” 
18 “The numbers are not often used by you.” 
19 “That would be ok.” 
20 “That's good.” 
21 “It's quite easy and safe.” 
22 “Yes, the more number, the difficult for other people crack.” 
23 
“Yes, this can help to protect your account because nobody knows what you have used in your 
password.” 
24 “It is a start but not enough.” 
25 “I agree with this idea. It should be combination of numbers and characters and symbols.” 
26 “More secure.” 
27 “I don't think so.” 
28 “It makes my security code (password) safer; however, it is not perfect anyway.” 
29 “Good idea but hard to remember.” 
30 “Very good idea if you can remember them without writing them somewhere.” 
31 “If it is useful, I will pay for it.” 
32 “No opinion” 
33 “I agree because that would be hard to guess by others.” 
34 “It will help a bit” 
35 “Probably not.” 
36 
“Yes, it will improve your quality of your password in which no one can easily work out your 
password.” 
38 “It is not very useful.” 
40 “Good idea.” 
41 “No idea.” 
42 “It is difficult to steal.” 
44 “I think it is better and will protect you more than simple passwords.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Using a combination of letters and numbers in passwords can protect an online banking 
account  (I5) 
45 “I think it would be harder to trace.” 
46 
“Password with a random capital letter is more secure than a capitaliser first letter i.e. ‘Password’ is 
not secured, but "paSswoRD" is more secure.” 
47 
“Using this combination will make your password harder to get, and thus it is an effective way if 
securing your information.” 
48 
“Good use of passwords with regular changes is a simple way to provide security for your banking; 
provided you do not give this information out to keep is private (secured) form.” 
49 “Alphabetically and number” 
50 “I think it may help but it is complicated to do and to recognise it.” 
51 
“So many passwords are difficult to remember, putting those restrictions makes it more likely 
people will forget, I think, causing more admin troubles.” 
52 “Not that easy to figure out by others, it's good, and I use this method as well.” 
53 
“I understand that using a combination, including numbers, symbols etc. are more difficult to hack. 
I have seen on some sites when you are making a password that is a gauge or monitor that indicates 
how "secure" your password is.” 
54 
“I think anything that can help to protect me from this sort of things is worthwhile, but I might have 
a bit of difficulty remembering which letters been upper case and which were not.” 
55 
“It is quite secure in one step. However, this approach is not enough to prevent the banking scam. 
In my prospect, the out of bandwidth method should be considered to use to prevent me and other 
people from this thing.” 
56 “I'm aware that this is considered a "strong" type of password.” 
57 
“It may prevent brute force and dictionary attacks, but is no use against keylogging - in fact, 
random keystrokes may be picked up as passwords from keylogger records because they are not 
words.” 
58 
“When the password is complicated, it means more difficult for someone to steal your 
information.” 
59 “I don't know.” 
60 “Yes, best to use a password that cannot be guessed easily.” 
61 “I don't know if it helps, but I use combinations of letters, numbers and lower case.” 
62 “No opinion.” 
63 “Anyways that will make my account secure is ideal for me.” 
64 
“Yes, but it might be more difficult to remember. Yes, I do. Most people chose the number as it 
easy to remember.” 
65 “It is good plus some special characters would be good, but I still don't trust Internet.” 
66 “That would be difficult for the hackers to guess.” 
67 “From a scam - unlucky, but it can protect you from brute force attempts to guess your password.” 
68 “They would form a slightly stronger password that would take longer to brute force attack.” 
69 “Apparently the more complex the string, the harder it is to crack.” 
70 “The more variety in the password, the better.” 
71 
“The more difficult the password, with the combination, less chance of the online account being 
accessed by the other users.” 
72 “It's a stronger password but difficult to remember.” 
73 “Not needed yet.” 
74 “I use this method. It seems to work.” 
75 “I think so.” 
77 “It doesn't work because no matter which case, it is word processing. Besides, it's easy to forget.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Using a combination of letters and numbers in passwords can protect an online banking 
account  (I5) 
78 
“It makes it harder for someone shoulders surfing to guess the combination. It will make online 
banking scams harder. The problem with this is that it can make it harder for someone to remember 
the password, or if they have more than one password, and they may write it down.” 
79 
“I think I believe that this makes a stronger password but would not in itself completely protect 
anyone. For example, if you gave your password to someone it would not matter what it was.” 
80 
“They make it slightly harder for those who have seen the password to guess. The combination 
makes the password harder to read in a quick glance.” 
81 “I'm advised that it is helpful.” 
82 “Not sure it actually adds much security though.” 
83 “I've heard of it and I'm currently doing so but I don't think that will help very much.” 
84 “It is one of the better ways to avoid a computer program getting your password.” 
85 “Both upper and lower case characters make the combination harder to hack.” 
86 “I agree to do so.” 
102 “It's a good idea.” 
106 “No, make it is too difficult.” 
107 “Helps to prevent banking.” 
140 
“Nope, just makes the probability of finding the password harder and longer for the thief, but they 
can still figure out.” 
143 “Yes.” 
146 “It may be secured.” 
149 “Yes, enhance security.” 
165 “No. They can still take things from the Internet.” 
177 “Anything that can make it harder for others to hack into your information.” 
178 “Good Security.” 
180 “Yes, otherwise if they use dictionary attacks.” 
181 “Yes, increase the password security.” 
182 “Yes, it is harder to crack.” 
183 “It is hard to know the password number.” 
188 
“I think it would but not sure how long it would take before I get used to the combinations 
especially if I have to change it every 3 months.” 
189 “There should be special characters also included in passwords” 
191 “More secure.” 
194 “Good protection.” 
196 
“I am not sure if the combination could protect me from an online banking scam. But I think that 
kind of mixture will be more secure than numbers.” 
200 “I guess it will be safer.” 
206 “Good.” 
207 “It would help.” 
208 “It would help but not 100%.” 
209 
“Probably more secure as it means more combinations if someone is going to try a brute force 
attempt. Although won't protect against a phishing scam.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Respondents’ opinions about using date of birth or phone number as a password is insecure 
(I6) 
1 “Yes, if the information is available to the public (Facebook, Govt. births/deaths databases etc.)” 
2 “Yes.” 
3 
“It maybe if used in conjunction with other knowledge such as hard drive number, telephone 
number, ISP, Domain name.” 
4 “Very insecure.” 
5 “Yes.” 
6 “Yes.” 
7 “Yes.” 
8 “Not secure enough.” 
9 “Yes.” 
10 “To some extent -yes.” 
11 “Yes.” 
12 “Yes.” 
13 
“I would like to mention an incident which had happened a year ago in Australia. A lady lost her 
purse in which she had bank cards and delivering license too. A person who found the purse stole 
some amount from her account since she had her birth year as a password. So, in my opinion it is 
totally insecure.” 
14 “Would agree.” 
15 “Yes, anything that can be predicted will not be fairly secured.” 
16 “Yes, probably.” 
17 
“Yes, because if you lose your purse, it may have your photo id (student card) where it may have 
your date of birth or phone number which scammers will use this number first.” 
18 “Absolutely yes.” 
19 “No.” 
20 “No.” 
21 “Yes, it shouldn't be personal details.” 
22 “Yes, it is easy to guess.” 
23 “Yes, it is insecure because people such as friends and family can easily guess these details.” 
24 “Date of birth + social security number is a start of phone number, I don't know.” 
25 
“Yes, I think that a password using my personal detail should not be from date of birth or phone 
number. It must create with symbols or numbers mixed together.” 
26 “Yes, too simple and easy to get.” 
27 “Yes.” 
28 “It is less secure than other combinations without personal information.” 
29 “Insecure.” 
30 “Yes, very insecure.” 
31 “No. If you use your birthday or phone number as your password, the hacker can easily guess it.” 
32 “Yes, it should be more difficult things.” 
33 “Yes.” 
34 “Yes.” 
35 “Easily discovered.” 
36 
“Yes, maybe you lost your wallet which contained ID and bank card. If your password is your date 
of birth, it will be easy to work out.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Respondents’ opinions about using date of birth or phone number as a password is insecure 
(I6) 
37 “Yes.” 
38 “Maybe it is insecure.” 
39 “I don't think it is safety.” 
40 “Yes, too common.” 
41 “No.” 
42 “I don't think is secure. Someone can still change it.” 
44 “Very insecure.” 
45 “Yes.” 
46 “Well that is just silly.” 
47 “Yes, because that is the first thing hackers will use to and access your account.” 
48 
“Yes, too many people already have access to this information and can then determine your 
password by trial and enter.” 
49 “Yes.” 
50 
“Yes, some companies usually record personal information online when lead somebody can get it 
easily.” 
51 “Yes.” 
52 “Of course, it is easy to guess and that information is known by many people.” 
53 “Yes.” 
54 
“I do agree. I tend to make my passwords as abstracted as possible and I try not to take them from 
my personal details such as address etc. Instead I may use my favourite brand of lollypop and the 
price (example allensredfrogs312).” 
55 “Yes, this is because it is easy to guess.” 
56 
“Yes, it would be inadvisable to use this type of number as a password - too easily discovered & 
used fraudulently.” 
57 “Yes. This data is available easily from the phone book or from public records.” 
58 “Yeah- it is very easy for someone to guess.” 
59 “You are always advised not to use this type of information and I would "not" be happy to do so.” 
60 “Yes.” 
61 “Yes, I think if it is predictable, it is less than 100% secure.” 
62 “Yes.” 
63 “Yes.” 
64 “I agree with that, but it is hard to remember.” 
65 “Definitely.” 
66 “Yes, I think so.” 
67 “Yes.” 
68 “Yes, if the attacker has that information they could use it to attack.” 
69 “Yes.” 
70 “Very easily guessed, it needs to be more obscure and something no one easily guessed.” 
71 “Yes, definitely!” 
72 “Yes, because that information can be obtained with relative ease.” 
73 “Yes.” 
74 “Yes, I do.” 
75 “I think so that is why in bank do not recommend that sorts of password.” 
77 “Depends. It is only insecure when you lost your ID or phone. Or you are betrayed by your friend.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Respondents’ opinions about using date of birth or phone number as a password is insecure 
(I6) 
78 “Yes. These are too easy to guess.” 
79 “Yes.” 
80 “Yes. Date of birth is known to everyone, especially so with Facebook birthday reminders.” 
81 “Yes.” 
82 “Yes.” 
83 “Yes, especially for people like me.” 
84 
“Yes, it's well known that quite a few people do use this D.O.B. as the system and it would be a 
simple case of the scammer locating the consumer phone bill or driver license.” 
85 “Yes.” 
86 “Yes, to a certain point.” 
102 “No.” 
106 “No.” 
107 “Yes.” 
111 “Yes.” 
128 
“I think for short term or temporary then that would be ok. It may be dangerous for long term to use 
though.” 
140 “Yes, that's the first they try.” 
143 “No.” 
146 “Yes.” 
149 “Yes, our ID is easy to get from passport, driver license, etc.” 
165 “Yes, it's too obvious; you could say something from another language or something.” 
177 “Yes.” 
178 “Yes.” 
180 “Yes.” 
181 “Yes.” 
182 “No.” 
187 “Of course not.” 
188 “Yes.” 
189 “Yes it is obviously insecure.” 
191 “No.” 
194 “Yes.” 
196 “Not at all.” 
200 “No. I don't think so.” 
206 “Yes.” 
207 “Yes.” 
208 “Definitely not.” 
209 “Definitely.” 
 
 
Respondent’s 
ID 
Discussion about opinions if changing password every 3-6 months can protect their online 
banking account from phishing (I7) 
1 “No, changing passwords will only help against brute force or dictionary attack.” 
2 “Whilst it may be secure, every 6 months is OK.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Discussion about opinions if changing password every 3-6 months can protect their online 
banking account from phishing (I7) 
3 
“Do not know how effective this strategy is because I do not know what other strategies maybe 
employed to protect privacy.” 
4 “I think it is a good practice.” 
5 “No.” 
6 “I prefer to stick to one otherwise I'd be confused” 
7 “I agree it can help but too hard to keep remembering what the pin number is at present.” 
8 “Good to change every 3-6 months, but you must remember.” 
9 
“Changing passwords every 3-6 months can protect online banking-this will make it harder for 
everyone to keep track on password or anyone that has been monitoring your password.” 
10 
“Because it prevents repetition & reduces the 'illness' of someone obtaining my password 
/information.” 
11 “Yes. That would be great but what happen if you forget? But I believe it a great idea.” 
12  true.” 
13 
“As I mentioned earlier, phisher could have every details of what have been provided in fake 
webpage. So, here again it may help for other kind of fraudulence activities.” 
14 “No” 
15 “Yes, unless the hacking techniques get developed faster than 3-6 changing password technique.” 
16 “I don't think it would really help.” 
17 
“I do not think so because I have been to Australia more than one and a half year. I have got same 
password and my money hasn't been stolen. If we are careless and tell our private things to 
everyone, then scammers can hack out bank account.” 
18 “I don't think so.” 
19 “The bank should do more jobs for security not customer.” 
20 “Yes, I agree with that and 3 months is better.” 
21 “I don't think it is the best solution for security.” 
22 “That's not useful.” 
23 “Passwords should change were often instead of 3-6 months.” 
24 “Not enough security.” 
25 “It is a good idea for support and protect my online account.” 
26 “Good to protect personal ID.” 
27 “No, I don't think so.” 
28 “It may help, but it is not a universal measure.” 
29 “I'm not sure. That’s not frequent. Maybe it should be every week or day but that's not practical.” 
30 
“Misleading- regular changes can offer more security but it must not be over stated. Change 
depends on nature of phishing method.” 
31 “I didn't think it is useful because the hacker can get your code once, he also can get you twice.” 
32 “If they can get my password once, I change it everyday they still can get it.” 
33 “I think so. It is not best way, but still good idea.” 
34 “May be.” 
35 “Probably not if some hacker decides you're gonna be the next victim.” 
36 
“Any opinions can be divided into two parts. On one hand, it will be good for your right to protect 
your bank account. On the other hand, it will make yourself confused sometimes i.e. forget 
password.” 
37 
“Actually, I cannot rely on changing password regularly can protect my online banking account 
from phishing at all.” 
38 “It can protect your account more safely.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Discussion about opinions if changing password every 3-6 months can protect their online 
banking account from phishing (I7) 
40 “Good idea for protection.” 
41 “Good it protects well.” 
44 “Not very good. It should be changed every month at least.” 
45 “I think it is a good practice to change password regularly to avoid any phishing.” 
46 “You should change your password more often than that.” 
47 
“This makes sense because changing your password often is a good method for preventing your 
information being accessed without permission.” 
48 
“Only up to a point. Hackers can gain access to your computer files if you operate and open 
wireless system.” 
49 “As, this method is totally secure and safe.” 
50 “I think it is an alternative way to prevent somebody to find out password easily.” 
51 “It makes sense, but as above, so many passwords to remember make it hard to remember.” 
52 “Err~ it is trouble, but I think this might help, so I will do this if it is required.” 
53 
“Changing passwords every 3-6 months can protect your online banking account from phishing 
because it will be more difficult to hack or access. Using the same password gives more 
opportunities for it to be used by an illegitimate source.” 
54 
“I would change my password more frequently than 3-6 months, but I agree that more people 
should change their password more frequently.” 
55 
“In my view, it is not enough to prevent from this phishing. As I stand above, the out of bandwidth 
communication is the best way to prevent the phishing.” 
56 “I agree with it and I do it!” 
57 
“Probably, but it's too hard to change and remember your password every three months. I think 
biometrics is safer, or two part encryption system.” 
58 
“Yeah, it helps maybe, but it is also trouble for users!! It is difficult to remember the changing 
password.” 
59 “If the bank asks a change every 3-6months, it must be necessary and I would comply.” 
60 “It would help to prevent phishing but not necessarily prevent it.” 
61 
“I think it should be (almost) compulsory to change regularly, but I don't know if it will help if you 
have already been targeted.” 
62 “I don't know what phishing is; therefore, no opinion.” 
63 “Good.” 
64 “I agree with that, but it's hard to remember.” 
65 
“It is definitely a hassle for us to think of a new decent password although I don't know changing 
will help security.” 
66 “I think it is not really necessary.” 
67 “This would have no effect on phishing.” 
68 
“I disagree. No matter how often you change your password, if you give it away in a phishing 
attack you are in trouble.” 
69 “I would expect that you would need to change more often.” 
70 “It helps, but it is not enough- need more measures and more often changed.” 
71 
“I think that regularly changing your password is a great deterrent to having an online account 
phished.” 
72 
“That presupposes that the account has been hacked and if so then changing the password is helpful 
but by then the damage is done.” 
73 
“I believe it but do not want hassle of recording and memorising new passwords (fear of loss of 
access).” 
74 “I haven't had problem with phishing so I don't know if this works.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Discussion about opinions if changing password every 3-6 months can protect their online 
banking account from phishing (I7) 
75 “I don't know.” 
76 Did not answer 
77 “At some level, it does. But it would not always work. And finally you may run out of your pin.” 
78 
“It does not protect you from phishing but changing your password on a regular basis keeps it more 
secure.” 
79 
“No. Phishing involves you being tricked into giving your details. Make no different if you change 
it.” 
80 
“Changing details often make it harder for hackers to track and trace the banking password. Thus 
this can reduce Internet scamming, though online by small extend.” 
81 
“I disagree as phishing is an attempt by malicious parties to get someone to willingly offer up their 
details.” 
82 
“Only if you're not found into it by a phishing site. Wouldn't really help unless you change it right 
after the information is phished, but still good practice.” 
83 “I think it's troublesome and I'm very forgetful that is extra work for me.” 
84 
“People should be encouraged to change their password often as human nature makes us lazy and 
we start repeating the same password everywhere.” 
85 “Changing password every 3-6 months is good and harder to trace.” 
86 “No opinion” 
102 “It's a good idea but hard to remember.” 
106 “Good idea.” 
107 “Prefer to change password without bank notification ‘prompt’.” 
128 “While that is a good suggestion I think I would find it impractical.” 
140 
“I don't think so unless someone is targeting specifically on you and need time and tries to get the 
code.” 
143 “I don't know.” 
146 “It is quite practical but it is an inconvenience.” 
149 “Make it more secure but troublesome.” 
165 “Even if you keep changing it, if they want to get in they will.” 
177 “Yes, it's a good idea to change password.” 
178 “No, cannot.” 
180 “It's wrong. It can increase the protection but doesn't protect it.” 
181 
“Changing user's password regularly would reduce the exposure to online threats such as 
'phishing'.” 
186 “It could be changed more often.” 
187 “It is somehow safe.” 
188 “I think it will.” 
189 “Not necessarily, user should be aware of viruses and phishing scams.” 
191 “Too long, not efficient.” 
194 “It's confusing to keep changing passwords.” 
196 “Good.” 
200 “Yes.” 
206 “That is a security way to do protect the password.” 
207 “It would help.” 
208 
“In my opinion, changing password every 3-6 months is not enough to protect your online baking 
account from phishing. The best way is using security token every time when you log in to your 
online banking account.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Discussion about opinions if changing password every 3-6 months can protect their online 
banking account from phishing (I7) 
209 “If your details were captured then you may have a chance to change them before they are used.” 
Respondent’s  
ID 
Respondents’ experiences in receiving an email from a bank and asking respondents for 
confidential information (I8) 
1 “No.” 
2 “No.” 
3 
“I cannot remember but I do think that encryption is the best answer for any electronic 
correspondence containing highly sensitive information.” 
4 “Yes, I deleted it.” 
5 “No.” 
6 “No, never happened before.” 
7 “Yes. Ignored it.” 
8 “Call bank. Check if information requested is correct.” 
9 “Yes. Did nothing, I know that was a scam.” 
10 “No.” 
11 “No, I have not” 
12 “No.” 
13 
“Not yet. Even if they ask to provide via e-mail I will not provide, rather I walk in to the closest 
bank branch to enquire about the information.” 
14 “If the e-mail has asked for information, it is a scam.” 
15 “I receive a lot of fake e-mails but I never respond.” 
16 “No.” 
17 “No, they have never sent me an e-mail.” 
18 “I have never received.” 
19 “No I haven't.” 
20 “No, I haven't received.” 
21 “Yes, I ignore them.” 
22 “No, I've never received that mail.” 
23 “No, I have not received this kind of e-mail.” 
24 “No.” 
25 “No, I haven't.” 
26 “No.” 
27 “No.” 
28 “Never.” 
29 “Not a real one. I guessed it was faked and I deleted it.” 
30 “Yes, delete it.” 
31 “Yes, I just did as the bank told me.” 
32 “No.” 
33 “Never.” 
34 “Never.” 
35 “No.” 
36 “No. if it occurs, I will check whether it reliable or not.” 
37 
“Yes. I've received an e-mail from stranger similar to ANZ e-mail to provide him my personal 
detail. I called my bank and inform them.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Discussion about opinions if changing password every 3-6 months can protect their online 
banking account from phishing (I7) 
38 “No.” 
40 “No.” 
41 “Yes, I just leave it.” 
42 “No, I haven't.” 
44 “No, I haven't.” 
45 “Yes. Delete!” 
46 “Only the manager at the bank of Nigeria. I just deleted this e-mail.” 
47 “No, if I did I would just delete it.” 
48 
“Yes, sent a copy of the message to IT central. Thus a frequent occurrence also sent copies to the 
bank concerned after finding their contact details on the official website.” 
49 “When I change my details online after that usually I am getting e-mail from bank.” 
50 “Never.” 
51 
“Yes, I assume it was unreal. The first few times I tried to contact the bank, but bank purposely use 
their websites to make communication harder, not easier, so I have up trying and just delete.” 
52 “No.” 
53 “No.” 
54 
“I received an e-mail that I had won a lottery. They wanted my details. They did not ask for bank 
details. But it was obviously a fake lottery so I didn't respond. I received another e-mail when I was 
job hunting saying that someone was interested to set up an interview with me, but first they needed 
to confirm some of my information. So I looked up the information on their e-mail signature and 
when I couldn't locate the company I didn't provide the details. I would never provide details to 
someone I didn't know over the Internet. If this was legitimate I would show identification at the 
interview as a way to verify my ID.” 
55 “No.” 
56 “No, never.” 
57 “No, but I have received a lot from phisher claiming to be banks.” 
58 “Never.” 
59 “Yes, I forwarded to the bank. Who responded?” 
60 
“Yes, Ignored it and deleted it. Banks emphasise that they do not send e-mails asking for 
confidential information.” 
61 “No.” 
62 “No.” 
63 “No.” 
64 “No, never.” 
65 “Nope.” 
66 “No.” 
67 “Yes, I delete it.” 
68 “Not rather an official e-mail.” 
69 “E-mails, usually, trying to capture passwords/ account details. Deleted it!” 
70 “Yes, reported it & deleted message.” 
71 “Yes. I have deleted most of them. Once I sent it through to the bank to let them know.” 
72 “Yes, I deleted the e-mail.” 
73 “No.” 
74 “Yes and I called them to verify.” 
75 “Thanks god, I have not.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Discussion about opinions if changing password every 3-6 months can protect their online 
banking account from phishing (I7) 
77 “No, their letter said they would never do this. It is happens, I will check the mail address first.” 
78 
“I have received e-mails from people pretending to be my bank and I just delete the e-mails. Once I 
did receive a number of e-mails over a few weeks asking for information and I contacted my Bank 
with the details of the e-mails.” 
79 
“Yes. At least weekly if not more. I deleted and move on with my life. My bank does not contact 
clients for security issues via e-mail.” 
80 
“Bank e-mails will not provide direct link to the login page. Somewhere in the content of genuine 
e-mail from bank will advise all users to log on a fresh page.” 
81 “No.” 
82 “No.” 
83 “No. If I did, I will call my bank personally to verify before providing the information required.” 
84 “No. but my first step if I was I would contact my bank immediately.” 
85 “My bank has never sent me any e-mail regarding confidential information.” 
86 “Yes, delete it.” 
102 “Yes, but refuse to give them.” 
106 “No.” 
107 “Yes, deleted e-mail.” 
111 “Never received any e-mail.” 
128 “Yes, I have. I took a screenshot of that e-mail, deleted the e-mail & contacted the bank.” 
140 
“Yes, confidential information only such as I forgot my access into the account but never 
password.” 
149 “No.” 
165 “No.” 
177 “No, I haven't.” 
178 “Yes, it was suspicious.” 
180 “No.” 
181 “Yes, ignored the e-mail. Reconfirmed with bank by calling or visiting them.” 
182 “Yes, disregard.” 
186 
“Nope, and I would do it if I received a mail like that. I would directly go the bank to confirm 
authenticity of that mail.” 
187 “No.” 
188 “No.” 
189 “No.” 
191 “No.” 
194 “Never.” 
196 “No.” 
200 “No. I haven't.” 
206 “No.” 
207 “No.” 
208 “No.” 
209 “No.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Discussion about ways to determine a legitimate email (I9) 
1 “Little information identifying me, "Gut feeling", asking for passwords in an e-mail.” 
2 
“I do not receive e-mails from the bank; in the event that I did I would go to the bank with a copy 
and discuss its contents with them.” 
3 
“Again if uncertain about the validity of the origins of the e-mail and its author check with your ISP 
and the ASIC website. Generally anything that is received that I maybe unsure about I delete. If the 
e-mail looks like it is genuine and it contains enough information for me to believe that it is 
genuine, but is not, then the problem maybe deeper than just a 'scam'. It maybe from someone who 
knows more about you and your personal information than just your e-mail address.” 
4 “I ignore all e-mails from financial institutions.” 
5 
“I was under the impression that banks don't e-mail their clients. Any communication is sent by 
postal delivery.” 
6 “Usually get warned beforehand from a friend.” 
7 “Usually, because they don't want a reply it just a statement or receipt of a payment them mobile.” 
8 “E-mail address is mutually enclosure to that branch.” 
9 
“My bank has advised us that any requests from them will first come by mail. Never will it be done 
only by e-mail.” 
10 “I never receive e-mails from my bank.” 
11 “I would discard the e-mail & contact the bank.” 
12 “Bank would never ask for personal information on e-mail.” 
13 
“Few things that I consider are: 1. Bank Logo 2. Font style and size 3. Type of information asked 4. 
Usual/ unusual from regular page 5. Contact details of sender is provided or not.” 
14 “If the e-mail asks for information, it is a scam.” 
15 “Banks never ask for personal information.” 
16 “I don't respond to any.” 
17 
“If you are not sure whether that e-mail is from bank or not, it's better to go and ask them or call 
them.” 
18 “It's hard to determine.” 
19 “No opinion” 
20 “It is difficult so I don't trust filling document via e-mail.” 
21 “E-mail address is not from the bank office.” 
22 “Check the e-mail address.” 
23 “I am not sure because I never reply to any e-mail from bank.” 
24 
“Contact information, besides my bank never sends me e-mail except some advertisements. They 
always keep saying that I never should provide security issue over the Internet.” 
25 “I ask a question or tell or e-mail to my bank.” 
26 “From e-mail address and contact list.” 
28 “Banks "never" ask confidential information by mail.” 
29 “I'm not sure. Normally banks don't send an e-mail, so I assume it's a scam.” 
30 “I always assume a scam and take necessary measure/safeguards to deal with them.” 
31 “I will check the website or phone to the bank.” 
32 “Have the logo of the bank.” 
33 “Read e-mail or compare real site or delete without reading.” 
34 “Just by giving a reply and check the correct address.” 
35 “Only use 'secure mail' within account.” 
36 “I've no idea. Maybe just trust the anti-virus system.” 
 365 
 
Respondent’s 
ID Discussion about ways to determine a legitimate email (I9) 
37 “The end of the sender address was not .au, it was .us” 
38 “No, I can't think so. Some people could make the e-mails like the banks e-mail.” 
40 “Never received e-mail from bank.” 
41 “The same telephone number.” 
42 “Ignore it.” 
44 “Logo, ask me to see them personally at the bank. Never ask for personal information.” 
45 “I have accounts from the particular banks or by contracting them (the bank) first.” 
46 “I wouldn't respond directly through the e-mail but rather log onto the bank's website to confirm.” 
47 “1.Paper format, spelling/ grammar and logo. 2. Does not ask for personal information.” 
48 “I use one bank which clearly states they will NEVER ask for private information online.” 
49 “Bank logo, design, and the way it appears.” 
50 
“The topics of e-mail which indicate the name of the bank and make me know that is the e-mail 
from bank.” 
51 “They don't ask me to do anything like click a link, confirm info, etc.” 
52 
“If that's a bank statement of mine, or advertisement but no website, I think those are not e-mail 
scams.” 
53 
“I do not know but I have never responded to an e-mail that has requested personal information 
unless I know the source.” 
54 
“As I have my age on my e-mail account set as age 13 I do not receive advertising e-mails. So I 
have not encountered this issue. But I get message from my bank once I log into my Internet 
banking account. They very rarely get sent to my e-mail account. I bank with Westpac.” 
55 
“1. Checking the source very carefully. 2. Checking the purpose of the message. If it asks for 
providing confidential information, I try to do the out of bandwidth approach to keep my 
confidential information.” 
56 
“I never receive e-mails from my bank except to tell me my instatements are ready. I would be 
suspicious of anything else because my bank communicates with me through secure mail through 
the bank website.” 
57 
“My banks have a strict of e-mail policy- they have always said they would never send an e-mail 
asking for personal details or logons.” 
58 “From the e-mail address. Notice the details.” 
59 “My bank doesn't send any e-mails.” 
60 “Any e-mail sent by a bank, I will suspend it is a scam.” 
61 
“I have never received an e-mail from my bank, so I would phone the bank to validate any 
unsolicited e-mails.” 
62 “Never react one.” 
63 “Not received any.” 
64 “I don't open that mail, but choose to enter bank's website.” 
65 “I usually don't reply e-mail.” 
66 “Check their e-mail address first, which is their e-mail service provider.” 
67 
“You can never be certain; however my banks do not send any e-mail as policy. Therefore, all bank 
e-mails must be scams.” 
68 
“Look at the sender address. If this has been altered, e-mail clients often report it. Look for 
comments in the e-mail such as "do not reply to this e-mail", "type the URL www.bankname.com 
into your browser." etc.” 
69 
“Most of the banks say they would not use e-mail. Messages are from the site once you have logged 
in.” 
70 “Bank has said they will never ask for details that way.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Discussion about ways to determine a legitimate email (I9) 
71 “Our bank says they NEVER ask for account information by e-mail so we know it is a scam.” 
72 
“The scam often has spelling errors and the links have strange addresses but if they look good I 
ignore them.” 
73 “Caution.” 
74 “I verify with a bank with a call.” 
75 “I don't check e-mails from Internet banking.” 
77 “The part after '@'. There should be some information related to the bank, if it's from bank.” 
78 
“A bank will not ask for banking details such as your password in an e-mail so I treat all this type 
of e-mails as scam.” 
79 “I delete all e-mails from Banks. Generally this is not how my bank communicates with me.” 
80 “I base on the trust of the official bank website.” 
81 “I don't receive e-mails from my bank.” 
82 
“I never use link from bank e-mails. Apparently checking the line address for any links in the e-
mails is a giveaway. But safer to go directly to bank website in browser.” 
83 “I will call my bank to verify.” 
84 
“As well as making sun that they are not asking for my personal information. I have also introduced 
by bank that any e-mails need to include the address employee no. as well as their contact phone 
number.” 
85 “I do not trust any personal e-mail from the bank.” 
86 “No opinion” 
102 “Call the bank to verify.” 
106 “Code and lock Sign.” 
107 “I don't. I contact the bank via the phone in the next working day.” 
128 “I would wait until I can contact a bank's representative.” 
140 
“Really not sure but after all the Africa seems the approach is of it is too good to believe then forget 
it. Don't be greedy as nothing is free.” 
143 “Will not answer any e-mails from banks.” 
149 “I'm not sure. Looking at the e-mail address?” 
165 “Ignore all e-mails, and take to a bank in person.” 
177 “Ring your bank to confirm.” 
178 “If they ask for personal information they are usually scams.” 
180 
“I always throw them in the bin whether they are scams or not. If they have something to tell me, 
they can contact me directly.” 
181 “No idea how to determine if it's genuine or not!” 
182 “The domain.” 
187 “Read carefully.” 
188 “Don't know.” 
189 “I receive my e-mails inside online banking log on as well as my personal e-mail address.” 
191 “Not asking anything about your confidential details.” 
194 “Bank name and website” 
196 “I do not know as I had not received.” 
200 I don't know. 
207 “Within the secured webpage of the bank.” 
208 
“The bank that I'm a client usually does not send e-mails to client. So if I get one, read it carefully 
and phone the bank for more information.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Discussion about ways to determine a legitimate email (I9) 
209 “I always assume that they are a scam regardless.” 
 
Respondent’s 
ID Discussion about ways to distinguish a legitimate online banking website (I10) 
1 “URL” 
2 “By using the information given to me by the bank i.e. Netbank etc.” 
3 “Do not know.” 
4 “I type the URL of the official site.” 
5 “Have no idea.” 
6 “Gosh never thought about it must be too trusting.” 
7 “Unsure.” 
8 “Look at copyright.” 
9 “My husband set it up with bank.” 
10 “I have my banks webpage as my favourites.” 
11 “The secure icon.” 
12 “Not sure.” 
13 
“Few things that I consider are: 1. URL address- I do check every time, even though it is retired 
from cookies. 2. Appearance-Is the page looking same as previously when you did transaction? If 
not check URL one more time and type it manually.” 
14 “Never go through a link attached to an e-mail.” 
15 “Straight web address with [https://] before.” 
16 “I don't know.” 
17 “I don't know.” 
18 “I don't know.” 
19 “The correct address.” 
20 “I always know how much money I have from my balance.” 
21 “I'm not sure, maybe website address.” 
22 “Check the website address.” 
23 “I always put web address by myself.” 
24 “In order to log in I must use a digipass with algorithms.” 
25 “I don't distinguish.” 
26 “No idea.” 
28 “I used to check the spelling of webpage, when I enter to the bank website.” 
29 “I don't know.” 
30 “Access from 'favourites' generally but if not then I always check the address.” 
31 “In my own computers, there is software which can find out the computer virus and clear them.” 
32 “Check the website address.” 
33 “Compare webpage which I usually use.” 
34 “It is not easy actually, based on the experience only.” 
35 “Check web address.” 
36 “No idea. I just put the normal website address.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Discussion about ways to distinguish a legitimate online banking website (I10) 
38 
“My online banking is from ANZ, so I often visit the legitimate webpage which have the ANZ 
word.” 
40 “Not sure.” 
41 “Just go to the government web site to check.” 
44 “Address has web browser authenticity (show green tab bar for safe).” 
45 “Check its authority and URL.” 
46 “I always type the full address into my search bar. I don't use a bookmarked page.” 
47 “1. URL is secure https:// 2. Correct format, spelling and logo.” 
48 
“The online banking webpage can only be connected to from the official bank website. Takes a 
long time to go through security protocols.” 
49 “Sorry, no idea how.” 
50 “I am not sure. Normally, I use online banking as direct information form bank which is credible.” 
51 “I look at the URL.” 
52 “Use the official website and log in.” 
53 
“I have only accessed through my "Favourites" on my own computer. Plus, I have never had a 
problem with the site.” 
54 
“I wouldn't have any idea. I guess one way would be if it was a secured site. The colour of the 
background on the address bar turns green I think.” 
55 “1. Clicking URL very carefully. 2. Checking any eccentric on the interface in the website.” 
56 “I'm not sure I could.” 
57 “Spelling errors, grammar, logo quality, comparison to a known legitimate site.” 
58 
“If the webpage is a legitimate webpage, the address line will have a little lock there and also the 
background colour will change to yellow or something.” 
59 
“I do not save in Favourite as I have been advised that these can be corrupted. I don't know a way 
to ensure it is a legitimate site.” 
60 
“Can be difficult. Look for spelling errors and layout, interpret grammar. Sometimes a scam can 
have grammatical errors.” 
61 “I use Favourites, so it “should" open to the actual bank's site. Other than that I really don't know.” 
62 “The web address is saved in my favourite so I just log in.” 
63 “I cannot. Once I log on I assume it to be the legitimate site.” 
64 “I always check the homepage before I log in.” 
65 “Checking URL in the address bar. Plus, the SSL icon in the tray.” 
66 “Check the website address from the bank website.” 
67 “I check that true sites security certificate it signed by a reputable key authority.” 
68 “Look at the URL. Other things like spelling mistakes can be a giveaway.” 
69 “I don't think I would be able to tell.” 
70 “Never thought about it.” 
71 “I don't know. I presume it is the right one.” 
72 “I go there from my bookmark or type in the address myself. I never click on the links in e-mails.” 
73 “Content and context.” 
74 “I check the http and access the bank quite regularly so look for inconsistencies.” 
75 “No idea.” 
77 “Get into its homepage correctly, and then those webpage you get in by links are legitimate.” 
78 
“It can be difficult but there are some differences. Some of the layout will be different and the ads 
or wording may be different. I have not personally come across a counterfeit webpage. No.” 
 369 
 
Respondent’s 
ID Discussion about ways to distinguish a legitimate online banking website (I10) 
79 “I check the URL.” 
80 “No.” 
81 “It has a verification sign at this start of the address bar.” 
82 
“Navigate directly to it using proper/main address, e.g. ANZ.com. If the banks main site is being 
obverted, no idea.” 
83 “I can't really distinguish.” 
84 “By viewing what information is being requested from me.” 
85 “Always look for their logo and read the fine print.” 
86 “No opinion” 
106 “I'm not sure.” 
140 
“Sometimes the bank tells you. But one way to know is also that the sequence of process differs 
from the usual way I have been doing or accustom to.” 
143 “I don't know.” 
149 “It's the official website written on the address.” 
180 “Hard to tell but usually the address is a good start, where the link point is also good way to check.” 
181 
“Based on the explanation and security features explained to us by the Bank Officers during the 
process of applying for online banking account.” 
182 “URL.” 
187 “Not sure.” 
188 “The padlock that appears on the webpage.” 
189 “By looking at URL, secure web lock symbol, graphics and logos etc.” 
191 “Not asking anything about your confidential details.” 
194 “Web Address” 
196 “No. I don't know.” 
200 “I cannot distinguish.” 
207 “You go directly to the webpage of the bank.” 
208 “Contact information - Secure certificates.” 
209 “I load it from a saved link.” 
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No. Phishing bank account experienced (I11) 
The attacker was successful in 
obtaining anything from the 
account (I12) 
Use or attempt to use 
personal information for 
some other fraudulent 
purpose (I13) 
7 
Not sure. Credit card yes bank 
alerted us & cancelled 
transaction & used new card. 
No 
Yes, credit card in a place 
where never been to. 
17 
No, not mine. But twice with 
my sister's account had been 
attacked. We went to the bank 
and explained that we have not 
used credit card. It's 
unauthorised person. And bank 
investigated. 
Yes, he used her credit card twice. 
No, I don’t know how they 
got my sister's personal 
information. 
46 
Yes, I noticed a small 
transaction appearing on my 
credit card once a month. I 
called the bank and had my card 
replaced. 
Obviously, they had deducted $2-
$3 each time for about 2 months-
all ended up around $40. 
Not that the aware of. 
53 
Yes. I have only been contacted 
once because someone was 
trying to use my credit card in 
another province.  
The bank suspected it was fraud, 
they contacted me and I assured 
them the purchaser was not me. I 
then immediately cancelled the 
credit card and received a new 
one. 
No. 
69 
Yes, the bank's fraud division 
told me that someone from New 
York was using my visa for 
shopping. 
I didn't see anything on the 
statements but they had 
apparently made secure 
purchases. 
Not as far as I know. 
84 
Yes. I periodically view my 
banking details. I once noticed 
that only I cent or 2 cents had 
been deducted from my account. 
I immediately contacted my 
bank to prior these. 
Yes, as above.  I cent or 2 cents 
had been deducted from my 
account. 
Not via banking; however, 
did have license plates 
stolen from my car which 
was then used on another 
car without the police 
checking their own details. 
IT was claimed to be my 
car which meant they felt I 
was liable for the costs. 
101 
Not sure. I had only one of my 
blogs hacked and a phishing site 
was installed. Westpac called 
me and I changed my password 
and deleted the phishing 
directories. 
Not sure. I had only one of my 
blogs hacked and a phishing site 
was installed. Westpac called me 
and I changed my password and 
deleted the phishing directories. 
No answer 
178 
Yes, my NAB had been hacked 
when I booked the air ticket. 
The hacker came from Greece. 
Yes, the hacker took $5,000. I'm not sure if they did. 
206 Yes. 
Yes, because I have lost my 
money for 3,000$ from online 
banking. 
Not applicable 
 
  
 371 
 
Respondent’s 
ID Respondents’ opinions about the vulnerabilities of online banking (I14) 
1 “Uneducated users.” 
2 “Do not know.” 
4 “Easy to guess passwords, bank web sites with only one level of protection, e.g. single password.” 
5 “Password & security # being left lying” 
6 “Only when literature gives on the credit card info.” 
7 “Unsecure, computers and naive computer/Internet users” 
8 
“Personal information is somehow known (either unintentional or stolen) easily guessed 
passwords.” 
9 “Not applicable” 
10 “Not sure.” 
11 “'Phishing'. I do not know what that is.” 
12 “Not enough security.” 
13 
“1. Users careless behaviour. 2. Banking policies including users right to get access to the 
information. 3. Security of banking websites 4. Government policies to deal with system penetrator. 
5. Minor responsibilities go to cyber operators too. There was an incident regarding this matter. 6. 
Some responsibilities to ISPs. If only ISPs have strong firewall or other security measures, it could 
be remarkably reduced.” 
14 “People trust email.” 
15 “Low security standards->” 
16 “I don't know.” 
17 
“1. If we provide our personal detail to others. 2. If we lose our purse/bag having bank details. 3. If 
we use our date of birth as password.” 
18 “Due to man people do not have enough knowledge to distinguish the phishing.” 
19 “Protecting personal information quite well. Raise strong security service.” 
20 “The victims themselves because they don't know when they pass to their account.” 
21 “Banking security system.” 
22 “Click the unknown website.” 
23 “I am not sure because I have been using internet banking only for 3 months.” 
24 “People do not aware of the risk.” 
25 “No opinion” 
28 “Trustful of clients.” 
29 “I don't know.” 
30 “Gullible/ stupid/ inexperienced users.” 
31 “Maybe the bank's website and the email which bank sent to their customers.” 
32 “Knowledge of online banking and Internet.” 
33 “Security system in bank.” 
35 “Limited layers of password protection.” 
36 “Maybe the system of bank or some bugs of software of personal computer.” 
37 “No enough security program between the bank and the users.” 
38 “People visit the unsafe webpage and put their own information everywhere.” 
41 “No opinion” 
42 “People who save money to banks. 
44 
“Websites that look professional and information that looks legitimate & helps the user gain 
money.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Respondents’ opinions about the vulnerabilities of online banking (I14) 
45 “Easy detectable or easy to hack of the passwords.” 
46 “User ignorance, people not being able to identify what is legal and what could be fake.” 
47 “People are not educated enough in the use of computers to determine what is fake or real.” 
48 
“People are ignorant. Forget the bank's advice re online banking or in a hurry & click & provide 
information without thinking about it. Some emails also manage to look very official & use return 
addresses that mimic a possible email for the bank.” 
49 “Good copy version which is similar to others.” 
50 “A bad security system in online banking may cause phishing to access easily.” 
51 “Websites look real.” 
52 
“People want cheap stuff or free stuff, and click the website which is provided, and fill out the form 
or something in order to get a gift or something.” 
53 
“I think the vulnerable points are not the bank websites but sites/business that sells things on line. 
Once you have given out the card and personal information, it is impossible to know where it goes 
and who has accessed to it.” 
55 
“The carelessness of victim to access the information on website. The reluctance of victim to 
follow the rough information.” 
56 “I'm not sure what phishing is.” 
57 
“Fear of having your account frozen-the shock factor. Fear of being scammed by someone- being 
supposedly "protected' by the scam process. Belief that the scamming process is part of a legitimate 
security upgrade. Masquerading as a legitimate problem with your account- offering a solution.” 
58 
“Some advertisements which are very attractive such as good jobs get money easily. And some 
adult webpages.” 
59 “No opinion” 
60 “Gaining customers users and passwords to hack into the banking system.” 
61 “Really don't know.” 
62 “I have no idea.” 
64 “From user who reckless and careless in security.” 
65 “Gullible people are always easy to be tricked.” 
66 “Not enough awareness of virus, not yet installed anti-virus software.” 
67 
“Poorly designed software of security usability and banking websites, wildly difficult and 
nonstandard authentication methods.” 
68 
“People lack of knowledge about computers and the Internet. And sometimes greed (Nigerian 
scams).” 
69 “People don't always know what is legitimate or not.” 
70 “Passwords. Phishing to fund who my bank is, so they can try to pose as my bank for information.” 
71 “A password that is a birth date, birth year or a password. Something easy to ascertain.” 
72 “The emails often look legitimate.” 
73 “Too complex to remember, in action, and asleep.” 
74 “Irregular checks on the account. Not being aware of all entries- debits and credits.” 
75 “Users’ attention.” 
77 “The curiosity or careless of customers.” 
78 
“People are just aware of the need for security of their personal details. Some people do answer 
these phishing emails unaware of the fact that they are not legitimate emails. For the average person 
there is little or no information available about the need for security only a leaflet maybe from the 
bank.” 
79 
“People are stupid. They don't understand the Internet and the risks. They assume everything is 
legitimate. I'm amazed that phishing works to be honest.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Respondents’ opinions about the vulnerabilities of online banking (I14) 
80 
“1. People do not log out from their online account after log in. 2. Not having an internet 
protection/ firewall on. 3. User does not monitor account on a regular basis.” 
81 “Naive people.” 
82 “People being ignorant of risks.” 
83 “Getting the person's personal information.” 
84 “By requesting details using offer that may appear too good to be true.” 
86 “No opinion” 
111 “Careless use of passwords.” 
154 
“The most vulnerable part of the system is the human elements. It doesn’t matter how effective the 
technical increases are if the customer allows their own part of the system to be compromised.” 
165 “It is just too easy, and most people are unaware of the dangerous of online phishing.” 
180 
“The awareness of the end user. Not being clearly focused and awake at the moment you login 
also.” 
181 “Almost perfect duplication of a website / email and Users lack of Internet Security knowledge.” 
189 
“Banks not using secure web, strong password, lack of user awareness, not using anti- virus, anti-
spyware, anti-malware programs etc.” 
191 “Not protected by internet security software.” 
196 “Cheating the customer for PIN no.” 
207 “Access point.” 
 
 
Respondent’s 
ID 
Discussion about methods that respondents used, or would use, to protect themselves or to 
solve the problems caused phishers (I15) 
1 “No opinion” 
4 “Maintain a complex password and changed to a bank with better online security.” 
5 “Would call the bank.” 
6 “No opinion.” 
7 
“Excellent computer security software and only one person do the Internet banking & only one 
computer.” 
8 “Ask. Double check.” 
9 “No opinion.” 
10 “Fortunately I haven't had any problems.” 
11 “Contact bank and change password.” 
12 “Anti-phishing. Anti-Spyware.” 
13 “No opinion.” 
14 “Only respond to trusted emails.” 
15 “Keep my security Program up to date.” 
16 “No, but not sure.” 
17 
“1. The best way to protect is don't give personal detail to others unknown people.2. Do not uses 
date of birth as password? 3. Contact bank time to time concerning transaction.” 
18 “Pay much more attentions.” 
19 
“Never tell other about my personal detail information. Or I navel use my personal information 
online.” 
20 “I always change my password.” 
21 “Keep my personal information secret and follow the direction of security system.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Discussion about methods that respondents used, or would use, to protect themselves or to 
solve the problems caused phishers (I15) 
22 “Changing all passwords as soon as possible. 
23 “More careful while using webpage. Ensuring the webpage is correct.” 
24 “No opinion.” 
25 “I used anti-virus to protect my computer from hackers.” 
26 “Use my own laptop. Also, log on and log off all the time.” 
27 “Change my password.” 
28 
“Do not provide any private information by mail or by phone. If you have some doubts about some 
requests for information, go to the bank office directly.” 
29 “No opinion.” 
30 “No opinion.” 
31 
“I will clear my computer every week, not log on some strange websites, and not download some 
illegal software.” 
32 “Use online banking at home and use difficult password.” 
33 “I did not do anything.” 
34 “I will complain and require that bank for the details.” 
35 “No opinion.” 
36 “In my opinion, just rely on anti-virus software.” 
37 “Trying to find out the best software and not using Internet banking twice a day.” 
38 “Visit the legitimate webpage and protect own information.” 
40 “Call bank.” 
41 “Do not use online banking.” 
42 “Set password carefully.” 
44 “Change password. Always contact the bank concerning emails that ask for information.” 
45 “Use uncommon passwords & change them regularly.” 
46 
“I read all I could about phishing scams. I was also educated about phishing attack during my time 
at university, but only because I did a computer security course.” 
48 “Do not open email from any bank.” 
49 “I don't know.” 
50 “I delete or ignore all phishing.” 
51 “I look at the URL and go from my own favourite link.” 
52 “Don't believe any cheap or discount staff from unknown website or spam.” 
53 
“I RARELY buy things online. I usually access sites that I know to be reputable-Ticketmaster, 
Name Brand retailers etc. I still don't know if they are 100% safe, but they seem less likely to be 
operating scams.” 
55 “Carefully check the information on an unidentified email that ask to follow doing something.” 
57 
“Delete any emails from banks. If I need information I phone them or login to my online banking 
facility.” 
58 
“Never click in some website which I never heard and not familiar at all. And never believe the 
advertisement which looks very fake.” 
64 “Always observe strange email and don't fill in personal detail if unnecessary.” 
65 “Get a password that doesn't make sense at all. Be a security freak.” 
66 “Installed anti-virus software.” 
67 
“I use cryptographically secured password, and very vigilant when using online banking, I only use 
my PC- NO NET CAFE.” 
68 “No opinion.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Discussion about methods that respondents used, or would use, to protect themselves or to 
solve the problems caused phishers (I15) 
69 “The bank fixed it.” 
70 “No opinion.” 
71 “No opinion.” 
72 “No opinion.” 
73 “Caution, research, protection.” 
74 “Monitor my account closely. Check all entries-debits and credits and query with the bank.” 
75 “No opinion.” 
77 “Be careful. Don't easily get into those websites you didn't know.” 
78 
“Installed an anti-virus program and I keep it up to date. Before I go onto Internet banking I check 
my anti-virus status.” 
79 “Information is power. Learn about how you can minimise risks.” 
80 
“1. Wait for log out successful webpage to pop up before closing the window. 2. Turn on internet 
security. 3 Regularly check bank statement to monitor any suspicious withdrawal so as to take 
action immediately.” 
81 “I regularly change passwords; banking site has a click keyboard and is not keyboard entry.” 
82 
“Most banking phishing (that I know of) is by fake e-mails from bank with links to phishing sites. I 
don't use links from bank emails.” 
83 “I did nothing.” 
84 
“Rang the people and got their details i.e. fullname, employee numbers, and requested that they 
take the matter up with their suspicious. Then I requested a follow up and call from their supervisor 
as well as a letter of apology.” 
85 “Always contact the bank, for more information.” 
178 
“Once my money had been taken out. I contacted the bank and I waited for 3 months for bank to 
investigate and to get money back.” 
181 
“Questionnaires to the bank during the application for an online account & reconfirmation with the 
bank if the Users receive any email from the bank.” 
189 “Always use anti-spyware programs, beware of suspicious links and webpages.” 
191 “Install Internet software protection.” 
196 “Ask the bank manager.” 
207 “Keep everything confidential.” 
 
Respondent’s 
ID Respondents’ opinions about installing an anti-malware application (I16) 
1 “No, the user still needs to be aware.” 
2 “Do not know anything about Trojan etc.” 
3 
“No. People installed with 'Rader Love' /cybernetics and who 'enjoy communication or live in 
community with others who are the same may have no problem in accessing personal information 
illegally.” 
4 “Yes.” 
5 “That's all I have.” 
6 “Yes, hope so.” 
7 “It is half the solution.” 
8 “No. There are stronger viruses that can break into the firewall and steal information.” 
9 
“Anti-spyware and anti-virus is a must. But one has to also be careful in using your bank details i.e. 
shopping online. Check to see if webpage is secured.” 
10 “Unsure what level Trojans can now attack.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Respondents’ opinions about installing an anti-malware application (I16) 
11 “Yes.” 
12 “Yes, I updated regularly.” 
13 
“Absolutely not. System penetration could be done by a variety of methods. So, penetrator may not 
use the same form of method to access information all the time.” 
14 “Yes.” 
15 “No, learn about security.” 
16 “No, but not sure.” 
17 
“No, because there must be more powerful virus than this. But this anti-virus cannot secure 
computer 100%.” 
18 “Yes.” 
19 “Yes, I think so.” 
20 “I don't think so because the program to break these anti-viruses is improved.” 
21 “Not enough because some hackers still can attack people.” 
22 “Yes.” 
23 “If you have registered version of anti-virus in your computer. It may help to protect.” 
24 
“No as you should not leave permanent information on the Internet. However, installing anti-virus 
program is a start, but you also have to be aware.” 
25 “Yes, I think that these are almost secure my computer from attacked.” 
26 “Yes.” 
28 
“It is an essential measure, but it is not enough protection. Because each new released of anti-virus 
programs is the base for creating a new virus program.” 
29 “Probably 100% safe, but I'm not sure why.” 
30 
“Depends on product and source of product. I am sure that computer use can be monitored by 
scanning devices but it would need to expend a lot of time/money for uncertain possibility of 
reward.” 
31 
“Yes, to most of the computer users. Their way to protect their computer is very simple, so it is easy 
to be attacked.” 
32 “No. These things cannot find the newest virus.” 
33 “Yes, I think so.” 
34 “Yes, it will help.” 
35 “Helps with viruses but maybe not specific attacks.” 
36 “For my situation is enough.” 
37 
“No, because many viruses have ability to break the anti-virus. Anti-virus companies improved their 
programs, the Trojans and any viruses have also improved their ability to break it.” 
38 “Yes, I do.” 
40 “Yes.” 
41 
“No, it still has some viruses in my computer even people use anti-virus to protect online banking as 
well.” 
42 “Yes, these can secure your computer.” 
44 “No, in my opinion, it only protects the computer itself (not your personal information).” 
45 “No, I think there is more secure protecting software.” 
46 
“No, because if you visit insecure sites then you can pick up new viruses. Also, if you are unaware 
about what information you release into the web then you can be attacked.” 
47 
“No, because there is always someone who has enough skills/technology to hack your computer. 
Those who can probably are not interested in hacking the average citizen.” 
48 
“Need to do both - install security and take common sense precautious when dealing with private 
information.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Respondents’ opinions about installing an anti-malware application (I16) 
49 “Yes, it does help to protect.” 
50 
“No, because some programs cannot kill it or some programs are out of date to kill new types of 
Trojans.” 
51 “Yes.” 
52 
“That's not enough. Security software is needed in my computer, and account security management 
software as well.” 
53 “I don't know enough about those applications.” 
54 
“I think it is the best place to start, but there are other steps that can be taken like changing 
passwords regularly, and making passwords more detailed and harder to figure out from personal 
information” 
55 “No. it depends on a user himself to be careful about the received information.” 
56 
“I assume it is sufficient because I don't know of other software. I believe my bank now provides 
security software to increase security.” 
57 
“No. It's also crucial to be vigilant about emails offering prizes, helps, and free deals. "If it looks too 
good to be true, it is too good to be true." I also avoid suspect sites and check the origins of these 
mails. Many come from anonymous remailers and have bogus return address. I have black hole 
spam filters set up on my mail server, and brute force protection there, too. And I have my 
minimum of 8 characters, upper and lowercase and punctuation and am randomly generated. I run 
firewalls, antivirus that are auto updated and I have scheduled anti spyware scams. My critical data 
is backed up on an external drive, the family archives are in two places.” 
58 
“Not enough because the virus types are changing all the time. Some protection software does not 
work in some cases. From my point of view, everyone should increase their knowledge for how to 
reduce the risk when using Internet.” 
59 “No opinion” 
60 
“It will help. No system would be 100% secure. Hackers or fraudulent people will not ever stop 
trying.” 
61 “Anti-virus and anti-spyware is good only if it is up-to-date.” 
62 “My computer is a company laptop which has anti-virus installed and updated regularly.” 
63 “No.” 
64 “Yes, I do.” 
65 “I don't believe/trust anything absolutely.” 
66 “So far, I think so, but we need to choose a good anti-virus.” 
67 
“No- Zero day exploits and new viruses often circumvent this kind of software, and it can only 
prevent a small class of exploits.” 
68 “No. These programs can't stop you giving away your information if you get tricked into it.” 
69 
“Probably not sufficient. My only machine is lunched to the net through a firewall and they also 
have anti-virus software, but spam still gets through.” 
70 “It's a start, but I think you need a variety of measures.” 
71 
“I think that if someone REALLY can’t to get into an account they will find a way. The only thing 
we can do is follow the security advice the bank gives us.” 
72 
“Anti-virus software etc. is added protection, stealth software is also useful (if they can't see you 
they can't attack you) plus a common sense approach to suspect emails.” 
73 “Yes.” 
74 “I think it is a combination of spyware and checking accounts.” 
75 “I don't know.” 
77 
“No. That software can prevent most of virus from your computer, but not at all. Every anti-virus 
has its weakness. If you don't update on time, it increases the risk to be attacked.” 
78 “Yes. By a using a reputable one and if it is kept up to date.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID Respondents’ opinions about installing an anti-malware application (I16) 
79 
“No. not enough. These software packages help but the hackers are always one step ahead. The 
software responds to new attack methods so they are always behind.” 
80 
“No. Internet hackers are intelligent. If they want to hack into your account, they'll have hacked into 
the main bank organisation, not just from remote monitoring of customer's everyday usage.” 
81 “No.” 
82 “Keeps you really safe from spyware and Trojans if updated regularly.” 
83 “Probably it may help but not greatly.” 
84 
“No. Quite often it takes the simplest of ideas to fool any system like the old saying ‘Nothing is 
foolproof’.” 
85 “I am with Micro Trend and never been attacked before.” 
86 
“Depends on the software but I usually have 3 types of software and this appears not to have any 
problem.” 
143 “Yes.” 
149 “Yes. Depending on the anti-virus.” 
165 “No, because they know how to get around things like that.” 
177 “No. Computer hackers are very skilled.” 
180 
“No, if my computer is going to be attacked it can be attacked by a number of other things outside 
the classical virus/Trojan. Plus, virus coders always are a step ahead than anti-virus coders.” 
181 
“It would reduce the risk and exposure, but Users security and reconfirmation with bank is a must 
before answering / replying any emails from bank.” 
187 “Somehow safe.” 
189 “Yes up to certain level, but still other security features and user awareness are important factors.” 
191 “Yes.” 
194 “Yes.” 
196 “Yes.” 
207 “No. You have to be vigilant of these attacks as well.” 
208 “No.” 
209 “No, you will still be vulnerable to phishing emails.” 
 
Respondent’s 
ID 
Respondents’ opinions about countermeasures that could secure them against various kinds 
of online banking attacks (I17) 
1 “Being aware, limiting online banking activities.” 
2 “Do not know.” 
3 
“Again, ISP's anti-virus software and software designers in general, legislation and in particular 
log.” 
4 
“I question every web page that I go to if I haven't specifically entered the URL or already trust the 
web.” 
5 “Don't know.” 
6 “Friends to be more vigilant in warning me.” 
7 “Not letting kids use the computer that banking is done on.” 
8 “Don't respond to junk or supposed "scam" mails that are obvious and should not be trusted.” 
9 “Never give my details to anyone that I don't know.” 
10 “I always 'junk' emails that I'm unsure of.” 
11 
“I don't access account often+ change password every 6 months. I don't use birthday, maiden 
name.” 
12 “Don't open emails I not sure who is from.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Respondents’ opinions about countermeasures that could secure them against various kinds 
of online banking attacks (I17) 
13 
“1. Never revealed your important information. 2. Ensure the legitimacy of the information 
provided.” 
14 “Have anti-virus software that is updated regularly.” 
15 “Never open an email from person I do not know.” 
16 “I don't know.” 
17 
“If you are not sure whether the email comes from bank or not, then go to the bank and talk with 
them” 
18 
“I think people should have basic ability to distinguish the phishing activities or the bank should 
pay much more attentions.” 
19 “Use your related information as less as possible in public place or online.” 
20 “I ignore any strange mails.” 
21 “Keep personal information secret.” 
22 “Do not open the strange e-mails and websites.” 
23 “E-mails, webpages can be stopped by report them as abuse.” 
24 “Limit contacts and friends on the Internet, only use "secure" sources.” 
25 “I secure with combination in the keyboard and symbols and characters and numbers.” 
26 “Use complicated password.” 
28 “Do not be trustful. Do not provide your secret personal bank information to anyone.” 
29 “Use common sense. Be suspicious.” 
30 “Software methods- access methods in how pages are selected.” 
31 “Do not open the strange emails or websites.” 
32 “Do not tell anyone about my personal information on the Internet.” 
33 “I don't usually do not surfing and avoid entering my information in any website.” 
34 “No opinion.” 
35 “No opinion.” 
36 
“Don't open any strange website. Sometime the link which sometime can attack you, just don't click 
it.” 
37 “Normal programme is enough to secure myself with changing password weekly.” 
38 “Be alert about those attacks.” 
41 “Don't put much true details of yourself on the Internet.” 
42 “Don't use personal information.” 
44 “Usually if it offers a "too good to be true" deal, I disregard or call to clarify.” 
45 “Do not open emails that do not look legitimate and do not click on the links provided.” 
46 
“I do my major banking transaction behind the work formally. I also don't use my credit card for 
payment.” 
47 “Rely on anti-virus/spyware/Trojan software and common sense.” 
48 
“I don't know phishing emails only use the computer with the university’s firewall, even when 
working from home.” 
49 “Report spam and response that email.” 
50 “Using antivirus program and do not open any phishing.” 
51 “Don't click on links from emails or follow links to unknown places or companies.” 
52 “Don't believe any cheap or discount stuff from unknown website or person.” 
53 “I only use a work email and it has a very high-level of security.” 
54 “I am not familiar with the term phishing.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Respondents’ opinions about countermeasures that could secure them against various kinds 
of online banking attacks (I17) 
55 
“1. Carefully check the source of email and check the detail in the email before processing 
something.” 
56 “I assume from running anti-virus software regularly & keeping it up to date.” 
57 
“Delete any email from banks and other unknown sources without opening them. Never open a link 
from an unknown source If you must do so, then do it from a virtual machine that can be trashed 
and rebuilt Use a firewall with an auto updating blacklists, use an anti-spyware program with 
updating blacklists. Protect your email account with spanassasin. Demand identification from 
banks. Reply to borderline suspect emails to see if you get a response. Check grammar carefully in 
email from possibly legit sources. Check with the real organisation to see if they sent you mail.” 
58 “Install protection software and firewalls. And remember not to trust someone or webpages easily.” 
59 “I have Internet security and firewall.” 
60 
“Employer issues warnings on possible phishing emails. I never open emails when I don't know 
who has sent them. I delete them.” 
61 “I don't know.” 
62 
“Again as my laptop is a company laptop, all anti-virus programs are installed & updated 
regularly.” 
64 “Users need to observe before click on strange email or webpage.” 
65 “I trust to be a security freak of myself.” 
66 “Use anti-virus, don't trust the content of the email easily.” 
67 “Good understanding of email, website authentication and security concerns.” 
68 “Simply check URL, and 'from addresses' of any webpage or email I interact with.” 
69 “Change passwords.” 
70 “I turn the computer off when I'm not using it. Change the password often.” 
71 “Delete them or send them to the bank so they are aware it is happening.” 
72 “Common sense and anti-virus software.” 
73 “Install Norton and also care to detail.” 
74 “Delete cookies, check account regularly, use spyware, have a secure firewall.” 
75 “Confirm website address before use.” 
77 “Keep away from anything suspicious.” 
78 
“By being alert to the fact that they happen. If I have any doubts about a site I do not leave any 
personal details.” 
79 
“Delete all emails from banks. Never respond to any request for personal details in email. Have 
strong passwords, and change them often. Ensure you are using the correct URL for your bank.” 
80 “Use anti-spyware & virus protection.” 
81 “Anti-phishing software for email and web browser.” 
82 “Never enter personal data into anything.” 
83 “Do not give any private information online or through phone. Face to face is the best.” 
84 
“I have 2 e-mails. One is used purely for business and my most trusted associates and the other is 
used should I need to provide one to an unfamiliar party.” 
85 “Install anti-virus/software.” 
86 “I usually do not answer or go to a site that I am not aware of.” 
107 “Don't open them.” 
128 
“I'm very cautious about any emails that I receive especially if they are not people on my contact 
list.” 
140 “Deny anything that are not requested or known by me.” 
149 “Install a good firewall and spam detector.” 
 381 
 
Respondent’s 
ID 
Respondents’ opinions about countermeasures that could secure them against various kinds 
of online banking attacks (I17) 
165 “Unsure, will research it after completing this quiz.” 
177 “Do not give personal details/or any details.” 
180 “Be more paranoid. Seriously doesn't happen very often to me.” 
181 
“Confirmation before and after any transactions is a must & keeping ourselves updated with 
banking news (threats, cases, additional online security features & etc.).” 
189 
“Being alert of suspicious webpages, using security software, reporting any suspicious attack to the 
bank.” 
191 “Don't open strange email & links.” 
196 “Prohibit or refuse to accept phishing e-mails.” 
207 “Updating protecting software whenever possible.” 
208 
“Be aware of it and not giving any personal information to anyone or showing some of your 
personal information in public such as Facebook or Twitter.” 
209 
“Only use trusted websites loaded from saved links. Also I ensure that for every website I sign up 
to I use a completely different password that is completely random instead of using a "global" 
password that a website could capture and use at other sites you visit.” 
 
 
Respondent’s 
ID 
Comments or additional opinions about the current or future situations of online scamming 
(I18) 
1 “No opinion.” 
2 “No opinion.” 
3 “Not at this point.” 
4 “Improve login security for online banking.” 
5 “No opinion” 
6 “No opinion” 
7 
“The banks are group to have to stay accountable and educated as the crooks out there are really 
computer savoy.” 
9 “No opinion.” 
10 “No opinion.” 
11 “Not really.” 
12 “TV commercials to educate users.” 
13 
“1. ANZ has particularly started refunding the amount that customer loose in fraudulent activities. 
It is most welcome step which other banks have to immediately follow. 2. Financial institutions 
need to be more responsible and active in order to control such criminal activities. 3. Government 
should come with strong policies in against of such activities and in collaboration with financial 
institutions. 4. A number of social awareness program can be run (Unfortunately I have not seen 
any social awareness program in order to secure customers/individuals from predictors) 5. 
Commonwealth has SMS notification method which allows users to know about their spending.” 
14 “No.” 
15 “Improve the security mechanism.” 
16 “No.” 
17 “No comments.” 
18 “No opinion” 
19 “Use your related information as less as possible in public place or online.” 
20 “Bank always asks people to change their passwords.” 
21 “Improve bank security system.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Comments or additional opinions about the current or future situations of online scamming 
(I18) 
22 “No opinion.” 
23 “If the cybercrime continues to increase then bank should spend more money on Internet security.” 
24 
“I use a digipass from my bank. 1 Personal code to access digipass.2. I type 8 numbers to get a code 
displayed in a digipass on a secure webpage. The security level of encryption is quite good-random 
digits. I believe that "hack" bank webpage is very difficult but possible. However, if money is 
stolen by phishing or similar cases, bank should compensate for it.” 
26 “No opinion.” 
28 
“The method of banking attacks will improve in the future, because of improving security systems. 
Bank should spend more money to implement the newest security technologies and it will influence 
to clients expenses for bank services.” 
29 “I guess the problem is getting worse.” 
30 “No opinion.” 
32 “We cannot solve these problems.” 
33 “We have to secure our bank by ourselves, not rely on the bank much.” 
34 “Strong password required. Bank should have a very good security system.” 
35 “No opinion.” 
36 “Improve the bank system. Improve the bank identity security such as SMS security.” 
37 “No opinion.” 
38 “No opinion.” 
41 “No opinion.” 
44 “No opinion.” 
45 “No opinion.” 
46 
“EDUCATED YOUR USERS! How about using your advertising budget to provide some user 
education on TV!” 
47 
“If people look the time to read the policies and terms of agreement, less people would fell for the 
scams.” 
48 “The banks need to be more protective about banking users about security issues & private use.” 
49 
“It is a good topic and in the future, organisation must adapt changes to sustain in business from 
this source.” 
50 “Should provide more online security system.” 
51 “No opinion.” 
53 “No opinion.” 
54 
“I almost feel that my online account is safer than the account linked to my debit card. There have 
been more incidents that I know of recently where people have had their accounts attacked after 
having used their cards at EFTPOS machines and ATMs.” 
55 “No opinion.” 
56 
“Banks have a responsibility to provide a safe environment for online banking as it is in the banks' 
interests & to have allow customers visiting branches in person. Banks do not have enough physical 
branches to allow all their customers to visit & do their banking in person.” 
57 
“We had better come up with a physical or biometric solution pretty fast if we're going to stay 
source. I'm OK about having an ID chip implanted, or using a fingerprint scan or finger length scan 
for ID.” 
58 “No opinion.” 
59 “Get to know how your bank operates.” 
60 
“Online banking attacks will keep on happening. Banks need to be always on the lookout for new 
ways of phishing or hacking. Customers always need to keep checking statements and beware of 
any changes.” 
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Respondent’s 
ID 
Comments or additional opinions about the current or future situations of online scamming 
(I18) 
61 “I would like my bank to tell me more about the risks and signs of phishing.” 
62 “No opinion.” 
63 “More education from banks would be ideal.” 
64 “Bank's webpage can notice or warn to user about phishing or spyware before log in.” 
65 “All they care is changing you, not actually providing services.” 
66 “No opinion.” 
68 “No opinion.” 
69 “Keep us informed.” 
70 “I think people need more information on how to protect themselves.” 
71 
“I believe my bank has good online security; however, I have not yet had this tested by fraudulent 
activity.” 
72 “No opinion.” 
73 “No problem so far.” 
74 “Using online site is a risk. Place limits on your accounts and check regularly and notify the bank.” 
75 “Users must be careful and banks must be responsible.” 
77 “No opinion.” 
78 
“Unfortunately, the banks and anti-virus organisations can only be reactivating rather than 
proactive as it is unknown what new Trojans, spyware or adware are being developed.” 
80 
“Make sure no one else knows your log in details. Do not log onto Internet banking more than 10 
minutes per session. Using net code security token.” 
82 “No opinion.” 
83 “No opinion.” 
84 
“Although the world is a much busier place, there still needs to be time made for phone calls. Most 
emails leave questions that can only be ensured by a person not a computer.” 
85 “No opinion” 
86 “No opinion” 
107 
“Senior manager need to be vigilant with problems instead of results. The banking ombudsman 
needs to be actively involved.” 
140 “It's the option to use the fingerprint. An acceptable finger will further prevent copying.” 
143 
“Banks should invest lots of money to look after our money. As we trust them with our money, 
they are responsible for it. As they make money from our money, so they have to look after it.” 
149 “No.” 
165 
“I'd like to see that innocent people do not get attacked by things like these, and if they do the bank 
takes responsibility and pay for any losses.” 
180 
“Stop thinking that customers are going to run away if you spend a little longer making sure that 
they are, who they are, when using your services.” 
181 
“Banks should regularly run the test to ensure their online features, updating & increasing online 
security, face-to-face exposure and educating users is a must before any online account application 
is done.” 
 
